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Abstract 
Spinoffs are companies based on university intellectual property established to 
commercialize university technology to the marketplace. The objective of this study 
was to examine the reasons for the rapid diffusion of spinoffs in the UK, as well as 
the potential effects of these companies on university resource acquisition. The study 
used two broad theoretical perspectives from the sociology of organizations: 
institutional theory and organizational ecology. It blended elements from other related 
perspectives such as organizational evolution and social exchange theory.  
Driven by the need to establish a full database of spinoffs for the first time, 
quantitative data collection and analysis techniques were predominantly employed. 
The emerging database comprised of nearly 9 million datapoints capturing the full 
population of university spinoffs (and their demographics) by all English and Scottish 
universities over a period of 15 years (1993-2007). Qualitative exploratory data 
collection methods were also used to supplement the design and structure of the 
study, including hypothesis formation. In total, 6 in-depth interviews with 
Technology Transfer Managers were conducted at a representative number of 
universities across England and Scotland.  
The study identified the role of certain environmental, institutional factors in shaping 
the decision by universities to adopt spinoff formation as a standard practice. Such 
factors were the role of networking, social compliance, industry associations, and 
media information providers. It also demonstrated that spinoff formation gradually 
but significantly enhanced university financial resources over time. The study finally 
discussed the process of coevolution of universities and spinoffs as distinct 
populations of organizations within the community of academic entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, the discussion moved towards building a new theory of “reciprocal 
legitimacy”.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In the last two decades, the importance of university technology 
commercialization has attracted the interest of numerous researchers. In the United 
Kingdom, university commercial activities accelerated in the 1990’s, a period when 
many educational institutions established Technology Transfer Offices (Wright, 
Vohora and Lockett, 2002). In this context, a principal route for university technology 
transfer to the marketplace has been the establishment of spinoff firms. Spinoffs are 
organizations founded to exploit a piece of intellectual property created in an 
academic institution. Early rough estimates reported that British universities 
generated 338 spinoff firms between 1996-2000 with 175 spinoffs incorporated in 
2001 alone (Charles and Conway, 2001). This enthusiasm for spinoff generation has 
recently been matched by academia, resulting in a significant increase in the amount 
of research devoted to the phenomenon.  
Despite the above estimates, so far there had been no unified database of UK 
spinoffs and various industry- and government-sponsored reports have lamented its 
absence. This has been a core motivation for my study: lack of data makes research 
on spinoffs harder and hampers policy initiatives aimed at improving university 
technology transfer. Second, extant research on university spinoffs has been rather 
unidirectional. It has mainly focused on why spinoffs are necessary for the local or 
national economy (Shane, 2004a) or on methods to enhance spinoff formation among 
universities. Yet, we know little about the exact conditions under which they spread. 
The first research question of this study is therefore “how did spinoffs spread?”. It is 
well known that in the early 1990’s there was certainly some opposition to these 
companies, as active community members considered them risky and dangerous for 
the mission of contemporary universities. There was also lack of expertise in 
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establishing spinoffs. How did universities overcome environmental uncertainty and 
practical obstacles such as these to engage in spinoff formation? Was it a purely 
rational decision or not? Extant research has also omitted to consider whether 
universities benefited from commercial activities. The second research question of 
this study is obviously “how did spinoffs affect university resource acquisition?”.  
As mentioned, a core challenge in this work has been the construction of a full 
university spinoff database. I consulted numerous public sources and contacted 
virtually every single UK university to collect information on spinoffs. I also spoke 
with Technology Transfer Officers at a number of educational institutions in order to 
understand the spinoff phenomenon prior to forming testable hypotheses. The breadth 
of information collected allowed me to look at spinoffs over time, as my database 
spanned over 15 years. It also helped me study spinoffs and theorize at multiple levels 
of analysis: the individual spinoff, the population of spinoffs, and the academic 
entrepreneurship community that includes spinoffs and universities alike.  
My research hypotheses are grounded in the sociology of organizations and, in 
particular, institutional theory, and organizational ecology and evolution. Instead of 
looking at static explanations of the spinoff diffusion process or the spinoff-related 
benefits on universities, these perspectives have allowed me to look at the wider 
environmental context of university spinoff formation. For example, I examine the 
impact of environmental pressures from the government and other institutions upon 
the decisions of universities to form spinoffs over time. I also examine the 
coevolution of spinoffs and universities as communities of organizations over time, 
drawing parallels with symbiotic relationships of biological species. Because of the 
complexity of the spinoff phenomenon, I have used various other theoretical 
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perspectives closely linked to the ones mentioned above, such as diffusion and 
management fashion theories as appropriate.  
This documents is structured as follows. First, I present an overview of the 
literature on the university spinoffs phenomenon identifying recent trends and gaps 
that need to be filled. In chapter 3, I review the main tenets of institutional theory and 
organizational legitimacy as well as ecological theories of organizational change that 
will be used throughout the next chapters. Chapter 4 presents my first empirical study 
that examines the first research question on the diffusion of UK spinoffs. The next 
chapter deals with the second research question, looking at potential financial benefits 
of spinoff formation to universities. Finally, drawing parallels from biology, chapter 6 
presents a novel conceptualization on the coevolution of spinoffs and universities as 
two different species in an ecological community. In the last chapter, I provide an 
overview of the findings and conclusions of this study, suggesting directions for 
future research.  
A final note on the format of this thesis: A lot of the information presented in 
chapters 2 and 3, including theoretical and phenomenological definitions as well as 
methodological approaches are repeated or supplemented in chapters 5-7 where the 
empirical research and findings are presented. The reason for this is that, chapters 5, 6 
and 7 follow the template of research papers published in academic journals. Thus, to 
give a precise overview of each of these independent research projects, I included 
there information that may have been presented at earlier chapters. For the same 
reasons, chapters 5-7 are written in first plural to reflect the fact that they represent 
joint work with my main advisor during my studies.  
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2. SPINOFF PHENOMENON 
University spinoffs and, more generally, academic entrepreneurship have 
attracted the attention of an ever higher number of scholars internationally. According 
to Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang (2007), there have been 173 journal papers on 
academic entrepreneurship and, according to Djokovic and Souitaris (2008), 103 
papers specifically dedicated to academic spinoffs only in the past few decades. 
Shane (2004a) was one of the leading authors in providing a comprehensive review of 
the literature on the spinoff phenomenon. His seminal book on academic 
entrepreneurship describes the major developments in the field of spinoff formation 
and technology transfer. His work starts by answering the questions of why and how 
university spinoffs emerged in a historical context, and provides evidence on the 
establishment process, outcomes, performance determinants and problems of 
university spinoffs.  
Rothaermel et al. (2008) distinguish four major research areas in the field: a) 
the entrepreneurial research university, b) productivity of the Technology Transfer 
Office, c) new firm creation and d) environmental context and networks of 
innovation. Each of these domains answers specific questions – for instance, domain 
(a) looks at university cooperation agreements, licensing, marketing activities and the 
role of science/incubation parks. Domain (b) examines the varying degree of 
autonomy of the TTO, its policy on equity stakes, and its performance in terms of 
spinoffs formation and licensing deals. The third research stream, which is most 
relevant to my work, focuses specifically on spinoffs looking at issues such as 
venture capital availability, IPOs, and the growth and performance of spinoffs. The 
final domain emphasizes the role of the larger environment within which universities 
are embedded and identifies four factors that define academic entrepreneurship, i.e. 
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networks with other universities, science parks, business incubators and university 
geographic location (Rothaermel et al., 2008). 
Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) distinguish among macro-, meso- and micro- 
level research studies. At the macro level, they argue that government and industry 
support mechanisms and incentives, as well as the role of the technology and market 
conditions are important determinants of inventions commercialization. At the meso 
level, the authors argue that spinoff formation is determined by university support 
mechanisms and individual strategies. Finally, at the micro level of analysis, their 
attention shifts to the imprinting effects of the founding conditions including the 
composition and characteristics of the founding team and their networking with the 
university and the industry, as well as the actual performance of the spinoffs 
themselves (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008). 
My purpose in this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive literature review of 
the phenomenon beyond those of Rothaermel et al. (2008), Djokovic and Souitaris 
(2008), and Shane (2004a). Instead, I will use these reviews to reveal several research 
gaps in the literature that will help situate my own research in this large body of 
scholarly work. In particular, I wish to focus on four major issues that I examine 
theoretically and empirically in the next chapters and that are important for 
methodological, analytical and theoretical reasons. These are:  
 definitions and length of databases used 
 levels of analysis used 
 explanations for spinoff diffusion, and 
 outcomes of spinoff activity  
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2.1. Definitions and length of databases used 
Although there is no objection to using survey research methods to examine 
spinoffs, I consider it as astonishing that after 25 years of work in the field, we still 
have no unified longitudinal database of spinoffs in any country. But I first need to 
clarify what I mean by spinoffs. Shane defines academic spinoffs as “new companies 
founded to exploit a piece of intellectual property created in an academic institution” 
(2004a: 4). Pirnay, Surlemont and Nlemvo (2003) define university spinoffs as “new 
firms created to exploit commercially some knowledge, technology or research 
results developed within a university” and Lockett and Wright (2005) and Nicolaou 
and Birley (2003) provide similar descriptions. A major source of confusion, which 
could potentially hamper efforts to quantify the spinoff activity in a certain country, is 
the use of start-up firms established by former university employees as alternatives to 
spinoffs. Shane argues that “Companies established by current or former members of 
a university, which do not commercialize intellectual property created in academic 
institutions are not included in the spinoff definition. Thus, university spinoffs are a 
subset of all start-up companies created by the students and employees of academic 
institutions” (2004a: 4). He rejects other authors’ definitions, such as Roberts (1991) 
who consider as spinoffs companies founded by anyone who has studied or worked at 
a university. 
When I mention university spinoffs, I therefore refer to a definition that 
existing databases or scientific papers often confuse with ordinary startups. As I argue 
in my methodology chapter, the first contribution of this study is the construction of a 
single, unified, complete database of all UK spinoffs. This has important implications 
for how we understand and interpret the spinoff industry. In their reviews, 
Rothaermel et al. (2008) and Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) provide examples of 
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papers where the authors have made no or limited efforts to validate that firms in their 
samples fully match Shane’s definition. For example, Grandi and Grimaldi (2005) 
refer to “university startups” instead of spinoffs and Mansfield (1991, 1998) assesses 
industry startups based on university inventions – something quite different from 
academic spinoffs (cf. Nerkar and Shane, 2003). Similarly, Lockett and Wright 
(2005) use a survey methodology that does not guarantee whether firms in their 
sample are actually spinoffs. 
The second issue with the datasets used in the literature is their length. 
Sampling can be biased compared to population or census data due to 
responding/selection bias, time/historical effects and other contextual factors. For 
instance, Lockett and Wright (2005) use university data over only two years to 
examine the determinants of spinoff formation. Their sample of spinoff “birth” events 
consists of only 62 responding universities capturing spinoffs formed during that 
limited timeframe1. Grandi and Grimaldi (2005) use a similarly limited sample (42) 
of university “startups”. Perhaps due to these restrictions in data availability, in the 
academic entrepreneurship literature there is disproportionate representation of 
university licensing and patenting activity (where data is available) relative to spinoff 
activity (e.g. Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003; Sampat, 2006; Sine, Shane and 
DiGregorio, 2003; Shane, 2004b). 
2.2. Levels of analysis used 
Consequently, a relevant methodological issue has to do with the level of 
analysis employed by scholars. Researchers have routinely used the individual 
university or spinoff as the unit of analysis, as data limitations restrict higher level 
analyses. In my third conceptual paper, I am able to examine the interdependence of 
                                                          
1
 Contrast this with my own panel database of all 1,404 spinoffs by 113 universities over 15 years 
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spinoffs and universities as two distinct industries/communities that coevolve (Astley, 
1985). This chapter attempts to develop theory without the use of actual data – but 
having an overview of the field through my database has been instrumental in doing 
so. Current methodological approaches have made it impossible to also look at 
demographic (Carroll and Hannan, 2000) or population (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) 
effects on the birth and death rates of spinoffs within specific geographic locations or 
other established criteria. Finally, the breadth of the datasets used has made 
researchers unable to examine the long-term effects of environmental or institutional 
factors on the emergence, growth and taken-for-grandedness of the spinoff industry 
over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
2.3. Explanations for spinoff diffusion  
A key theme regarding the spinoff phenomenon is the question of why did it 
actually emerge against other, traditional methods of university technology transfer 
such as technology licensing. There is ample evidence on this central question and I 
here wish to provide a short summary of the theoretical perspectives and findings 
presented in the literature. A stream of research in academic entrepreneurship has 
examined environmental factors that predict a smooth transfer of technology to the 
market. Prominent among these factors are the existence of a venture capital industry 
willing to invest in early-stage technologies or a well functioning financial market 
such as NASDAQ or the Alternative Market in London (Shane, 2004a). Another 
environmental effect has to do with government legislation: the Bayh-Dole act that 
was introduced in the United States in 1980 is largely seen as a key policy 
intervention that enabled academics to seek alternative routes for the 
commercialization of their inventions rather than rely on licensing of patents and IP 
(Shane, 2004b). Drawing on transaction cost economics, Shane (2002a) has shown 
 18 
that patents deriving from universities are more likely to be exploited through a 
spinoff firm when these patents are ineffective in a line of business. This argument 
further supports the link between the nature of the technology and its receptivity by 
the market in determining the decision of universities to finally form spinoffs. Other 
researchers have shown that efforts by universities to secure revenues from equity 
positions in new firms are often seen as less risky compared to licensing intellectual 
property to outside partners (cf. Bray and Lee, 2000; Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz and 
Burton, 2002), which further incentivizes university spinoff generation. 
At the micro- or meso- levels (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008), a stream of 
research has emphasized the role of academics and researchers in university 
laboratories as central to the creation of spinoff companies. For instance, the extent to 
which academic founders are market-oriented influences directly the attractiveness of 
business ideas coming out of universities (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2005). Also, the 
entrepreneurial orientation and networking capabilities of individual inventors 
improve the chances for spinoff formation and success (Walter, Auer and Ritter, 
2006). In this context, Nicolaou and Birley (2003a) have used network theory to 
propose a trichotomous categorization of university spinoffs: An orthodox spinoff 
refers to the process where both the academic and the technology are spun out of the 
university, a hybrid spinoff involves the technology spinning out of the school but the 
academics partly retaining their university positions, while a technology spinoff 
involves technology spinning out but the academic maintaining no links with the 
newly established firm. The role of differential networking dynamics can therefore 
explain some of the core dynamics in the evolution of the industry. 
Apart from the individual inventors, universities are seen as playing a critical 
role in the spinoff process by embracing entrepreneurial efforts through Technology 
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Transfer Offices (TTO). A number of researchers have explored the different types of 
these offices (cf. Markman, Phan, Balkin and Gianiodis, 2005) suggesting that the 
age, experience or structure of a TTO (Bray and Lee, 2000; Powers and McDougall, 
2005; Shane, 2004a) are directly related to their productivity in spinoff generation. 
University policies towards the restriction of inventors’ involvement to consulting or 
contracting roles may also discourage them from starting their own companies 
(Tornatzky, Waugaman and Gray, 1999) thus reducing chances for spinoff formation. 
DiGregorio and Shane (2003) have shown that the overall quality and prestige of a 
research institution can boost the rate of spinoff formation, because well known 
institutions have more resources at their disposal to push technology 
commercialization. The quality of a university’s faculty is also found to be a strong 
predictor of the number of startup companies formed (Powers and McDougall, 2005) 
because their expertise and talent are highly appreciated by private investors who 
entrust their funds on spinoff firms.  
Evidently, this short review shows that what is missing in this body of work is 
the inclusion of non-efficiency explanations to the spinoffs’ diffusion. As I argue in 
my papers, one of the key problems with spinoffs is their liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965a). The same liability applies to universities that engaged in 
spinoff entrepreneurial activities for the first time. In the following chapters, I 
therefore place particular emphasis on the role of environmental, institutional 
pressures on universities and I include non-efficiency or non-rational explanations to 
the spread of spinoffs. Such forces are those of compliance to state regulation, 
mimetic behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and fashion processes 
(Abrahamson, 1991; 1996) that are largely dictated by the universities’ and spinoffs’ 
need to acquire legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
 20 
2.4. Outcomes of spinoff activity  
Despite the increasing volume of publications on academic entrepreneurship, 
there is also a clear tendency to observe the phenomenon from the scope of what 
universities can do for spinoffs, rather than what spinoff firms can do for universities. 
As I showed earlier, there has been extensive research conducted on the role of TTOs 
and the role of university strategic decisions on the rate of spinoff formation and the 
success/performance of these firms (Roatharmel et al., 2007; Shane, 2004a). We also 
know that universities attempt to foster an entrepreneurial spirit among their staff by 
offering special courses, seminars and mentoring (Birley, 2002) or by organizing 
networking events (Mustar, 1997). However, we do not know whether such 
investments on behalf of universities are paying off and to what extent they contribute 
to the schools’ success. 
From the universities’ point of view, Louis, Jones, Anderson, Blumenthal and 
Campbell (2001) examined the activity of life scientists and found that engaging in 
entrepreneurial activities such as holding equity in a spinoff company enhanced 
faculty research productivity. Doutriaux and Barker (1995) studied Canadian 
researchers who started spinoff companies and found that their research funding 
increased by an average of 57% from two to three years before founding the company 
to two to three years after the event (see also Blair and Hitchens, 1998). It has also 
been suggested that many scientists perceive spinoffs as more desirable places to 
work compared to established institutions because they believe that the former 
undertake more interesting and challenging projects that the latter (Kenney, 1986). 
Yet, these findings are limited and often atheoretical. Universities operate in 
the highly competitive industry of education, where the acquisition of resources and 
human capital are critical for their success. Universities compete for government and 
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private funds to expand their research facilities; they advertise themselves in order to 
attract PhD candidates and often charge fees for their services due to increasing costs 
of production. It is therefore surprising that so little work has focused on the impact 
of spinoff generation on the universities that create them. In line with my previous 
arguments, I believe that the main reason for this bias is the lack of systematic data 
collection efforts and the assumption among researchers that innovations that diffuse 
are, in fact, always enhancing the productivity of the innovator/adopter (Abrahamson, 
1996; Rogers, 2003). 
In his seminal work, Shane (2004a) summarized this and the other points I 
raised above eloquently. He lamented the lack of knowledge that still permeates the 
spinoff literature with regards to the origins, evolution and impact of spinoffs: “To 
date, we have no comprehensive study of university spinoffs. We lack systematic 
explanations for and evidence of the importance of spinoff companies, the historical 
evolution of spinoff activity, the factors that explain the formation of spinoffs… or 
the effect of spinoffs on the universities that create them” (2004a: 3). Despite 
progress since then, I aim to contribute to this broad debate not only with my 
database but by bringing in the theoretical perspectives of neo-institutionalism and 
population and community ecology from the field of organization studies (Baum, 
2006). 
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3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
3.1. Introduction  
In the following paragraphs, I provide an introduction to the two main 
theoretical approaches, institutional theory and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Astley, 1985), which form the basis for my research. The purpose of this 
section is to familiarize the reader with the main constructs that will later appear in 
the three papers (ch. 5-7) and to provide the origins, purposes and applications of the 
institutional and ecological perspectives in the existing literature. Where possible, I 
also give examples of these theories as to their application in the higher education 
market that constitutes my phenomenological context. Further, the following 
introductory paragraphs provide core recent developments in these theoretical streams 
that help situate my own studies in contemporary organization studies literature. For 
further reading, detailed literature reviews for both the institutional and ecological 
theories are reported in the Appendix (1, 2) of the study.  
3.2. Institutional theory 
The institutional perspective of organizations seeks to explain the nature and 
origins of social order that prevents variations among organizational forms, structures 
and behaviors. Central to institutional theorists’ work is the question of “why is there 
such a startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practices?” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) To answer this question, institutional theory draws from the strictly 
Weberian tradition of bureaucracy that describes the relationship between 
organizations and their environment (Weber, 1978) as well as the Darwinian model of 
adaptation, whereby firms formulate strategies by adapting to environmental changes. 
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A major contribution of institutional theory is related to the weakness in 
existing theory concerning an inattention to the audiences responsible for conferring 
legitimacy on actors and objects. The structure of an organizational field that defines 
the behavior of its members is formulated and enforced upon firms by different 
members of its environment. For example, fields are defined by public opinion, by 
the views of important constituencies, by knowledge legitimated through the 
educational system, by social prestige, by the laws and definitions of the courts, or by 
governments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Social control on organizations can be 
imposed either directly with the threat of negative sanctions or indirectly through 
incentives (Zucker, 1977). Often, these elements of formal structure function as 
highly rationalized myths and firms are driven to incorporate the practices and 
procedures defined by them in order to increase their legitimacy and their survival 
prospects. Firms that abide by these societal rules can therefore avoid inspection and 
negative judgments by their environments with regard to their actions. 
Importantly, these environmental norms tend to eliminate behavioral 
differentiation among organizations, in favor of isomorphism and a question arises as 
to whether conformity with institutionalized rules conflicts with criteria of efficiency. 
Institutional theorists suggest that once disparate organizations in the same line of 
business are structured into an actual field, powerful forces emerge that lead them to 
become more similar to one another (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organizations 
may change their goals or develop new practices and new firms may enter a field 
driven by a desire to improve performance so that a certain degree of innovation is 
secured for a short period of time. However, in the long run, a threshold is reached 
beyond which adoption of these practices provides legitimacy rather than improves 
performance. This happens because organizations tend to model themselves after 
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similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or 
successful, so that mimetic behaviors among competitors eliminate the advantage of 
early adopters. Consequently, failure to conform to the widely established rules 
results in claims of illegitimacy and inability to adapt (Zuckerman, 1999). 
To understand how institutionalism exercises power upon organizations, a 
comparison is often made with resource dependence theories (Oliver, 1991). 
Resource dependence stresses the organizational necessity of adapting to 
environmental uncertainty, coping with problematic interdependencies and actively 
managing or controlling resource flows (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In contrast, 
institutional theory emphasizes the self-serving advantages of compliance with 
institutional requirements, even when resource scarcity is not existent and market 
forces are not influential. Firms tend or pretend to comply with norms deriving by 
historical or cultural pressures because, in the long run, illegitimacy is a more 
imminent threat to their existence. 
3.2.1. Institutional isomorphism in higher education 
The above broad definition of institutional theory has often been applied to 
national systems of education. For example, it has been argued that, in modern 
societies, certain ideologies define the functions appropriate to a university such as 
instruction or research methods in various scientific fields (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
These ideologies represent rationalized and impersonal prescriptions that identify 
various social purposes and specify in a rule-like way the appropriate means to pursue 
technical goals. 
Several social control agencies hold certain authorities to preserve these 
ideologies, e.g. federal legislatures and their constituencies, the state education 
agency, the state-level professional associations and the teaching-training institutions 
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of a country (Rowan, 1982). In educational organizations, institutionalized norms and 
values created by these constituencies play an extremely important role in innovation. 
Thus, expanding educational organizations looking for new domains or new 
structures are forced by pressures of conformity to adapt those structures that have the 
support and endorsement of key agencies in the institutional environment (Rowan, 
1982). 
This sensitivity for compliance by universities is explained by high levels of 
uncertainty regarding the potential value of changes in their structure. Educational 
innovations can seldom be justified on the basis of solid technical evidence and they 
usually gain legitimacy and acceptance on the basis of social evaluations such as the 
endorsement of legislatures or professional agencies (Baldridge and Burnham, 1975). 
For example, school administrators who create new curricula or training programs 
must attempt to validate them as legitimate innovations in educational theory and 
governmental requirements. If they are successful, the new procedures can be 
perpetuated as authoritatively required or as satisfactory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) 
and they may then diffuse over time to other local schools. The case of university 
commercial activities and spinoffs that I examine here is a case of such successful 
educational innovations. 
In contrast, when negative evaluations emerge even from only a portion of the 
institutional environment, local school systems hesitate to adopt the new practices, 
and those that have adopted them may have to drop them. For instance, a number of 
research-oriented institutions seriously consider adapting to declining enrollments by 
eliminating the teaching function (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). To entertain this 
option would be to challenge central organizational norms and to violate legitimacy 
claims, thereby incurring considerable costs for the focal institutions. 
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Despite the uniformity of external pressures on educational organizations, the 
institutional environment may be partly differentiated for certain subgroups. This 
does not mean that some organizations are constrained by the institutional 
environment while others are not, but rather, that there are different expectations for 
different types of organizations in the same population. Many of the commonplace 
distinctions that are drawn between public and private universities reflect such 
differentiated expectations (Tolbert, 1985). The two types of institutions have a long-
standing tradition of drawing on different sources of financial support. Public 
institutions have typically relied heavily on governmental sources of support, 
especially support from state legislature through subsidies, contracts and research 
grants (Rankin, 1956). Private schools, on the other hand, have received their income 
primarily from tuition, endowments and gifts or grants from private donors. These 
patterns derive historically from legal decisions addressing the issue of state control 
over institutions and, over time, differences in dependency relations for public and 
private colleges have become institutionalized (Tolbert, 1985). Accordingly, public 
universities that charge fees are deemed unacceptable, and private schools that 
receive state subsidies are perceived as illegitimate. For example, Covaleski and 
Dirsmith (1988) have shown that institutional forces may incur severe consequences 
to public universities by determining budgetary practices for schools that appropriate 
federal funds. 
Apart from external pressures on universities, institutional theory suggests 
that internal reorganization is often undertaken in an attempt to make the organization 
isomorphic with the changing institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987). In this respect, strategic decisions by 
university administrators legitimize their organizations by aligning them to practices 
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and formalities expected by similar players. Pfeffer and Moore (1980), for example, 
have shown that the level of paradigm development characterizing a department’s 
scientific field and its priorities may predict the level of grants and contract funds 
obtained as well as explain internal budget allocations. In my empirical study (ch. 6), 
I find similar effects of spinoff formation on the appropriation of funds by public 
universities in the UK.  
3.2.2. Organizational legitimacy 
Originating from institutional theory as described above, organizational 
legitimacy lies at the core of industry construction, in the sense that only legitimate 
organizations can survive and proliferate to form a field (e.g. educational market). 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is created subjectively 
by the reaction of observers towards the organization, yet it is possessed objectively 
in that someone may or may not have it. By extension, organizations that lack 
acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities are more vulnerable to claims that 
they are negligent, irrational or unnecessary. 
Legitimacy implies that an organization is accepted by its environment with 
regard to its aims or that its actions may be taken for granted and deemed appropriate 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). At the individual level of analysis, Lawrence (1998) 
suggested that legitimacy indicates that one is qualified for a particular profession, so 
that this person has the knowledge, skills or competence to be a member of that 
profession. Weber (1978) has also shown that professionalism is a concept that 
legitimizes institutions because activities classified in specific categories become 
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easily understood and can be analyzed more appropriately (see also Zuckerman, 
1999). 
Suchman (1995) differentiated between two questions regarding legitimacy. 
First is the question of who confers legitimacy to a firm. In this respect, several 
typologies of legitimacy have been proposed among which a) moral, b) pragmatic and 
c) cognitive legitimacy which can be further analyzed into more subcategories 
(Suchman, 1995). However, Aldrich and Fiol’s (1994) classification of a) 
sociopolitical and b) cognitive legitimacy encompasses a rather simple and practical 
definition of the term, so that legitimacy can be better operationalized (cf. Deeds, 
Mang and Frandsen, 2004; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Sociopolitical legitimacy 
reflects “the extent to which a new form conforms to recognized principles or 
accepted rules and standards”, while cognitive legitimacy refers to the extent “that a 
new form is taken for granted” by its environment (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994: 646). In 
essence, sociopolitical legitimacy describes how a firm visibly conforms to 
regulations or standards imposed by the government, whereas cognitive legitimacy 
stems from the observations, judgments and evaluations of the organization’s 
environment. Thus, legitimacy can be offered to an organization by governments or 
regulators as objective outside participants or by its environment which incorporates 
such elements directly linked to the firm as its customers, suppliers or competitors. 
A debate has erupted in recent years particularly over cognitive legitimacy 
with regard to how it can be obtained. Some researchers argue that cognitive 
legitimacy is developed through strategic efforts by firms, while others believe that it 
is granted to them by influential institutional factors (Singh, Tucker and House, 
1986). For example, Rao (1994) has shown that in the early days of the American 
automobile industry, it was the manufacturers’ strategic actions (i.e. certification 
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contests) that generated favorable perceptions for their products and eventually 
legitimized their presence in the market. In a rather different context, Pollock and 
Rindova (2003) have shown that the media can influence the level of underpricing 
suffered by start-up firms that seek to go public, by granting them legitimacy through 
positive or negative media coverage. The media, thus, may affect perceptions of 
legitimacy and must be seen as an active force that firms need to manage strategically 
in the pursuit of legitimacy (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). However, the media can 
also reflect public evaluation through unbiased coverage of events so that legitimacy 
is simply magnified and transferred to audiences through media lenses. These kind of 
media effects are core considerations in my own research projects. 
Other contemporary students of sociology have also shown that a synthesis of 
social movements theory and institutionalism can explain the process of institution 
building in organizational fields (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003). These scholars 
support the view that social movements are collective challenges to authority in 
political and cultural domains that endeavor to affect change at various levels of 
social life, thereby granting some forms of organizing more legitimate than others. 
The second issue regarding legitimacy is the question of legitimacy for what. 
It is widely accepted that legitimacy is an intangible asset (Lounsbury and Glynn, 
2001) that may help a firm by making its audiences more likely to supply it with 
resources due to its credibility and continuity (Suchman, 1995). A company may seek 
passive support from its environment (for example the authorities’ consent for its 
operations) or active support evident when the accumulation of resources becomes 
easier. Terreberry (1968) claims that legitimacy can be assessed by the level of 
resource transactions flowing into the firm so that legitimate firms are able to attract 
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more resources not because they are famous or well known, but because they are 
considered rational, meaningful entities. 
Since legitimacy is critical for a firms’ survival, managers rarely can afford to 
treat legitimacy as a completed task (Suchman, 1995). In a world characterized by 
relentless innovation that favors early adopters of new forms or activities (including 
among educational institutions), competing organizations are in danger of conceding 
legitimacy to others. To maintain their legitimacy, organizations must therefore 
perceive future changes in their environment (proactive) or protect past 
accomplishments (reactive). Managers can also stockpile cognitive legitimacy 
primarily by constructing communication links between the organization and its 
social surroundings (Suchman, 1995). 
A final note in this introductory literature review has to do with how 
legitimacy differs from reputation or status. Legitimacy focuses on the degree to 
which firm products, practices and structures are consistent with societal expectations 
rather than on their distinctive performance outcomes as the latter two concepts 
would do. For example, both of two firms with and without reputations for being high 
quality producers must create products with a minimum level of quality in order to be 
legitimate/acceptable (Rindova, Pollock, Hayward, 2006). Therefore, while 
legitimacy is measured by comparing a firm’s actions to a set of socially or politically 
acceptable standards, reputation is expressed by directly comparing two 
organizations, so that one of them will have the same or better reputation than the 
other (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Rao (1994) suggests that if one extends the idea 
of legitimacy further, then reputation becomes the outcome of the process of 
legitimation. In this respect, third parties such as professional societies or rating 
agencies may endorse an organization (legitimacy), and the very act of endorsement 
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embeds an organization in a certain status hierarchy thereby building reputation for 
the organization. 
3.3 Population and Community ecology  
The second major theoretical perspective of my dissertation is organizational 
ecology. The application of ecological models to the study of organizations derives 
from biology and human ecology (Hawley, 1986) and started around the same time as 
institutional theory and organizational legitimacy in the mid-1970s. Hannan and 
Freeman (1977), Freeman and Hannan, (1975) and colleagues (e.g. Carroll and 
Hannan, 1989) introduced the population ecology perspective as an alternative to the 
then existing theories of organizational adaptation. In their seminal papers, they 
contrasted the efficiency-based assumptions of adaptation and resource dependence 
theories by arguing that organizations suffer from inertia and are less rational or 
efficiency-oriented (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Organizational ecology is closely linked to evolutionary theory: it describes 
how organizations are selected out of their population based on the degree of fit 
between their individual adaptations (better, inertia) and the environmental demands 
placed upon the whole field/industry (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). The theory has 
therefore evolved based on a clear research paradigm and methods using classic 
mathematical models of demography (e.g. Lotka-Voltera equations, event-history 
studies) deriving from biology. Organizational ecology also relies on population-data 
(e.g. archival data) to capture the interdependence of organizations within that 
population (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 163). 
Early conceptualizations of ecological models in organizational studies have 
focused on two core density-dependent assumptions. At the population level, the so 
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called first-order density dependence implies that initial density (high number of 
organizational births) is seen as a mechanism that confers legitimacy to individual 
organizations and to entire industries, because more entries mean higher levels of 
information and learning on the industry, thus making it look more legitimate. In 
contrast, second-order density pushes organizations towards competition, as too many 
organizational entries in an industry will eventually have to fight for limited resources 
or niche markets (Carroll and Hannan, 1989). 
At the individual organizational level, there are two ecological processes that 
affect mortality rates (i.e. deregistration or liquidation) of firms. The first category 
has to do with age-dependent processes such as the liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983), the liability of 
adolescence, the liability of obsolescence and the liability of senescence (Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000: 281). Each of these processes deals with the importance of 
organizational age in how quickly or easily the focal organization is selected out of 
the population. The second type of ecological process at the individual organizational 
level has to do with the size of the organization (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 313) and 
the impact of size on its fit with environmental demands/changes. 
The population ecology theory has been criticized on several fronts. The main 
criticism, by institutional theorists, has to do with the way legitimacy is measured and 
operationalized (Young, 1988; Zucker, 1989). It has also been recognized that the 
focus on organizational inertia is overemphasized  population ecologists have 
responded to this by incorporating more dynamic models of competition (Barnett and 
Pontikes, 2008), cooperation (Barnett, 2006) and learning (Bruderer and Singh, 1996) 
to the main ecological assumptions. 
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Recently, cooperative and competitive dynamics among industries have 
developed to a higher level of ecological analysis, the community ecology level 
(Astley, 1985). Drawing from bioecology and social exchange theory (Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005), community ecology uses populations as the unit of analysis, 
examining their co-dependence and co-evolution within wider social systems. The 
collective power and interests of these populations thus enable them to formulate 
strategies to the benefit of all industry players – joint action can lead to increased 
legitimacy and protection from “predator” fields or industries (Astley and Fombrun, 
1983; Vermeij, 1994). As one would have expected, population and community 
ecology perspectives are hardly ever applied to non-profit organizations and, in 
particular, educational institutions. In this work, I use population ecology in ch. 6 to 
argue about the legitimacy of spinoffs. In ch. 7, I conceptualize about how 
cooperative dynamics between universities and spinoffs (seen as two distinct 
industries) can positively affect their mutual, legitimization and subsequent 
performance. 
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4. METHODOLOGY  
The methodological design of this study combined quantitative and qualitative 
data sources. In total, I collected spinoff and university-related information that filled 
over 9 million datapoints. I also conducted 6 in-depth interviews with key 
Technology Transfer Managers at selected universities across England and Scotland. 
The need to create a full UK spinoff database has been enormous. Various 
government- and industry-sponsored reports (HM Treasury, 2003, 2007; Minshall 
and Wicksteed, 2005) as well as individual scholars (Shane, 2004a) have called for 
such an initiative, as it has been recognized that lack of data hampers policy making. 
Indeed, it is remarkable that after so many years of expansion, the population of UK 
spinoffs and their demographics is still unknown. Below, I first elaborate on the 
qualitative and then on the quantitative methodological approaches. 
The research design of this thesis involved both inductive and deductive 
logics in addressing the main research questions. While the deductive approach 
allowed me to develop testable hypotheses and a theoretical structure based on 
existing accumulated knowledge, the inductive approach allowed me to move away 
from the empirical findings to the construction of explanations and theories about 
what was observed (Gill and Johnson, 2002). During the course of this study, there 
was a constant dialogue between the theory and the data. The process I followed 
could be captured by the following stages: (a) developing an initial understating of 
the study’s research question and relevant issues, (b) developing hypotheses as 
emerging from the relevant literature of the field and through secondary data, (c) 
refining these hypotheses by interviewing TTO managers, (e) developing a final set 
of testable hypothesis, (f) collecting appropriate data to test the hypotheses, and (g) 
interpreting the data drawing from the empirical findings and relevant theory.  
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4.1. Qualitative data 
The inductive element of the research design involved the collection of 
primary data from the TTO managers of six universities in England and Scotland. 
The six universities were treated at instrumental cases (Stake, 2000), with the 
rationale to gain better understanding of the particular issues universities faced in 
their commercialisation activities between 1993-2007. Yin (2003) argues that case 
studies as research tools allow exploring questions of “how” and “why”, providing a 
contextual understanding of the research question. In the entrepreneurship field, there 
have been calls for further attention to “how” and “why” (Ucbasaran, Westhead and 
Wright, 2001; Ireland, Webb and Coombs, 2005). Among the advantages of a case 
study is its capacity as a research method in developing intense, detailed and subtle 
observations around the unit of analysis (Goode and Hatt, 1952). The main 
limitations of case studies are the inability of scientific generalization (Stake, 2000; 
Eisenhardt, 1989), the narrowness and idiosyncrasy of its theory outcomes leading to 
a complex theory that “lacks simplicity of overall perspective” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
547), and its inability to prevent equivocal evidences and biased views to influence 
the direction of the findings (Yin, 2003). In this study, I did not wish to form any case 
study  I used the data obtained from six universities in order to explore questions of 
“how” and “why” they got involved and continued to be involved in spinoff activities 
over the years.  
For the selection of the six universities, I employed theoretical sampling 
techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989). I used as criteria a) the geographical location of 
universities, b) the number of spinoffs they had created, c) the size of their TTO in 
terms of staff and d) their research budget. All this information was available to me 
from my large quantitative database. I finally chose to interview the TTO managers 
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of the following six universities to look at their historical and current spinoff 
activities:  
 London South Bank University (London; few spinoffs; small team; very small 
budget) 
 University College London (London; many spinoffs; medium team; very large 
budget) 
 Oxford University (England; many spinoffs; large team; very large budget) 
 Surrey University (England; medium spinoffs; small team; medium budget) 
 Strathclyde University (Scotland; medium spinoffs; medium team; small 
budget) 
 Edinburgh University (Scotland; many spinoffs; very large team; large budget) 
I collected primarily qualitative data in the six cases of these universities, by 
employing semi-structured interviews with the TTO manager of each University. 
Qualitative methods are appropriate to study the dynamics of a process, as they are 
sensitive to the organizational context and are useful in uncovering the sequence of 
activities and events related to the research question (Pettigrew, 1992). Further, 
qualitative methods are argued to minimize bias from the researchers before the 
ultimate outcomes become apparent (Van de Ven and Engleman, 1990), taking into 
consideration the influence of individuals’ perceptions and engagement to the 
phenomenon (Lee, 1999; Patton 2002), as an element of the phenomenon. The main 
criticism of qualitative data collection and analysis methods are the lack of 
standardized protocols for analyzing data, with the findings of qualitative research 
been questioned over the degree of subjective interpretation of the researcher 
(Golden-Biddke and Locke, 1997). 
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The use of semi-structured interviews was in accordance with my goal to gain 
understanding of the empirical content of the study without imposing a-priori 
hypotheses to be tested (Fontana and Frey, 2000). The advantage of this type of 
interview in comparison to the heavily structured interview is the ability of the former 
to be sufficiently open and to be improvised in “a careful and theorized way” 
(Wengraf, 2001: 5). I developed an interview guide which aimed at (a) retrospectively 
exploring the involvement of the university in commercialization activities, (b) 
exploring the outcomes of this engagement and c) uncovering the role of 
media/discourse in this historical process. 
Each interview lasted for about 60 minutes and was face-to-face. I emailed the 
interview guide to the interviewees prior to our meeting to facilitate the discussion 
and familiarize them with the research questions of the study, taking into account 
their time commitments. I was using a standardized interview format at the beginning 
of each interview defining the phenomenon of university spinoffs, then I would allow 
a narrative to emerge on the way spinoff formation has been experienced in the 
universities, adjusting the sequence of the themes and concepts of the questions of the 
interview guide. After each reply from the informant I would provide them with my 
interpretation of the reply, as well as occasionally some propositions from the 
relevant literature, asking for validation or reflection. 
All interviews were tape recorded after having acquired the consent of the 
informants. I also kept fieldwork notes to help the transcription of the interviews and 
facilitate the data analysis phase. In the data analysis, I transcribed each interview in a 
verbatim format and I listened to the interview tapes again, while reading the 
transcriptions allowing further familiarization with the data. At that stage I 
incorporated the hand-notes that I had kept during the interview (e.g. drawings, key 
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words, names, ideas) and associated them with the actual data. As suggested by Dey 
(1993) and Miles and Huberman (1994: 69-72), the analysis went through three 
distinct stages: First level coding, pattern coding and, finally, mapping. The pattern 
coding and quotes from the interview are presented in Appendix 10.4.  
4.2. Quantitative data 
Acknowledging the need for a full spinoff database, I proceeded based on a 
demographic data collection plan (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Human demographers 
evaluate census data in terms of coverage and content – coverage refers to the extent 
that the data sources include information about all organizations that fit a definition 
(and avoid missing data or duplicate entries); content refers to the time period and 
detail that characterize the information (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 164). Temporal 
population data such as those in a demography plan are the most often available 
sources to sociologists and are organized as panel data (Blossfeld, Golsch and 
Rowher, 2007). Panel data normally contain more information that cross-sectional or 
time-series data and have the benefit of allowing researchers to extract better insight 
on the population/industry examined (Blossfeld et al., 2007; Brooks, 2008). 
I actually needed full demographics of both universities and spinoffs. 
Consequently, I consulted a large number of resources for each of these populations 
(cf. Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Davis and Greve, 1997), including archival data, 
industry directories, encyclopedias, government registries and proprietary or survey 
data over a large period of time (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). I coded this information 
in a spreadsheet (see Appendix 10.3) that would allow me to extract the right 
information for each of my research projects. According to Ventresca and Mohr 
(2006), a careful organization of archival and secondary data for ecological or 
demographic studies such as mine has the benefit of allowing the researcher to use 
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multiple levels of analysis, focusing on cause and effect (network) relationships 
among variables, over time (2006). 
In separate chapters, I detail the statistical analysis that I carried out. While for 
linear and hierarchical regression analyses it suffices to maintain a standard format in 
the database, the circumstances are different for event history studies on panel data 
(Blossfeld et al, 2007). In particular, I used both time-constant and time-dependent 
covariates to analyze transition rates across a set of states [e.g. 0,1] and this required 
the specification of at least two dimensions: state space and time axis (Blossfeld et 
al., 2007; Yamaguchi, 1991). State space refers to the starting (origin) and ending 
(destination) point of the organizations being examined (e.g. starting from state 0 and 
moving to state 1, or starting from state 1 and moving to state 2); the time axis helps 
define the waiting time until that happens (Allison, 1984). I used the STATA 
statistical package for all my analyses. 
4.2.1. Spinoff data 
The major challenge with spinoff data is to distinguish spinoffs from other 
startups that are somehow related to universities. I collected data from individual 
university websites (pages usually dedicated to technology transfer, e.g. “services for 
business” or “knowledge transfer”) and contacted almost all English and Scottish 
universities directly through emails and telephone. I further looked extensively at 
recent reports on spinoffs including the following publishers:  
 Library House spinoff reports, 2006-2007 
 Ernst & Young biotech reports, 2005-2007 
 Chemistry Leadership Council report, 2005 
 University Companies Association (UNICO) annual surveys, 2001-2006 
 British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) 
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 Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) 
 Scottish Funding Council (SFC) 
I crosschecked the above sources to complement my initial database and made 
additions to the list of spinoffs for each university. I amended the information based 
on whether spinoffs had ceased trading, had been acquired by larger corporations or 
had been merged. Some companies were not located in the UK companies’ registry 
(FAME), so they were excluded from the database even though they did appear in 
universities’ technology transfer web pages. Most of these entities must have 
remained dormant or appeared in the FAME database for a very short period of time. 
Still others were mentioned in university web sites but were not found to be linked to 
a university either in terms of a) location, b) ownership or c) board appointments of 
the founders/inventors, and were therefore excluded from the database as start-ups. 
Specifically, when firms were located outside the UK or at geographical 
regions far away from the inventor university, I contacted them to verify that they 
satisfied the definition of a spinoff. Regarding university ownership in the spinoffs, 
this is admittedly not a solid criterion since ownership of spinoffs by universities is 
not a universal practice; I nonetheless preferred to follow a conservative approach in 
my methodology: if a spinoff did not satisfy other criteria and no university had a 
stake in it, it was excluded from the database. Finally, if at least one of the 
managers/directors of the company was listed as being a Doctor or Professor in the 
FAME registry, then further research was conducted to decide whether it was a 
spinoff or a start-up. Yet other companies were non-profit organizations that had 
gained autonomy from the university since their inception, and they were therefore 
also excluded. 
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Particularly difficult was the distinction between firms that grew up in or 
migrated to university science parks. Some universities could not provide me with a 
list of their spinoffs and referred me to their Science Park websites and corporate 
managers. Consequently, I applied the location-ownership-board appointments 
methodology to decide which science park firms were true spinoffs and which 
ordinary startups that were simply renting space in the park. Typically, I would first 
check their website and if it was mentioned that the company had been formed by a 
(former) MBA student from the university, I would exclude it from the sample as a 
start-up immediately. 
I finally double-checked my data with the spinoff companies listed in the pan-
European “Proton Europe” university spinoff database. Proton Europe is a database 
supported by the European Knowledge Transfer Association (EKTA) that was 
established in 2003 by the European Commission. Its data is by no means as 
extensive as mine either in terms of length or breadth of the information available, not 
least because it incorporates Knowledge-Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) and other 
forms of university commercialization that do not satisfy the classic spinoff definition 
(Shane, 2004a). Applying the same process as above, I found that a lot of firms in the 
latter were not university spinoffs but ordinary start-ups by former employees or 
students at universities. For example, I found no trace of these firms being spinoffs 
either in the companies’ “About Us” websites or in terms of ownership (equity 
stakes) in them by universities in the FAME database.  
Further clean-up was necessary to arrive at a unified spinoff database. For 
example, in some cases, universities reported that a company was formed years 
before the official date of incorporation in the public registry, but I used the latter 
instead of the former. Also, when it was mentioned that a company was “acquired” it 
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followed that the firm had ceased operating under that name (dissolved) and that its 
final accounts were those of the year that the merger/ acquisition took place. With all 
the data organization and modifications, we finally arrived at a total of 1,459 spinoffs 
between the year 1963 and the end of 2007. Of these, 55 were joint spinoffs 
(intellectual property was owned by more than one universities that somehow 
collaborated) leaving me with a total of 1,404 unique spinoff entities. Basic 
demographics of the firms and universities in the database can be found in figures 4.1 
and 4.2.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Types of spinoffs formed in England and Scotland by year 
For my research purposes, I also needed indicators of spinoff growth; 
consequently, I collected university spinoff revenue figures from the FAME registry. 
Some spinoffs, however, either did not produce or did not report revenues, especially 
early in their lives. For this reason, I also collected information on their assets, an 
alternative indication of firm size. Some authors like Harcourt (1965), Hawawini, 
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Subramanian and Verdin (2003) and Fisher and McGowan (1983) argue against the 
use of accounting ratios (e.g. net assets, ROA) as proxies for economic profitability, 
not least because accounting methods of measuring profitability do not reflect cash 
flows, and returns are not adjusted for risk. It should be recognized, however, that 
data on value-based measures of performance for a quite large number of spinoff 
companies and over a long time period were not available until recently. This might 
explain why past research traditionally had no alternative to accounting measures, 
and why this approximation was preferred in my work too.  
4.2.2. University data 
A whole series of information regarding universities needed to be collected 
and used, primarily as control variables. I consulted directly university websites and, 
when necessary, public educational authorities, registries and government 
publications. For example, universities founding dates (age) were obtained from 
individual websites. Because most universities existed as colleges or schools but were 
not granted full university status until at least 1992 (Higher and Further Education 
Act, 1992), the latter was included, as opposed to the original date of college 
founding. This would rather fairly reflect their experience as established educational 
institutions, thus making them comparable with non-polytechnic ones. 
Regarding university status, I collected information on Nobel prizes from the 
online registry of the Nobel Foundation. I did not distinguish among academic 
disciplines but, admittedly, in most cases prizes had been awarded to members of 
traditional spinoff-generating faculties and research departments such as biology or 
engineering. As an example, the University of Manchester has earned the prize 23 
times of which 8 Nobel Prizes were in chemistry, 10 in physics, 2 in medicine and 3 
in economics. 
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Figure 4.2: University spinoff productivity in England and Scotland by year 
A special note is important for the University of London (UoL) which 
represented a unique case. As a confederation of colleges and schools, UoL embraces 
8 educational institutions that I treated as independent universities in my research. 
These are: the Institute of Cancer Research, King’s College, Queen Mary, the Royal 
Veterinary College, the School of Pharmacy, St George’s, University College London 
and the Wolfson Institute for Biomedical Research. I considered UoL too broad a 
confederation to merge its colleges into one, and I would have encountered great 
 45 
difficulties in assigning a single value to variables such as university age (most 
colleges were founded at different calendar years and some joined/left UoL quite 
recently) or status (some colleges have won many Nobel prizes, others none). Further, 
for the University of London’s various colleges, some spinoffs may have been 
assigned to one college with another also claiming the same privilege. To overcome 
this, I assigned the spinoff to both research colleges (for example, IXICO Ltd. was 
assigned to both UCL and King’s College). 
I collected extensive, detailed information on university funding. The primary 
sources for this were the four core British science Research Councils (BBSRC, 
ESRC, EPSRC, MRC) and government publications that I mentioned above (e.g. 
HEFCE, SFC etc). I looked at the mission of each Research Council to evaluate their 
priorities for awarding grants over the years. For example, I found that one criterion 
based on which grants were given is the technology/knowledge transfer applicability 
of the research project seeking funding. Overall, the mission of all councils from 
which I collected data was extremely important: the discourse at their websites and 
Annual Reports reveals that university commercial activities and spinoffs were 
regarded as important, further reinforcing my research hypotheses (see below). An 
important methodological hurdle had to do with how awards were assigned to 
individual researchers or entire universities. For example, the list of Biotechnology 
awards that I downloaded from the BBSRC online database is based on the 
“institution of grant”, i.e. the university or department that had applied for the grant. 
A lot of the times, the principal investigator in these projects had moved to another 
institution. Yet, despite the fact that the funds could now be used at spinoffs in the 
new institution, I did not assign these awards to the new institutions to which the 
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Information on university networks was pretty straight-forward to collect. 
British Universities are grouped into three federations: a) the Russell Group, b) the 
1994 Group, and c) the former Polytechnics, that include the Million+ network and d) 
the University Alliance network of educational institutions. I gathered this 
information from university websites, the alliances websites and other online 
encyclopedic sources such as Wikipedia. 
Finally, I tracked all media clippings of spinoffs and their parent universities. 
This piece of information was crucial for many of my research hypotheses. The 
research process I used in my primary database of LexisNexis was as follows:  
 An initial search was done with “company name” + “university name” as 
keywords. If no results were obtained, I repeated the search with “company 
name” and “location of the university”, e.g. the city of Cambridge.  
 If the company was reported with its initials or trading name, I also checked 
for these, e.g. Nano-porous Solutions (n-psl) Ltd.  
 When the company had changed its name voluntarily or due to a 
merger/acquisition, I checked with both names (old and new), e.g. Citrix 
Systems R&D Ltd (previously known as XenSource UK Ltd) 
 In the cases where a spinoff was established by more than one universities (e.g. 
Spirogen), I conducted separate searches for each university to see how much 
coverage each had accumulated in the media. This was important in particular 
because some joint ventures (e.g. Viratis Ltd) may have had different levels of 
media coverage because of differential university investments on this. As an 
example, Sterix Ltd was jointly created by Imperial College and Bath 
University: a search on LexisNexis revealed 95 hits associated with Imperial 
College and only 56 with Bath University during the same period of time.  
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5. THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS AMONG PUBLIC 
ORGANIZATIONS: FASHION AND ISOMORPHISM UNDER VARYING 
STATE INTERVENTION2 
5.1 Abstract 
This paper draws from the academic entrepreneurship literature using data on 
the population of English and Scottish universities and their spinoff firms over a 
period of 15 years, to unpack the full process of innovation adoption by public 
organizations. We distinguish among two different periods of normative and 
regulatory state intervention. We find that, despite pressures for compliance to state 
mandates, weak government intervention in the early years pushed universities 
towards the adoption of spinoff activities based on mimetic behaviors, industry norms 
and fashion mechanisms. When government regulations and norms were introduced 
to the higher education industry, the adoption rate collapsed and was now dependent 
more on efficiency explanations – only universities with strong prior success at 
spinoff formation were able to continue the process. Our work has implications for 
institutional and diffusion theories. We show that the rapid, unconditional compliance 
of public organizations to state mandates that has been previously proposed by 
diffusion theorists does not hold unless these mandates are closely regulated. As with 
private corporations, we also find that isomorphic behaviors and fashion diffusion 
processes are possible among public organizations.  
                                                          
2
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Babson Entrepreneurship Research conference, 
London Business School, Tilburg University and Maastricht University.  
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5.2 Introduction 
This paper draws inspiration from the empirical context of academic 
entrepreneurship (Etzkowitz, 2003; Shane, 2004a) to unfold the complexity of 
diffusion processes among public organizations. The diffusion of new activities and 
innovations has been the focus of organizational theorists for decades (e.g. Rogers, 
2003; Wejnert, 2002). For public organizations, institutional theorists have 
convincingly argued that compliance to state regulatory and normative demands and 
the dependence of these entities upon the state for resources force public 
organizations to adopt state-mandated practices rapidly and unconditionally (Scott, 
1981; Rowan, 1982; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Public 
organizations – for example the higher education industry – are in need for legitimacy 
perhaps more so than private corporations, because they are evaluated based on 
institutional and “public good” components that guarantee their accountability to the 
public, rather than technical criteria of efficiency or profit (Scott, 1981: 140). 
However, these conclusions have been based on the assumption that the state 
regulatory and normative demands are explicit. How will public organizations 
respond to state requirements when the norms and regulations imposed by the state 
change over time? It is likely that concentrating on the alternatives of institutional vs. 
technical pressures greatly limits our understanding of these processes. We believe 
that contemporary research should incorporate core elements of Rogers’s (2003) 
seminal definition of diffusion as the process where a) a novel organizational form is 
b) communicated through certain channels, c) over time, d) among members of a 
social system. 
In contrast to those limitations, diffusion theorists have significantly advanced 
our knowledge on the adoption trajectories among private corporations. Rogers’s 
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(2003) initial enquiry on the diffusion trajectory of innovation focused on the 
agricultural industry but more recent projects have looked at the adoption of new 
practices in diverse industries such as health care (D’Aunno, Sutton and Price, 1991), 
professional services firms (Lee and Pennings, 2002), computing (Attewell, 1992; 
Bothner, 2003), or industrial corporations (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1983). An 
alternative theoretical perspective on diffusion has been proposed by management 
fashion theorists (Abrahamson, 1991; 1996; Nelson, Peterhansl and Sampat, 2004). 
Their research aims to explain the diffusion of non-beneficial practices and the 
rejection of beneficial ones. Here, management innovations spread due to various 
fashion-setters such as market gurus and media corporations that promote their own 
irrational, non-validated practices as efficient management techniques to a field 
(Abrahamson, 1991, 1996). Institutional theorists have also emphasized the role of 
mimetic behaviors in conferring legitimacy and respectability to those organizations 
that model their structures and behaviors to the early adopters of a practice. This 
process leads organizations that belong to the same industry towards a state of 
isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that buffers claims of 
illegitimacy against them. Organizational theorists have also placed great emphasis 
on the role of professional associations and accreditation agencies as sources of 
legitimacy – membership to these associations can explain the adoption of practices 
by peer organizations in a field (Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby 
and Hinings, 2002; Greve, 2006). Recently, the literature on diffusion among private 
corporations has expanded to incorporate organizational characteristics (Ahmadjian 
and Robinson, 2001), competition dynamics (Bothner, 2003), learning (Attewell, 
1992), cultural linkages (Strang and Meyer, 1993) organizational strategy (Spell and 
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Blum, 2005), leadership styles (Kimberley and Evanisko, 1981) and contagion and 
structural equivalence (Burt, 1987) as antecedents to widely accepted new practices. 
One reason why so many explanations have been proposed in models of 
innovation diffusion among private firms is the uncertainty found in the institutional 
environmental. In particular, scholars have seen as an important source of uncertainty 
the often conflicting government regulatory and normative pressures placed upon 
firms (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin and Suddaby, 2008). For example, D’Aunno, 
Sutton and Price (1991) discussed how mixed regulatory policies at the federal, state 
and city level forced private mental health organizations to adopt practices 
contradictory to their previous operations. Henisz and Delios (2001) examined the 
role of the market policymaking apparatus in explaining the decision among Japanese 
multinational corporations on the location of their manufacturing plants. In this study, 
we emphasize the importance of uncertainty that stems from government regulation 
and normative intervention in the diffusion of innovations among public 
organizations. We argue that state mandates create niches for the adoption of new 
practices but the adoption trajectory depends on the actual regulatory and normative 
regime that defines the field over time (Scott, 1998). Thus, we challenge previous 
assumptions that state mandates or requirements are quickly and unconditionally 
adopted by public organizations (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Rowan, 1982) by testing 
various propositions that are commonly employed by studies on the diffusion of 
innovations by private firms (for an exception see Kraatz and Zajac, 1996 on the 
adoption process by public universities). The United Kingdom university spinoff 
industry that we study here can be an ideal context for this (Lockett and Wright, 
2005; Shane, 2004a). 
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Intensive government mandates for university technology transfer and spinoff 
activities in the early 1990s pushed English and Scottish universities to adopt spinoff 
formation as a novel management innovation. Spinoffs are private corporations that 
are based on intellectual property from university laboratories, and are often 
controlled by universities through equity stakes. Spinoff formation represented a 
significant departure from the traditional mission of universities (Etzkowitz, 2003; 
Shane, 2004a) away from research and teaching to “big business” (Bok, 2003; 
Etzkowitz, 2003). This diversification presented universities with great challenges in 
their decision as to whether or not to engage in spinoff formation. Further, there were 
no clearly defined norms or best practice advice as to how spinoff activities should be 
regulated. Many universities were forced to learn dealing with private industry actors 
such as Venture Capitalists and angel investors for the first time in their long 
histories. Spinoffs were initially seen as risky endeavors in contrast to the steady but 
secure income flows from licensing agreements to the private sector (Shane, 2004a). 
These factors created imbalance among university audiences (Rowan, 1982) as to 
whether spinoffs were really worth the investments needed for them to be established 
and grow. Over the last 15 years, the normative and regulatory government regime 
further increased market uncertainty. In the early years, the preferred norm was in 
favor for large numbers of spinoff firms neglecting to put emphasis on the spinoff 
survival and success rates. Later, the UK government shifted its attention from 
quantity to spinoff quality and established specific financial reward schemes aimed at 
universities that succeeded in high-growth spinoff activities. We detail the natural 
history of the spinoff industry by examining the entire population of English and 
Scottish public universities to uncover the full spinoff diffusion process. 
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5. 3 The diffusion of English and Scottish spinoffs 
Spinoffs are new ventures that are dependent upon licensing or assignment of 
university intellectual property for initiation (Shane, 2004a; Lockett and Wright, 
2005). This definition distinguishes spinoffs from other university startups that are 
established by students, graduates or researchers that are not affiliated with research 
conducted based on university intellectual property. Spinoffs are complex 
organizations that rely on some form of patent or invention and seed funding from 
private investors to be set up and grow. They were historically seen as a rare route for 
knowledge commercialization since other forms of technology transfer such as 
licensing had been prevalent for decades (Shane, 2004a). The origins of the United 
Kingdom spinoff industry can be traced back in 1977 when the then Patents’ Act 
gave inventors the right to share financial benefits from their research with their 
employer. State legislation in the United Kingdom had similar effects on university 
technology transfer as the United States’ Bayh-Dole act (Rafferty, 2008; Shane, 
2004b) by providing incentives to universities to encompass commercial activities. In 
1986, the UK government abolished the British Telecom Group’s monopoly in 
telecommunications and further privatizations throughout the 1980’s incentivized 
research and development among private companies that sought to enter industries 
now open to competition. A lot of these companies looked at universities to provide 
them with technology expertise through patenting and licensing. 
In 1993, a government White Paper designated universities as key to the 
realization of the UK’s research potential and suggested policies to increase 
university-industry collaboration (HM Treasury, 1993). In response, university 
Technology Transfer Offices spread in the early 1990’s and universities debated over 
strategies for the most efficient route to commercialize technology as mandated by 
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the government. Although spinoff firms had been formed for many years prior to 
1993, their numbers were characteristically low and their emergence could be 
described as naturalistic. Our data show that between 1963 (when the first spinoff 
was registered) and 1993, only 103 spinoffs had been incorporated, at an average rate 
of 3 per year among all 113 universities. In contrast, by the late 1990’s, most English 
and Scottish universities had incorporated at least one spinoff within their campus 
(figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1: Percentage of English and Scottish universities with at least one spinoff formed, 
1993-2007 
To understand the spread of spinoff firms over the years, it is important to 
differentiate between two periods in the United Kingdom government’s normative 
and regulatory intervention. When we refer to norms guiding the spinoff industry, we 
focus on government preferences with regards to the quantity vs. quality dimensions 
of spinoff generation by public universities. On the other hand, we define as 
regulatory intervention specific actions undertaken by state authorities to foster 
spinoff activities through financial and other incentives. Our window of observation 
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starts with the White Paper of 1993 (HM Treasury, 1993), continues all the way 
through to the White Paper of 2001 (HM Treasury, 2001) and concludes at 2007. In 
the UK political system, white papers such as these are authoritative reports that 
guide public opinion as well as businesses and lawmakers within the country’s 
political, economic and social spheres. 
Following the first white paper, in the period between 1993-2000, and despite 
continuous discourse by the government in favor of commercial activities, the UK 
government never monitored or regulated the spinoff industry. In 1996, the first 
major university Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) took place. RAEs are the 
most important, full-breadth university evaluation exercises conducted every 5-7 
years by the higher education authorities of England and Scotland and they 
incorporate performance assessments of university teaching and research collapsed 
into numerical scores. RAE scores are extremely important because they guide 
university funding for the years until the next RAE. The 1996 assessment did not 
make any explicit mention on technology transfer, nor did it produce scores for 
commercial activities and spinoff formation. In contrast, during the second RAE that 
took place in 2001, the assessment process included minor technology transfer 
criteria for the evaluation of research at engineering and medical departments of UK 
universities. The test of 2001 referred to aspects of research that had “immediate 
commercial applications” in the UK industry. Further, between 1993 and 2001, and in 
contrast to its approach with regards to university teaching and research activities, the 
UK government had not assigned any form of state association or authority to 
exclusively oversee spinoff activities. The most relevant such watchdog, the 
University Companies Association (UNICO), was established in 1994 by university 
managers themselves to coordinate spinoff and other commercial activities within 
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university Technology Transfer Offices (TTO). Lack of such professional bodies that 
could oversee the spinoff industry prior to 2001 was in contrast to mainstream 
diffusion explanations, particularly in higher education where state normative 
intervention is important for the professionalization and, eventually, 
institutionalization of novel practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1981). Other 
agencies, such as the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) or the 
Scottish Funding Council (SFC) that hold responsibility for the allocation of 
university funds were also left uninvolved in providing financial and other incentives 
for university spinoff generation. In the early years, the assumption supported by state 
discourse was that spinoff production would be financially self-rewarding for 
universities. State expectations were that spinoffs would directly compensate 
universities through equity investments that, when liquidated, would result in cash 
flowing into schools and their individual inventors (Feldman et al., 2002; Shane, 
2004a). There was also the expectation that commercial agreements with external 
industry financiers linked to spinoffs (e.g. venture capitalists) would bring substantial 
investments into university laboratories and other research facilities.  
By 2001, following the last Research Assessment Exercise, government 
suggestions to halt the acceleration of spinoff formation among universities were 
loudly voiced for the first time. Reflecting world-wide evidence on the spinoff 
industry, a major review by the UK government concluded that the number of spinoff 
firms being formed was hard to sustain unless a radical shift towards spinoff 
performance in the universities’ general incubation model was urgently implemented 
(HM Treasury, 2003). The government’s white paper focused on indentifying key 
performance indicators of university commercial activities as a major public policy 
priority. At the same time, to promote successful technology transfer strategies, in 
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2000 the government established a £50million University Challenge venture capital 
fund and sponsored several Science Enterprise Centers based at universities 
throughout England and Scotland (Lockett and Wright, 2005). The following year, 
the government extended invitations at universities to apply for special funding 
targeted at commercial activities and by 2002 the first substantial public funds 
dedicated to technology transfer were distributed to universities by the English and 
Scottish authorities (HEIF funds). There were three more rounds of HEIF funding 
introduced in 2004, 2006 and 2008. In all of these rounds, the government signified 
that the norms guiding the allocation of funds would be based on prudent university 
investments in high-growth spinoff formation.  
There was thus a significant shift in government regulatory (financial 
incentives) and normative (quality vs. quantity of spinoffs) focus in the early 2000s. 
This change in focus was primarily triggered by the Higher Education Business 
Interaction survey that took place for the first time during 2001-2002. The survey 
(which has been running annually ever since) wished to identify university strategies 
for the exploitation of intellectual property by collecting quantitative information 
from educational institutions across the UK. The government’s aim was to provide 
“invaluable intelligence for knowledge exchange practitioners and policy makers” 
(HEBCI, 2008) and it therefore focused on gathering historical information relevant 
to spinoffs (e.g. number of employees, spinoff revenues and growth, university 
licensing income, academic staff involvement in the provision of services to local 
businesses) for the first time. By the time of the second white paper and the second 
Research Assessment Exercise (2001), spinoffs were clearly established as a standard 
practice in academia. However, following the Higher Education Business Interaction 
survey spinoff numbers collapsed. This process sounds familiar to what institutional 
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and diffusion theorists would call the deinstitutionalization of a diffused practice 
(Oliver, 1992). Deinstitutionalized practices lose their appeal due to functional 
pressures from new definitions of what is technically efficient. The impact of the 
Higher Education Business Interaction survey rests with the fact that the process of 
resetting the technical criteria emerged from freshly unearthed information on the 
performance of university spinoffs. Diffusion theorists content that new evidence on a 
diffused practice that was previously unknown can destabilize shared understandings 
in a field (Oliver, 1992: 574; Nelson et al., 2004) leading to the collapse of support 
for its participant organizations. 
Furthermore, if the perpetuation of a diffused practice is no longer seen as 
rewarding, organizations will abandon it and understandings of what is legitimate and 
appropriate in a field may change (Abrahamson, 1991). Institutional theorists posit 
that specifying new rational codes and technical criteria that regulate a field rests with 
the state’s professional agencies and associations such as government departments, 
the higher education authorities or local school systems. If the state no longer confers 
lucrative financial subsidies and endorsement to widely used practices, the latter will 
be abandoned by its users (Oliver, 1992). However, the UK government started 
providing lucrative spinoff subsidies to universities only post-2001, and it is therefore 
surprising that spinoff formation diminished after that year. Our data on the English 
and Scottish spinoff industry show that firm foundings concentrated around the years 
1996 and 2001 when the two Research Assessment Exercises took place, indicating 
elements of compliance to state mandates (figure 5.2). However, after 2001, not only 
did spinoff foundings decline, but spinoff deaths also increased sharply3. According 
                                                          
3
 Our data indicate that a lot of spinoffs founded before 2001 had remained dormant for years. These 
firms had no prospects for growth and had never reported revenues or assets in their accounts. When 
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to Abrahamson (1996:256), a bell-shaped pattern of diffusion similar to the one 
observed in the UK spinoff industry is typical of a management fashion. Weak 
regulatory and normative intervention (no financial rewards on quality, emphasis on 
spinoff numbers) in the early years of the phenomenon created uncertainty among 
universities (HM Treasury, 1993). It is likely that this market uncertainty forced 
universities to adopt spinoffs based on industry norms, mimetic behaviors or other 
external influences placed upon university decision makers. 
 
Figure 5.2: Spinoff births and deaths in England and Scotland, 1993-2007 
In trying to explain the diffusion of spinoffs, we formulate hypotheses 
distinguishing between the two periods, 1993-2000 and 2001-2007. As we noted, we 
treat 2001 as the turning point in our analysis for several reasons. First, it was the 
year of the last Research Assessment Exercise that incorporated spinoff assessment 
criteria to university evaluations for the first time. Second, it was the year that the 
government introduced dedicated spinoff funds accompanied by specific demands 
and guidelines for growth-oriented university venturing activities. These and other 
regulatory and normative changes were implemented as a result of the government 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the government started monitoring the industry more closely, universities abandoned them altogether 
through deregistration.  
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starting forming clear impressions on the spinoff industry based on the Higher 
Education Business Interaction survey (Abrahamson, 1991; Oliver, 1992). To further 
advance theory on the diffusion of innovations among public entities (and contrary to 
previous studies by scholars such as Scott, 1981; Rowan, 1982; Ruef and Scott, 1998; 
Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), we focus on diffusion approaches (Rogers, 
2003) that are commonly used in studies of for-profit organizations (e.g. Burns and 
Wholey, 1993). 
Association Membership. The uncertainty caused by the changing 
governmental rules and norms was left to be filled by universities. Institutional 
theorists argue that uncertainty breads mimetic behaviors among organizations as the 
latter attempt to define what constitutes acceptable behavior versus not (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Ruef and Scott, 1998). Emerging activities and practices are 
defined by professional bodies, training organizations and other industry associations 
that confer legitimacy to those espousing the practice (Rowan, 1982). To participate 
or be monitored as a member of such a group or association makes organizations 
legitimate players that abide by newly defined professional standards (Zuckerman, 
1999). The role of associations in educational markets is particularly important: 
formalized educational markets with clear regulations, associations, organized 
communities, bodies and groups of interests are important in guiding the process of 
accrediting newly diffused practices (Meyer, Scott and Strang, 1987; Scott, 1981). In 
1994, English and Scottish universities founded their own professional body, the 
University Companies Association (UNICO) as a natural reaction to the emerging 
spinoff population. The Association was focused on exchanging best practice and 
training universities technology transfer personnel. Membership into UNICO 
increased rapidly as its members attempted to design university strategies and 
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structures that would increase spinoff venturing. University participation into UNICO 
during the early years was an act that sought legitimacy and a sense of belonging for 
these universities into a group of pioneers that abided by governmental demands for 
reform. Membership into UNICO can therefore explain the intention of universities to 
generate spinoffs early in the 1990’s – it was a symbolic and substantive gesture 
towards convergence to a specific business incubation model that UNICO members 
defined themselves in view of absence of any state norms or monitoring mechanisms 
that would guide the industry. However, the spinoff industry was later redefined 
based on new evidence (Abrahamson 1996; Oliver, 1992; HEBCI, 2002) and the role 
of UNICO may have lost its importance in predicting university spinoff formation. 
Following the second government white paper, the introduction of financial 
incentives for high-growth spinoff activities, may have slowed the impact of industry 
norms as defined by universities through their association. We can hypothesize:  
H1a. There is a positive relationship between UNICO membership expressed 
in years since joining the association and a university’s decision to adopt spinoffs. 
H1b. The effect of UNICO membership on a university’s decision to adopt 
spinoffs was stronger in the first period than in the second. 
Mimetic behaviors. In public organization settings, institutional theorists have 
rarely attributed the diffusion of new practices to mimetic pressures. Institutional 
theorists claim that isomorphism through mimicry is rare among public organizations 
because the state apparatus is assumed to have clear rules and sanctioning 
mechanisms that regulate their conduct (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Because of their 
dependence upon the state, public organizations will rush to adopt changes, lest they 
are seen as illegitimate. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) have examined how the adoption 
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of civil service reforms begun due to state regulatory requirements and attributed the 
rapid diffusion of the reforms to institutional compliance of city administrators 
towards state mandates (cf. Edelman, 1990, 1992). In the UK spinoff context, as 
universities were trying to designate behavioral norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
the spread of spinoffs depended upon schools mimicking each other in order to 
appear appropriate and modern within their changing field. The imitation process 
took place without universities being truly concerned with successful spinoff 
formation. Elements of a mimetic legitimization process (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Rowan, 1982) were evident in many cases. Most universities restructured their 
commercial activities around almost identical Technology Transfer Offices and 
around the same time period. Other structural and administrative arrangements such 
as outsourcing of spinoff activities to external corporations took place mostly after 
2001. We believe that if mimetic forces were in place, prior adoption of spinoff 
activities by universities within a geographical region would have further predicted 
the adoption of spinoffs by those universities that had not done so already. 
Geographic proximity and network embeddedness are common parameters affecting 
the diffusion trajectory among private organizations (Lee and Pennings, 2002; 
Wenjert, 2002). Yet, mimetic behaviors among geographically proximate public 
entities such as universities could explain equally well why other alternatives were 
eliminated, and why universities treated spinoffs as a taken-for-granted practice early 
in the history of the spinoff industry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We propose:   
H2a. There is a positive relationship between spinoff adoption by 
geographically proximate universities and the decision of another university in that 
region to adopt spinoffs. 
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New state requirements such as technology transfer through spinoff formation 
were occasionally seen as technically impossible or as having a negative impact on 
organizational performance, so that adopting organizations could decouple the new 
activities from their technical core (Scott, 1981). In organization studies, decoupling 
refers to a “ceremonial” adoption of state-mandated practices that organizations 
employ in order to appear legitimate and avoid government sanctions without 
wholeheartedly paying too much attention to the technical requirements of state 
mandates (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). In practice, decoupling is often achieved 
through externally visible organizational structures and practices that have no real 
substance (Westphal and Zajac, 1997; Westphal and Zajac, 2001). However, 
institutional theorists are unable to explain the overwhelming contradiction between 
strong government pressures and decoupling among public organizations. How can 
public organizations conform to state requirements so quickly in fear of punishment 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) when others can get away with decoupling? Existing 
theories of innovation adoption by public entities are unable to explain how 
decoupling organizations consistently avoid the scrutiny of regulators, associations, 
professional bodies and other agencies that surround these entities. We argue that 
isomorphic convergence towards spinoff generation among universities lost its 
importance after 2001, because new government evidence over the potential of the 
spinoff industry (HEBCI, 2002; HM Treasury, 2003) made decoupling impossible. 
After 2001, the government was able to distinguish between universities that were 
truly oriented towards high-growth spinoffs and was willing to reward these 
institutions financially. This policy was in contrast to university strategies aiming at 
spinoff formation for legitimacy purposes, often decoupling it from efficiency 
requirements. We propose:  
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H2b. The effect of spinoff adoption by geographically proximate universities 
on the decision of another university in that region to adopt spinoffs was stronger in 
the first period than in the second. 
Fashion dynamics. As we briefly mentioned earlier, management fashions are 
relatively transitory collective beliefs disseminated by exogenous to a group of 
organizations opinion leaders such as the media, lobbyists or major consulting 
agencies (Abrahamson, 1991) that certain management choices lead to progress 
(Abrahamson, 1996: 257). The illusion of the rational progress is temporary: short-
lived examples such as total quality management (TQM) exemplify this trend in 
recent management literature. Fashions take place because there is no objective 
evaluation or feedback on the usefulness of the new practices. Thus, the illusion of 
efficiency owes its strength to the lack of systematic knowledge gathering from the 
adopting organizations, or from other bodies responsible for the regulation of the 
industry (Nelson et al, 2004; Wejnert, 2002). According to Abrahamson and Fairchild 
(1999), fashions occur through certain triggering events. Triggers are not the same 
with solid institutional decisions that affect change through regulation, accreditation 
or administrative monitoring (Strang and Sine, 2002: 507). Changes in government 
discourse as that concerning university technology transfer in 1993 may have been a 
trigger of the new practices that spread, but they were less important than laws that 
contain specific sanctioning or rewarding powers. Fashion theorists contend that 
fashions tend to be frequent but short-lived in countries wherein norms of rationality 
and efficiency are clearly specified (Abrahamson, 1996: 263). Nonetheless, popular 
practices that have been state-mandated may also lose their appeal if the government 
withdraws its mandate (Abrahamson, 1996: 256).  
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Research on the diffusion and abandonment of fashions has predominantly 
taken place in for-profit organizational settings. In the context of academic 
entrepreneurship, media coverage (a fashion-setting mechanism) gathered pace from 
the early 1990’s with the population of spinoff firms attracting almost 500 press 
articles by the year 2000 (figure 5.3). The average number of media reports per 
spinoff also increased from 1.12 in 1995 to 2.74 in 1998 and 3.76 in 2000. Typical 
mentions in the UK press hailed spinoffs as taking research methods “from the 
laboratory bench to the hospital ward” (Observer, 2000) and as “building the new 
knowledge-driven economy” (M2 Presswire, 1998). 
 
Figure 5.3: Media coverage of English and Scottish spinoffs, 1993-2007 (average on right axis) 
In this media hype, one university was seen as planning to form “80 spinoffs 
in only three years”, highlighting excessive hopes on the “role that spinoffs would 
play in the national economy” (Sheffield Star, 2002). The influence of media 
coverage is central to the diffusion of innovations and fashion literatures 
(Abrahamson, 1991; Rogers, 2003), however, research on university spinoffs has 
ignored it focusing instead on efficiency-based explanations (Lockett and Wright, 
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2005; O’Shea et al, 2005). We argue that the UK media magnified spinoff events 
granting them legitimacy and respectability (Deephouse, 2000) even among 
audiences negatively positioned towards them. This may have attracted universities 
that were previously not engaged in the process to follow suit by forming spinoffs in 
a rapid bandwagon trajectory. For reasons that we highlighted earlier (Abrahamson, 
1991; Oliver, 1992), the influence of the media may have been less important in the 
second period of the spinoff industry evolution. We propose:  
H3a. There is a positive relationship between spinoff media coverage and a 
university’s decision to adopt spinoffs. 
H3b. The effect of spinoff media coverage on a university’s decision to adopt 
spinoffs was stronger in the first period than in the second. 
Efficiency explanations. Scholars in the United States and Europe looking for 
answers as to why spinoffs spread so quickly have offered efficiency-based 
explanations of how university strategies and initiatives as well as general economic 
conditions favored the diffusion of these firms (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Lockett 
and Wright, 2005; O’Shea, Allen, Chevalier and Roche, 2005). Researchers have 
implicitly assumed that more spinoffs were better for national economies and 
universities, without considering the prospects of survival and growth of these 
companies or the benefits that spinoffs brought back to universities. Diffusion and 
fashion theorists such as Abrahamson (1991) have claimed that this dominant 
perspective in the diffusion literature is indicative of the pro-innovation bias which 
suggests that diffused innovations will benefit the adopters, despite lack of such 
evidence. He and other theorists have proposed that lack of evidence is a predictor of 
fashion diffusion processes (Abrahamson, 1991; Nelson et al, 2004) because the 
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resulting ambiguity forces organizations to accept practices that are not beneficial or 
financial sustainable within their structure. By collecting information and setting 
standards for financial rewards around 2001, the government made steps towards 
rationalizing the spinoff industry. Few universities had formed spinoffs with clear 
growth prospects since 1993 because most had seen high spinoff productivity as 
necessary or sufficient given the government mandates (HM Treasury, 1993). Figure 
2 indicates that post-2001, not only did spinoff numbers decrease but spinoff deaths 
increased markedly. We contend that, following new evidence and new governmental 
guidelines, universities that did not consider the production of potentially successful 
spinoffs as feasible within their capabilities and resource capacity would abandon the 
practice. In contrast, those few that had prior experience in successful spinoff 
formation would continue after the government introduced financial incentives such 
as the HEIF funds. Thus, continuing to generate successful spinoffs was a natural but 
also strategic university choice based on criteria of efficiency. We hypothesize:  
H4a. There is a positive relationship between prior spinoff growth and a 
university’s decision to adopt spinoffs. 
H4b. The effect of prior spinoff growth on a university’s decision to adopt 
spinoffs was stronger in the second period than in the first. 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Sample and Measures 
We gathered panel data on the population of universities (113) and spinoffs 
firms (1404) in England and Scotland covering a period of 15 years between 1993 to 
2007. We located most data in publication outlets such the Higher Education 
Statistics Authority (HESA) and supplemented it with information from primary 
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sources such as direct contacts with universities and Technology Transfer Offices. 
The need to create a full UK university spinoff database has been enormous. Various 
government- and industry-sponsored reports (HM Treasury, 2003, 2007; Minshall 
and Wicksteed, 2005) as well as individual scholars in the UK (Lockett and Wright, 
2005) and internationally (Shane, 2004a) have called for such an initiative, as it has 
been recognized that lack of data hampers policy makers in the field. Indeed, it is 
remarkable that after so many years of expansion, the population of UK spinoffs and 
their demographics was still unknown. In the following paragraphs, we explain the 
various data sources that we used in this project.  
Dependent variables. We defined two dependent variables in our study. First, 
a binary variable measuring whether a university founded any spinoff in a given year 
(0=no, 1=yes) and second, a positive integer capturing the total number of spinoffs 
founded each year by a university. 
Independent variables. Membership into the universities’ spinoff association 
UNICO was measured as years since joining. As some universities left the association 
earlier than others, we used a decreasing yearly ratio of 0.80 to capture the slowly-
fading effect of a UNICO membership over time. The reason for this is that having 
left UNICO did not automatically erase the cumulative UNICO experience of a 
university that participated in the union for years.  
Local diffusion was measured as the percentage of universities in a UK region 
that had formed at least one spinoff in a year. We used the UK’s classification of 9 
geographic regions of England (Government Office regions) plus Scotland to assign 
universities in each of these. We then counted the number of universities that had 
formed a spinoff in each region and divided the figure by the total number of 
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universities located in that region. This approach has been employed in several 
diffusion studies, including in Strang and Tuma’s (1993) heterogeneous diffusion 
model as well as in deterministic diffusion models (e.g. Hedstrom, 1994; Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004).  
Media coverage of spinoffs was assessed by counting the number of UK press 
clippings that related to a university and its spinoff firms in a single article. We 
searched the LexisNexis database for articles with the name of a university and each 
of its spinoff firms as keywords and marked such articles in our 15 year period. For 
example, we searched with “University College London” and “Company X” for all 
universities and spinoffs and recorded a total of 8866 articles linked to 1404 spinoffs 
and their parent universities. Although we could group articles based on their 
negative or positive tenor (Pollock and Rindova, 2003), an examination of our 
database showed that there were hardly any articles negatively positioned towards 
spinoff-related events. We therefore proceeded to measure the independent variable 
“media coverage” as the total number of media articles of all universities and their 
spinoff firms minus the focal one, at any year. Content analysis of this type has been 
used in various other settings in organizational studies (e.g. Holden, 1986; Myers, 
2000). 
Efficiency in spinoff formation was measured as the logarithm of a 
university’s prior spinoffs firms’ total assets. Theoretically, we expected that past 
spinoff growth would affect the decision to form spinoffs in the future (yes/no) or the 
number of spinoffs generated in the future (Deephouse, 1996). Assets are frequently 
used as firm size indicators and can capture common endowments at the time of a 
spinoff founding such as patents, office space and personnel granted to them by 
universities. We see these endowments as indications of a university’s commitment to 
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generating successful future spinoffs. In this context, assets are better estimates of 
growth than revenues since revenues are hard to generate in the early years of a 
spinoff’s life due to its liability of newness. Also, revenues are commercial results 
often generated when the spinoff has become completely autonomous or has been 
acquired/merged with another external firm; thus, revenue figures are irrelevant in our 
study. 
Control variables. We controlled for a number of university-level and 
environmental factors that may affect the diffusion of spinoffs. To control for 
university performance, we collected yearly data on the number of publications in 
ranked journals by each university as listed in the ISI Web of Knowledge. University 
performance measured like this (cf. Keith and Babchuk, 1998) often called “stock of 
knowledge” has been used by other researchers on the spinoff industry (O’Shea et al, 
2005). We controlled for industry funding and university endowments as indicators of 
university exposure to businesses and individual entrepreneurs who invest through 
various contracts with or donate to these institutions. Funding from private sources 
rather than the central government have been seen as indicators of a university’s 
propensity to engage in startup formation (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003). To avoid 
potential multicollinearity problems between these funding covariates and university 
performance we took the average funding figures per full-time student instead of 
absolute figures. Consistent with previous research (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1999; Roberts and Dowling, 2002), we controlled for university reputation 
based on scores in the Times Higher Education university guide that is published 
annually since 1993. Many scholars have cast their doubts as to whether media 
rankings can accurately measure reputation because they consider them as rather 
noisy and inconsistent indicators of quality. However, ratings and rankings collapse 
 70 
the diverse and complex information necessary to evaluate organizational quality into 
a single number and “it is precisely this synoptic nature of rankings that makes them 
have a strong impact on an organization’s prominence” (Rindova, Williamson, 
Petkova and Sever, 2005:1038). Similar to reputation, we included a measure of 
university status defined as the cumulative number of Nobel Prizes won over the 
years. Status is different from reputation because the former is based on network 
theory and the demonstration of past quality, while reputation stems from signaling 
theory that emphasizes the ability to send signals to stakeholders through current 
organizational actions (Feldman et al, 2002; Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006: 
54; Sine, Shane and DiGregorio, 2003). 
We controlled for prior experience in spinoff formation before 1993, when 
our window of observation started, by coding 2 those universities that had such 
experience and 1 those that did not. We also controlled for Technology Transfer 
Office experience by measuring its age in each university. Various authors have 
highlighting the importance of TTO staff training and expertise as factors affecting 
the successful coordination of spinoff generation (Lockett and Wright, 2005; 
DiGregorio and Shane, 2003). To control for university age, we measured the number 
of years since the founding of each institution. We also controlled for relative 
university size by taking the total number of full-time university students. Rowan 
(1982) has shown that the size of educational organizations is not always a good 
predictor of their behavior, but it can be used as a control variable when other 
constructs are included in analyses. We also included a dummy variable to distinguish 
between the two countries in our sample, coding Scottish universities as 1 and 
English as 0. Scotland has had a distinctive approach to its spinoff industry compared 
to England with many English TTO managers envying the Scottish approach. The 
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main reason for this is Scottish Enterprise, a national, well-structured scheme for the 
financial support of high-tech businesses in the country. 
Finally, we included two environmental controls, i.e. regional GDP and 
regional R&D intensity, measured as private industry investments in R&D. The 
mechanism through which these operate is twofold: when economic development or 
R&D investments are high, it is natural to expect that entrepreneurial activities 
including academic entrepreneurship will increase. Alternatively, when GDP and 
R&D investments are low in a region, spinoff formation could be used a stimulus for 
the regional economy with the government supporting investments in research and 
knowledge transfer (Lockett and Wright, 2005). We collected data from the National 
Statistics Authority on per-capita GDP and per-capita R&D investments in each of 
the ten UK regions in our sample: nine in England plus Scotland.  
5.4.2 Analysis 
As stated above, we defined the dependent variable in two ways: first, as the 
university decision to form spinoffs each year (yes/no) and second, as the number of 
spinoffs formed each year. The reason for the two alternative specifications is that 
spinoffs were formed not only in different years and periods (pre- vs. post-2001) but 
also with different intensity across years, thus we wanted to account for this 
sensitivity in our dataset. In the first case, we employed discrete-time event history 
analysis estimating maximum likelihood logistic regression. Our data were discrete-
time rather than continuous because the exact timing of a spinoff founding was not 
included in the analysis (even thought it was known for most firms) as information on 
the other covariates was only available on a yearly basis. Because we had repeated 
events in our sample (i.e. the same university remained in the sample every year) we 
pooled yearly events over time as suggested by Allison (1984). 
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In the second case, we estimated negative binomial regression models as we 
were concerned with count variables that take small positive values. For easier 
interpretation, instead of coefficients (b), results of the negative binomial regression 
were reported as incident-rate ratios (exp(b)), where a one point change to an 
independent variable, holding the others constant, would lead to a change equal to the 
incident-rate ratio (IRR) of the dependent. To test our hypotheses and the differential 
impact of late government regulatory and normative intervention, we split our sample 
in two periods: 1993-2000 and 2001-2007.  
All independent and control variables in the models were lagged by one year 
to allow for their effects on the dependent variable to unfold smoothly.  
5.5 Results 
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations among variables in the 
models. Most correlations range from small to moderate, however, to examine 
possible problems with multicollinearity we computed variance inflation factors 
(VIF). In both periods and with both event history and negative binomial analyses, we 
found that all variables had VIF well below the usual warning level of 10, with the 
highest VIF not exceeding 6.5 and the mean VIF always below 3 (Gujarati, 2003). 
Tables 5.2 shows results for the entire period of observation; in both analyses 
we find strong support for hypotheses 1a, 2a, 4a but not for 3a. Membership into 
UNICO, local diffusion and prior spinoff growth (efficiency) were all found to be 
significant predictors of spinoff diffusion. Media coverage had a negative impact on 
spinoff formation that was significant in the negative binomial regression. This is 
perhaps a consequence of the popularity of spinoffs increasing dramatically in the 
second period, even as spinoff numbers declined. A possible explanation is that 
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spinoffs in the new era were judged based on higher success compared to the 
previous period, therefore fewer champion spinoffs attracted more press coverage 
compared to the many spinoffs attracting less average media coverage before the year 
2001. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show results of event history analysis on the decision to form 
spinoffs (yes/no). Overall, we find support for hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a and 4a once 
more, as the four variables increase X² and decrease the log likelihood in all models 
except 10. Model 12 shows that media coverage cannot explain spinoff productivity 
in the second period, a fact that further supports hypothesis 3b (model 6 shows that 
media coverage is significant pre-2001). Results also support hypotheses 2b and 4b as 
local diffusion was less important and prior spinoff growth was more important when 
government rewards were first introduced. However, we did not find support that 
early membership into UNICO (1b) was more important than after 2001.  
In tables 5.5 and 5.6, results of negative binomial regression provide partial 
support to our arguments. Specifically, we find local diffusion and media coverage to 
be more important predictors in the unregulated era (negative effect in the regulated 
era) as predicted by 2b and 3b but we find mixed support for membership and prior 
spinoff growth. Membership into UNICO was significant in both periods’ overall 
models, however model 8 on table 6 shows that, when added alone to the baseline 
model, membership in the second period was not significant as in model 2 in table 
5.5, therefore granting some support to hypothesis 1b. In contrast, model 11, table 5.6 
indicates that prior spinoff growth was not a more significant predictor of spinoff 
diffusion in the second period than in the first as suggested by hypothesis 4b. In 
summary, we found support for most hypotheses across both analyses indicating that 
results confirm our theoretical explanations on spinoff diffusion.  
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 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
                  
1 Publication output 1.00                
2 Industry funding 0.28 1.00               
3 Endowments 0.14 0.42 1.00              
4 Reputation -0.57 -0.52 -0.47 1.00             
5 Status 0.54 0.13 0.14 -0.32 1.00            
6 Prior experience 0.52 0.12 0.02 -0.54 0.27 1.00           
7 TTO age 0.58 0.17 0.05 -0.40 0.43 0.50 1.00          
8 Age 0.56 0.16 0.18 -0.46 0.66 0.37 0.44 1.00         
9 Size 0.27 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.11 1.00        
10 Scotland 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.16 0.21 0.24 -0.10 1.00       
11 Local GDP 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 1.00      
12 Local R&D 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 -0.07 -0.29 0.19 1.00     
13 Membership 0.33 0.08 0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.39 -0.02 0.16 -0.05 1.00    
14 Local diffusion 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.45 0.62 -0.03 0.22 1.00   
15 Media coverage 0.17 0.11 0.08 -0.28 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.16 -0.00 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.52 1.00  
16 Prior spinoff growth 0.34 0.10 0.07 -0.24 0.26 0.45 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.23 0.19 0.29 1.00 
 N 1695 1658 1658 1464 1695 1695 1693 1695 1665 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1694 
 Mean 154 266 217 56 0.49 1.30 4.38 65.7 14k 0.12 15k 1148 2.45 7.07 451 6.40 
 S.D. 284 661 1179 33 2.54 0.45 6.58 145 8359 0.33 4639 941 3.68 4.65 431 7.25 
All correlations above 0.056 significant at  p<0.05 
Table 5.5.1: Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics
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 Event history on the decision  
to form spinoffs by year 
 Negative binomial regression on the 
number of spinoffs formed by year 
Variables Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e.  Model 3 s.e. Model 4 s.e. 
 
Publication output 1.00** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)  1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Industry funding 1.00* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)  1.00 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 
Endowments 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)  1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Reputation -0.98*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00)  -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) 
Status -0.99 (0.08) 1.08 (0.10)  -0.98 (0.02) 1.01 (0.02) 
Prior experience 1.45* (0.25) 1.42† (0.28)  1.28* (0.13) 1.11 (0.12) 
TTO age 1.10*** (0.02) 1.08*** (0.02)  1.04*** (0.00) 1.03*** (0.00) 
Age -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00)  -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Size 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00* (0.00)  1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 
Scotland 1.87* (0.49) -0.35** (0.13)  1.69*** (0.22) -0.62* (0.01) 
Local GDP 1.00*** (0.00) -0.99*** (0.00)  1.00*** (0.00) -0.99** (0.00) 
Local R&D 0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00)  -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Membership   1.07** (0.03)    1.03* (0.02) 
Local diffusion   1.33*** (0.06)    1.15*** (0.03) 
Media coverage   -0.99 (0.00)    -0.99* (0.00) 
Prior spinoff growth   1.06*** (0.01)    1.05*** (0.01) 
          
          
X² 653.31***  745.88***   762.80***  864.61***  
Log likelihood -625.08  -578.79   -1424.07  -1373.17  
df 12  16   12  16  
N=1457; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 
 
Table 5.5.2: Results on the entire period of observation: 1993-2007 
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Table 5.5.3: Event history analysis on the decision to form spinoffs by year: 1993-2000 
 
Variables Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e. Model 3 s.e. Model 4 s.e. Model 5 s.e. Model 6 s.e. 
             
Publication output 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Industry funding 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Endowments 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Reputation -0.97*** (0.01) -0.97*** (0.01) -0.97*** (0.01) -0.97*** (0.01) -0.97*** (0.01) -0.97*** (0.00) 
Status 0.98 (0.09) 1.02 (0.09) 1.03 (0.09) 1.00 (0.09) 1.00 (0.09) 1.06 (0.10) 
Prior experience 1.51† (0.35) 1.89** (0.46) 1.86* (0.46) 1.74* (0.42) 1.20 (0.30) 1.87* (0.51) 
TTO age 1.11*** (0.02) 1.08*** (0.02) 1.08** (0.03) 1.08*** (0.02) 1.10*** (0.02) 1.06** (0.02) 
Age -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Size 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Scotland 2.95** (1.02) 3.36*** (1.16) -0.50 (0.24) 2.70** (0.93) 2.52** (0.89) -0.64 (0.32) 
Local GDP 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) -0.99* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) -0.99* (0.00) 
Local R&D 1.00* (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Membership   1.18** (0.06)       1.06 (0.05) 
Local diffusion     1.35*** (0.08)     1.27*** (0.07) 
Media coverage       1.00*** (0.00)   1.00** (0.00) 
Prior spinoff growth         1.05** (0.02) 1.02 (0.01) 
             
             
X² 333.75***  344.46***  365.97***  358.93***  343.58***  381.91***  
Log likelihood -341.06  -336.05  -325.30  -328.82  -336.14  -316.98  
Df 12  13  13  13  13  16  
N=835; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 
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Table 5.5.4: Event history analysis on the decision to form spinoffs by year: 2001-2007 
Variables Model 7 s.e. Model 8 s.e. Model 9 s.e. Model 10 s.e. Model 11 s.e. Model 12 s.e. 
             
Publication output 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Industry funding 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Endowments 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Reputation -0.98*** (0.00) -0.98*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.98*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) 
Status 3.45* (1.70) 3.42* (1.69) 3.96** (1.99) 3.55* (1.75) 3.16* (1.56) 3.43* (1.73) 
Prior experience 1.93* (0.52) 2.22** (0.62) 1.84* (0.52) 1.77* (0.49) 1.67† (0.47) 1.83* (0.54) 
TTO age 1.07*** (0.02) 1.05** (0.02) 1.11*** (0.03) 1.11*** (0.02) 1.07*** (0.02) 1.09*** (0.02) 
Age 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Size 1.00* (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 
Scotland 1.00 (0.42) 1.18 (0.49) -0.14** (0.09) 1.05 (0.45) -0.90 (0.37) -0.59 (0.45) 
Local GDP 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99*** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Local R&D -0.99*** (0.00) -0.99*** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99*** (0.00) -0.99*** (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Membership   1.05* (0.03)       1.07* (0.03) 
Local diffusion     1.39*** (0.12)     1.12 (0.11) 
Media coverage       -0.99*** (0.00)   -0.99*** (0.00) 
Prior spinoff growth         1.04* (0.02) 1.03† (0.02) 
             
             
X² 331.36***  335.84***  348.27***  350.95***  335.09***  363.78***  
Log likelihood -261.51  -259.27  -253.05  -251.71  -259.05  -244.71  
Df 12  13  13  13  13  16  
N=618; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 
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5.6 Discussion 
In this paper, we examined the diffusion of state-mandated practices among public 
educational organizations. The paper has important implications for the diffusion 
(Rogers, 2003) and fashion (Abrahamson, 1991; Abrahamson, 1996; Nelson et al, 
2004) theories for a number of reasons. First, rather than static explanations, we move 
towards a theory of more dynamic diffusion processes among state-owned 
organizations. The explicit assumption among diffusion studies dealing with public, 
non-profit organizations, is that there exist clear government guidelines that 
organizations follow in order to appear legitimate (Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002; 
D’Aunno et al, 1991; Davis, 1991; Greve, 1996). This sensitivity for compliance is 
presumably extremely high among educational institutions because changes in their 
mission or structure are not evaluated in “technical terms” unless they have first been 
evaluated in terms of conformity to the state requirements (Rowan, 1982; Scott, 
1981). We do not deny the role of “public-good” evaluations of state-owned 
enterprises on their decision to comply with state demands. But we argue that state 
powers have been misrepresented to describe the cognitive aspects of neoinstitutional 
theory, thus replacing other explanations of practice diffusion among public 
organizations. Because government intervention in public good markets is seen as 
extremely important, authors have assumed that organizations adopt practices 
automatically (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999) due to those pressures. Instead, we suggest 
that state powers are not so rigid, therefore leaving plenty of space for mimetic or 
fashion mechanisms to dictate the diffusion process. This conceptualization brings us 
closer to the true cognitive aspects of organizational change that lie at the heart of 
neoinstitutional theory: public organizations are driven by the need to appear 
legitimate and comply to state mandates as much as by cognitive dynamics outside 
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the realm of the government, such as fashions and peer strategies. In fact, weak 
monitoring of government-mandated practice implementation is the reason why 
public organizations are left exposed to fashions and mimetic processes.  
Further, in most diffusion studies, authors misattribute the adoption of 
practices to institutional compliance and coercive pressures for two reasons 
(Greenwood et al, 2008). First, they assume that the state has rationally examined 
clear benefits for the adopting institutions before mandating the new practices or that 
it has formalized its monitoring mechanisms with regards to how adopting and non-
adopting entities are rewarded and punished. In this instance, mimetic behaviors or 
fashion trajectories are excluded from the analysis as the taken-for grandedness of the 
new activities is assumed to be given exclusively by state approval (“sociopolitical 
legitimacy”, Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Second, in organizational studies of practice 
diffusion among public organizations, very few authors have satisfactorily 
operationalized both normative and regulatory intervention in a single study 
(Mizruchi and Fein, 1999) and in some cases institutional theorists have deliberately 
blended these elements to form a composite “institutional profile” (Greenwood et al, 
2008: 16) that supposedly affects diffusion. This has led researchers to commonly 
attribute the diffusion of practices to some unspecified government “institutional 
forces” that they designate at will. Contrary to these studies, we show that examining 
the adoption of innovations under different levels of regulatory or normative regimes 
(e.g. high vs. low) can help us significantly in understanding the true forces of 
innovation adoption among public organizations. 
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Table 5.5.5: Results of negative binomial regression on the number of spinoffs formed by year: 1993-2000 
Variables Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e. Model 3 s.e. Model 4 s.e. Model 5 s.e. Model 6 s.e. 
             
Publication output 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Industry funding 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00* (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 
Endowments 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Reputation -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) 
Status -0.97 (0.02) 1.00 (0.03) -0.98 (0.03) -0.99 (0.02) -0.99 (0.03) 1.02 (0.03) 
Prior experience 1.28† (0.19) 1.46** (0.22) 1.38* (0.20) 1.53** (0.23) 1.14 (0.17) 1.55** (0.25) 
TTO age 1.07*** (0.01) 1.06*** (0.01) 1.06*** (0.01) 1.05*** (0.01) 1.06*** (0.01) 1.04*** (0.01) 
Age -0.99 (0.00) -0.99† (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Size 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 
Scotland 2.19*** (0.35) 2.58*** (0.44) -0.96 (0.24) 2.07*** (0.34) 1.78*** (0.30) 1.10 (0.29) 
Local GDP 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Local R&D 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Membership   1.10*** (0.03)       1.06* (0.03) 
Local diffusion     1.14*** (0.03)     1.11*** (0.03) 
Media coverage       1.00*** (0.00)   1.00*** (0.00) 
Prior spinoff growth         1.03*** (0.00) 1.02† (0.01) 
             
             
X² 476.68***  489.68***  497.47***  509.71***  493.50***  528.55***  
Log likelihood -689.80  -683.66  -679.76  -673.64  -681.40  -663.87  
df 12  13  13  13  13  16  
N=835; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 
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Table 5.5.6: Results of negative binomial regression on the number of spinoffs formed by year: 2001-2007 
 
Variables Model 7 s.e. Model 8 s.e. Model 9 s.e. Model 10 s.e. Model 11 s.e. Model 12 s.e. 
             
Publication output 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99* (0.00) 
Industry funding 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Endowments 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
Reputation -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) -0.98*** (0.00) -0.97*** (0.00) 
Status -0.99 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) -0.98 (0.02) -0.97 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) -0.98 (0.03) 
Prior experience 1.30† (0.18) 1.35* (0.19) 1.24 (0.17) 1.17 (0.16) 1.26 (0.18) 1.21 (0.17) 
TTO age 1.01* (0.00) 1.01† (0.01) 1.02** (0.00) 1.04*** (0.00) 1.01† (0.01) 1.03*** (0.01) 
Age -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 
Size 1.00*** (0.01) 1.00* (0.01) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.01) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00*** (0.00) 
Scotland 1.21 (0.21) 1.26 (0.23) -0.52* (0.16) 1.19 (0.21) 1.16 (0.20) 1.28 (0.23) 
Local GDP -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00† (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Local R&D -0.99*** (0.00) -0.99** (0.00) -0.99 (0.00) -0.99** (0.00) -0.99** (0.00) -0.99** (0.00) 
Membership   1.01 (0.01)       1.04** (0.02) 
Local diffusion     1.15*** (0.05)     -0.94* (0.03) 
Media coverage       -0.99*** (0.00)   -0.99** (0.00) 
Prior spinoff growth         1.02 (0.01) 1.01† (0.01) 
             
             
X² 345.03***  346.74***  358.56***  380.16***  347.18***  393.65***  
Log likelihood -688.56  -688.28  -682.37  -671.57  -687.49  -664.25  
df 12  13  13  13  13  16  
N=618; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 
 83 
 
Our research has implications for management fashion theories. Despite 
Abrahamson’s call (1996: 274) there has been limited operationalization of fashion 
diffusion models. Here, we show that given a country’s norms of rationality, fashion 
theories are unable to explain alone the infiltration of fashion setters such as media 
into public organizations settings. We believe that a more fine-tuned process of 
measuring the normative environment and its codes of rationality is necessary if we 
are to understand the fashion market with its suppliers and buyers (Abrahamson, 
1996). This is critical for both public and private organizations that wish to avoid 
management fashions within their fields. In the case of public organizations, 
government regulations and financial rewards for spinoff formation were significant 
predictors of the spinoff collapse after 2001. Perhaps monitoring an industry and 
defining reward standards based on efficiency criteria is the answer to non-profit, as 
well as for-profit organizational fields. 
Third, the way we operationalized our research shows that diffusion per se 
does not signify institutionalization, a major point in need for clarification among 
institutional theorists (Greenwood et al, 2008: 11). Despite early media coverage and 
mimetic behaviors that affected the rate of spinoff creation, spinoffs never acquired a 
taken-for-granted status: alternative routes for technology transfer always existed. 
Although we cannot provide the evidence, we believe that universities abandoning 
spinoffs post-2001 moved back to such alternatives as technology licensing. This 
conceptualization runs in parallel with management fashion assumptions because the 
latter have been argued not to be associated with permanent adoption of practices: a 
fashion diffusion is a short-lived illusionary process that never acquires taken-for-
grandedness (Abrahamson, 1991; 1996). We add to this literature by arguing that 
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government legislation in previously mandated but unregulated fields can bring down 
an adopted practice. This might sound obvious and, as Abrahamson has pointed out 
(1991: 256), “the popularity of a management technique can anyway change based on 
government mandates”. Nonetheless, we emphasize the theoretical importance of a 
clearly defined regulatory or normative framework at the time that the practice starts 
spreading because, if these do not exist, the true institutionalization of a field will 
eventually be delayed. We thus see the institutionalization process as closely linked to 
audiences that oversee industries and fields through specific norms. 
Our study is different from work on institutional logics (Thornton, 2002) 
because logics define the content and meaning of institutions and prescribe specific 
actions in certain periods (Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). In the first 
period of the study, rather than spinoff numbers or spinoff growth, there was no 
central logic guiding government preferences other than the general need for 
“technology transfer”. If there existed one, that logic was vague enough to 
accommodate (and not punish universities with) large numbers of spinoffs that had 
extremely diverse chances for survival and growth. In the second period, a logic was 
clearly formed in that spinoff growth was seen as the truly necessary, meaningful 
action that should be rewarded. Thus, contrary to previous assumptions, we show 
how market or institutional logics cannot be constructed simply through government 
mandates or “triggers of change” and static legislation. Institutional logics are based 
on crafting meanings through specific normative, regulatory and cognitive beliefs of 
what constitutes appropriate behavior in a certain period. Institutional logics do 
require a certain level of balance among various institutional audiences in order to 
function properly (Rowan, 1982) and this balance must be dynamically reassessed at 
all times.  
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The paper has also important managerial and public policy implications. It 
shows how public money and efforts can be wasted when “compliance” and 
“conformity” to government pressures are left as the only driving forces behind 
public administration and restructuring. After the initial legislation of the 1980’s and 
1990’s, there were plenty of opportunities for the government to design specific 
policies for the spinoff industry including the accreditation of Technology Transfer 
Offices, the formation or endorsement of a spinoff association such as UNICO or 
other measures towards spinoff regulation. Such timely intervention would have been 
beneficial not least because alternative routes for the commercialization of university 
intellectual property existed prior to the spinoff growth and could have been better 
unitized instead of spinoffs. The existence of alternatives such as these is a major 
reason why strict monitoring and accreditation standards must be enforced to secure 
the avoidance of public organization management fashions. 
A second reason why spinoffs emerged not based solely on efficiency 
explanations is the degree of differentiation that the new demands for change 
represented relative to existing practices (Etzkowitz, 2003; Shane, 2004a). The 
insistence on greater technology commercialization given prior licensing or other 
business-university interaction signaled a significant departure from the traditional 
mission of the educational system (Bok, 2003). Because industry deals were 
previously done in a naturalistic way and the new demands were moving universities 
towards a more professional business model, state preparations should have been a 
priority. Work done on the diffusion of educational innovations has always assumed 
some sort of relevance between old and new practices, for example, the addition of a 
new course or administrative office within schools (Clark, 1968; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). These kind of mandates do not challenge importantly the core foundations of 
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educational systems, hence balance among school audiences (Rowan, 1982) is easier 
to achieve as there is no fundamental opposition against them. Also, rapid compliance 
to such state mandates does not incur any extraordinary financial or administrative 
costs to universities. In contrast, our spinoff setting shows how diversifying activities 
that carry great financial risks are more susceptible to a fashion style diffusion. To 
avoid wasting resources, governors and managers should therefore closely match 
their expectations from public organizations with equally well defined norms that 
guide and assist these organizations towards successful compliance. 
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6. LEGITIMATE PRACTICES AND ACQUISITION OF FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES BY PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS4 
6.1 Abstract 
We draw from legitimacy definitions of the institutional and population 
ecology theories to assess the impact of legitimate practices on the rate of resource 
acquisition among public organizations. The empirical context is academic 
entrepreneurship and, specifically, university spinoffs in the UK public education 
industry. Results indicate that the number of spinoffs (density-related legitimacy), the 
performance of spinoffs (performance-related legitimacy) and the publicity generated 
by spinoffs help universities acquire critical resources from both public and private 
constituents. The empirical contribution of this paper lies in examining the impact of 
university spinoffs on their parent institutions’ financial well being for the first time, 
using a completely novel database of spinoff firms. Theoretically, we show how 
legitimacy dynamics and elements of a socially constructed reality considerably shape 
the resource flow dynamics among public organizations. 
6. 2 Introduction 
How do organizations acquire resources? This central question in the 
management literature has attracted the attention of scholars drawing from several 
theoretical perspectives. For example, some researchers have emphasized the role of 
individual strategic actions such as entering into alliance formation with reputable 
partners (Gulati, 1991), while others have looked at environmental embeddedness and 
inter-organizational linkages within networks (Baker and Faulkner, 2006; Wiewel and 
Hunter, 1985) in order to explain resource acquisition. One of the most recent 
contributions to this debate has been proposed by institutional (Greenwood, Oliver, 
                                                          
4
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Babson Entrepreneurship Research conference, 
the Academy of Management, and the European Academy of Management 
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Sahlin and Suddaby, 2008) and organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) 
theorists who argue that organizations can enhance their resource acquisition by 
managing the legitimacy of their actions given the surrounding social system.  
Legitimacy has been seen as a direct prerequisite of organizational resources, 
because it refers to how the focal organization is seen by the environment that holds 
these resources (Suchman, 1995). Social players (e.g. customers, suppliers, 
governmental agencies) observe organizations, and if the latter are seen as not 
behaving in a way that respects the beliefs and values of the social system, they may 
withhold their financial endorsement as a way of punishment against these 
organizations (Suchman, 1995; Zuckerman, 1999). Such restrictions in the access to 
resources can be critical, not least because resources are important for a firm’s 
performance and its potential strategic advantage against competitors (Barney, 1991; 
Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007).  
Nonetheless, scholars have mostly examined routes to resource acquisition 
among for-profit organizations. One of the reasons why the management literature 
often differentiates public from private organizations is their different structural and 
strategic focuses. For example, public organizations rely upon the state for most of 
their resources (Tolbert, 1985) and are therefore expected to comply with government 
rules and expectations lest they lose one of their key financial supporters (Scott, 
1981). Form a legitimacy perspective, the organization studies literature posits that 
legitimate public organizations attract resources from the central government in a 
standardized, routine fashion (Rankin, 1956). Thus, it is conceptually and empirically 
unclear how public organizations can draw government and industry resources when 
there are no clearly specified reward standards. Not having clearly specified standards 
may be the result of a novel diversification (e.g. new products, new markets) 
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undertaken by public organizations. This diversification further raises claims of 
illegitimacy for these organizations due to their lack of expertise in the new fields. In 
this paper, we examine the mechanism through which the legitimacy of public 
entities’ actions (i.e. the legitimacy of the new products) helps them acquire 
resources.  
We draw from the context of academic entrepreneurship (Djokovic and 
Souitaris, 2008; Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007; Shane, 2004a) and, specifically, 
university spinoffs from public universities in the United Kingdom to test the above 
legitimacy assumptions. Spinoffs were mandated by the UK government during the 
early 1990’s as a means to expand technology transfer in this country. Despite the 
risks that spinoff formation embodied for the producing universities, the government 
never linked spinoff formation to financial rewards for universities. Spinoffs were 
risky for many reasons: they were completely new activities shifting the attention of 
public universities from teaching and research to commercial business (Bok, 2003). 
They were also illegitimate practices in the eyes of many audience members in the 
public. In this context, it is worth examining whether the gradual legitimation of these 
state-mandated spinoff practices helped universities acquire resources in any (direct 
or indirect) way.  
We concentrate on three core mechanisms that describe organizational 
legitimacy. The first has to do with the density-in-numbers effect of certain novel 
activities and the role of increasing density on the legitimization of the activities 
(Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The second mechanism has 
to do with the performance/ success of the new activities relative to competing 
organizations, and how high performance spinoffs confer legitimacy to these 
educational organizations (Rao, 1994). The third legitimacy element is linked to the 
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way information about novel activities is transmitted to the relevant organizational 
audiences. Central to this perspective is the role of media and the socially constructed 
reality that they help create (Luckmann and Berger, 1991). We first provide a short 
overview of the spinoff field in England and Scotland, and then we formulate 
hypotheses based on the institutional and ecological perceptions of legitimacy. 
6.3 University spinoffs in England and Scotland 
University spinoffs are “new firms created to exploit commercially some 
knowledge, technology or research results developed within a university” (Lockett 
and Wright, 2005; Shane, 2004a). The origins of the United Kingdom spinoff firms 
can be traced back in 1977 when the then Patents’ Act gave employee inventors the 
right to share financial benefits from their research with their employer. This 
regulatory state intervention had similar effects to the United States’ Bayh-Dhole Act, 
by incentivizing academic researchers to claim royalties and commercial benefits 
owned by their university (Rafferty, 2008; Shane, 2004b). In 1993, a UK government 
White Paper designated universities as key to the realization of the UK’s research 
potential and suggested policies to increase spinoff formation (HM Treasury, 1993). 
Historically, although spinoff firms had been formed for many years prior to 1993, 
their numbers were characteristically low and their emergence could be described as 
naturalistic: interesting ideas would diffuse to the market without a structured 
university approach. 
Spinoffs were initially seen as a dangerous deflection away from academic 
research and teaching and towards big business (Bok, 2003; Etzkowitz, 2003). There 
was considerable opposition to them both from within and outside universities 
(Shane, 2004a). Researchers have considered that, given the risks that spinoffs 
embodied, universities were expected to waste taxpayer money in unnecessary 
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venture formation (Bok, 2003). Despite these facts, the numbers of spinoffs rose 
steadily over the last 15 years. Extant literature on academic spinoffs has looked for 
answers as to why they spread so quickly (Lockett and Wright, 2005; O’Shea, Allen, 
Chevalier and Roche, 2005) or how increased numbers of spinoffs have contributed 
to the national economy (Shane, 2004a). But researchers have overlooked the 
question of whether spinoff firms directly affect the universities that create them. In 
this paper, we look at whether the diffusion of spinoff firms impacted the acquisition 
of financial resources by public universities. What is more, we consider how social 
actors beyond the actual numbers or success of the spinoffs formed by individual 
universities impacted on their resource acquisition. Specifically, we assess the role of 
the national media in explaining the “social construction” (Luckmann and Berger, 
1991) of the university-funding process. This perspective is in contrast to efficiency 
explanations of financial resource acquisition among public universities that have 
been previously proposed repeatedly in the management literature (Rankin, 1956; 
Tolbert, 1985). 
The examination of the impact of spinoff activities on university funding is 
important for a number of reasons. First, leading authors in the field have lamented 
that “we lack systematic explanations for the effects of spinoffs on the universities 
that create them” (Shane, 2004a: 3). Second, the phenomenon is extremely important 
for policy makers not only with regards to university performance in commercializing 
their knowledge, but also in terms of the institutional monitoring of new public 
organization activities. In specific, how does the government respond to fundamental 
changes taking place in the educational market? How quickly? How are universities 
rewarded within the general innovation policy frame of the state? The paper is also 
relevant to the extent that universities can exploit strategic changes in their 
 92 
environment to enhance their financial potential. In line with long-existing trends in 
the academia towards more financial autonomy among universities (Bok, 2003; 
Slaughter and Leslie, 1997), spinoff activities instilled a strong element of 
commercial orientation to the higher education market. We argue that public 
universities could exploit this change strategically by actively managing the 
legitimacy of their spinoff activities (Suchman, 1995).  
We test the above on the population of English and Scottish universities using 
a unique panel database ranging from 1993 to 2007. The database contains data on all 
1,404 unique spinoff firms established by 113 universities over the years. In 
summary, this study will examine the effect of a) the number of spinoffs, b) the 
performance of spinoffs and c) the publicity of spinoffs on the acquisition of financial 
resources by public universities. 
6.4 Theory and hypotheses 
Organizational legitimacy is a generalized perception that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is particularly important 
for public organizations because non-conformity to behavioral requirements dictated 
by the state can incur costs to these organizations. This sensitivity for compliance is 
particularly high among educational institutions because changes in their structure 
carry high levels of uncertainty due to their less technically- and more socially-
evaluated nature (Baldridge and Burnham 1975; Rowan, 1982; Scott, 1981: 139; 
Zajac and Kraatz, 1993). Public universities for example, and unlike for-profit 
organizations, are monitored by professional and governmental agencies that greatly 
restrict their freedom of movements due to the universities’ “public good” 
organizational nature. 
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Institutional theorists have recognized that not appearing as a legitimate social 
player can inhibit organizational efforts to acquire resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy and conformity to what is widely accepted as 
appropriate behavior is critical because organizations depend on audiences that 
surround them with resources. If members of these audiences do not endorse certain 
organizational behaviors, they are likely to divert their resources to those they see as 
legitimate organizational alternatives (Zuckerman, 1999). Social definitions of what 
is legitimate practice may also change over time as powerful social actors constantly 
reevaluate behaviors and field norms. Recent studies in the organization theory 
literature treat legitimacy as a continuum whereby certain actions are more or less 
legitimate than others (Suchamn, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Thus, it is 
important that organizations seeking to draw resources from their social environments 
constantly manage (adapt) their actions to the newly defined criteria of legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995).  
To measure the effect of legitimacy on resources, authors in the institutional 
and organizational ecology streams of research have proposed several 
operationalizations of the legitimacy construct (see for example, Deephouse, 1996; 
Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). We chose to apply 
three of these specifications to the UK spinoff phenomenon, namely the density-
dependence legitimacy (Hannan and Carroll, 1992), the performance-related 
legitimacy (Rao, 1994) and the media-effect legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter, 
2005). In particular, in the following paragraphs, we assess the legitimacy of 
university spinoffs using these approaches and link that legitimacy to the acquisition 
of financial resources by the universities that formed the spinoffs in the first place. 
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The rationale behind the decision to operationalize legitimacy as above is 
twofold. First, legitimation processes through density, performance and media 
coverage are some of the most commonly used research approaches (Deephouse and 
Carter, 2005). However, these measurements have been used predominantly in for-
profit organizational settings by management scholars. Second, the UK spinoff 
context is idle for the examination of legitimacy processes among public entities, 
especially given the change in direction towards business and commercial activities 
that the government-mandated spinoffs signaled (Bok, 2003). Dramatic shifts such as 
these challenge the legitimacy of organizations in a field, and the latter need to 
actively manage their behavior in order to appear legitimate enough in the eyes of 
resource holders. In this context, we ask: how did the numbers, performance and 
press coverage of spinoff firms affect university resource acquisition?  
6.4.1 Density-based legitimacy  
Population ecologists see legitimacy stemming from the safety-in-numbers 
effect (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001), so that 
increased numbers of a certain organizational behavior or form slowly acquire 
legitimacy within their field. Density owes its effect to the increased information that 
is presumably disseminated among audience members, hence the new practice or 
form is gradually accepted as the appropriate one (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). 
Population ecologists posit that high density increases the flow of available resources 
to organizations in an industry; however, density beyond a certain point in the 
industry’s life cycle will inhibit the rate of resource acquisition because competition 
ensues. Competitors will thus have to soon search for niches in their focal markets 
and concentrate their efforts in managing their resources accordingly (Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992).  
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In the UK, government legislation in the late 1970’s was the trigger of 
changes in academia (Strang and Sine, 2002: 507). The expansion of the English and 
Scottish spinoff industry was inspired by consecutive regulatory initiatives that, 
although did not completely specify organizational structures that universities should 
follow (e.g. the Technology Transfer Office, the intensity or locus of university-
industry linkages etc), they certainly precipitated efforts at reform among universities 
(Strang and Sine, 2002). The creation of spinoff firms was seen as an alternative to 
technology licensing that was common before 1993, or to Knowledge Transfer 
Partnerships that were also emerging as new technology transfer routes. Certainly, 
some universities engaged in spinoff formation more than others, for example due to 
university motives such as the need for greater financial autonomy, or university top 
management strategic initiatives (fig. 4.2). Further, because the number of 
universities that engaged in spinoff formation increased every year and because 
spinoff numbers also increased as a consequence, information about these activities 
gradually enhanced knowledge of the spinoff industry’s usefulness (Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992). 
The important stakeholders in the empirical setting of university spinoffs are 
the public and private sources of funding that stood as observers of the increasingly 
dense spinoff population. As noted above, legitimate organizational practices 
endorsed by key audiences can attract sources of university funding more quickly 
(Parsons, 1960) because they empower organizations by making them look 
meaningful to the members of their immediate audience (Suchman, 1995: 576). The 
effect of high spinoff productivity in enhancing the legitimacy of spinoffs as new 
university “products” may have taken different trajectories depending on the various 
audiences. Thus, private industry resource holders may have seen high spinoff density 
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as an opportunity for commercial deals with universities or as a chance to exploit 
university inventions. Public bodies may have seen increasing spinoff numbers as 
proof of university compliance to state mandates for university technology transfer 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). We therefore expect that increased spinoff formation 
legitimized these activities, thus also increasing the likelihood of private or public 
bodies supplying financial resources to universities (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
Based on this analysis, we hypothesize: 
H1: All else being equal, there is a positive relationship between density in a 
university’s spinoff portfolio and the acquisition of financial resources by that 
university. 
6.4.2 Performance-based legitimacy 
Another way of measuring organizational legitimacy is the performance of 
organizations in the early phases of an industry. Organizational studies scholars have 
examined the impact of high performance on a firm’s resource acquisition efforts in 
numerous occasions (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Rao, 
1994; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). One of the critical findings in the management 
literature is that high performing organizations can exploit their success by sending 
signals to resource holders, thus attracting financial endorsements. Market signals 
travel through informal networks and formal reports and help important stakeholders 
assess the future potential of an organization (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). This 
process may ultimately increase the reputation of a focal organizational relative to 
competitors and it is therefore likely that resource providers will entrust their support 
to that organization compared to another (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). 
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However, management and sociology theorists draw a distinction between 
reputation and organizational legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Rindova, 
Pollock and Hayward, 2006). While reputation refers to the effects of accumulated 
past performance, legitimacy is an archetype of reputation-building in new or 
emerging markets (Rao, 1994: 31). Organizational studies scholars view reputation as 
an outcome of legitimization processes in the early stages of an industry’s life cycle. 
For example, Rao (1994) has shown that novel organizations which participated and 
won industry competitions enhanced their legitimacy and were able to quickly 
acquire resources from their environments. Further, if they became successful in 
establishing themselves over a long period of time, they could increase their 
reputation relative to the competition. In other words, legitimacy processes take place 
early in the industry’s life cycle because, at that stage, it is important that 
organizations combat claims against their behavior, given their liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Once organizations have established themselves against claims 
of illegitimacy in a market, they can use reputation to combat competition. 
We believe that the spinoff population in England and Scotland is a good 
example of a new market, in that universities started forming spinoffs only few years 
ago. Further, the early stages of the phenomenon have been awash with opposition to 
spinoff formation as a new university practice (e.g. Bok, 2003; Shane, 2004a; 
Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). It is expected that high-performing spinoffs could banish 
claims of illegitimacy against universities by demonstrating that spinoff activities are 
healthy, acceptable university functions. One of the main expectations of the UK 
government was that spinoffs with high growth prospects would help the local or 
national economy (Shane, 2004a). We therefore believe that the government would 
sooner or later reward universities with successful spinoff activities for their 
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contributions. It is also natural that industry financial resource holders would 
demonstrate their support for university spinoffs relative to how legitimate these 
activities are, based on their performance. We hypothesize:  
H2: All else being equal, there is a positive relationship between the 
performance of a university’s spinoff portfolio and the acquisition of financial 
resources by that university. 
 
Figure 6.1: Spinoff performance in England and Scotland, 1993-2007 (average revenues in 
£000’s) 
 
6.4.3 Media-based legitimacy 
The decision to supply universities that form spinoffs with resources may not 
always be rational, though. Research in the sociology of organizations has shown that 
certain institutional intermediaries may affect the decision-making process of social 
actors. For instance, it has been shown that the categorization of organizations into 
industries by market analysts can impede their stock market performance, because 
investors seek the analysts’ views to make decisions (Johnson, Ellstrand, Dalton and 
Dalton, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999). Likewise, perceptions are shaped by various kinds 
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of media outlets that magnify facts thereby shaping the opinions of investors in IPO 
markets (Pollock and Rindova, 2003). 
The importance of media coverage in legitimizing certain events has been 
observed in various non-profit settings. Holden (1986) has shown how successful 
hijacking attempts that were covered by the press in the 1960’s were imitated by other 
individuals to further increase hijacking events in a rapid process of contagion. Myers 
(2000) has demonstrated how mass media networks helped legitimize incidents of 
collective violence in the same period. In educational systems, Brint and Karabel 
(1989: 113) have shown how the mass media were consistently framing inaccurate 
perceptions among young students on how community colleges should be reformed to 
accommodate their needs. Media influence, whether by reflecting or by affecting 
perceptions of what is legitimate and desirable behavior in a social system, have the 
power to create a “socially constructed” reality that shapes the process of rewarding 
or sanctioning organizational behaviors according to their own criteria of 
appropriateness (Luckmann and Berger, 1991). 
As we discussed, English and Scottish universities vary in the amount and 
success of spinoffs they generate, and spinoff publicity may also vary. This can be 
attributed not only to media outlets themselves but also to university attempts at 
covering spinoff events. For example, as our quantitative dataset demonstrates, in 
England the founding of a spinoff organization has been treated internally with 
different intensity by educational institutions, partly due to internal opposition from 
faculty members and partly due to the time required for the legitimation of the 
phenomenon as a whole. For instance, Imperial College London has been seen a 
pioneer in promoting its commercial business successes. Consistent with research in 
other studies (Brint and Karabel, 1989; Holden, 1986; Pollock and Rindova, 2003), 
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we expect that dissemination of information about universities’ spinoff companies 
through the national press could increase the awareness and favorability of these 
activities because knowledge of a field increases its legitimacy (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). The more media coverage its spinoffs attract, the more legitimate or 
appropriate the university looks to its audiences and, further, the more financial 
resources it may eventually be able to attract (fig. 5.3). We propose:  
H3: All else being equal, there is a positive relationship between media 
coverage of a university’s spinoff portfolio and the acquisition of financial resources 
by that university. 
6.4.4 2001 as a critical juncture 
So far we have argued about the density, performance and media effects of 
spinoff formation on university funding. However, it is worth investigating whether 
these effects have been constant over the life cycle of spinoff formation in the two 
countries. One of the reasons why this is important is that density effects on resource 
acquisition change depending on the life cycle of an industry (Hannan and Carroll, 
1992). Another reason is that perceptions of legitimacy among audience members 
may change in a field. Alterations in the preferences of an organization’s environment 
can thus impact on what is legitimate practice over time, forcing organizations to 
manage their legitimacy accordingly (Suchman, 1995) in order to continue enjoying 
the environment’s support. 
Our database on the English and Scottish spinoffs covers a period of 15 years, 
spanning between 1993 to 2007. The year 1993 is widely acknowledged as the 
starting point in technology transfer activities in England and Scotland (HM 
Treasury, 1993) and the explosion in spinoff formation after that year has been 
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documented by various scholars in the academic entrepreneurship literature 
(Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008). However, lack of a unified database on spinoffs has 
made it impossible for scholars to trace the evolution of spinoff activities over time. 
Our database shows that by 2000, most English and Scottish universities had 
established at least one spinoff, and the total number of spinoff firms among all 
universities climaxed over that year. In the post-2001 period, there were a lot fewer 
firms formed by universities. Further, considerable changes in the institutional 
environment of the industry took place around that time. 
Following 2001, government suggestions to halt the acceleration of spinoff 
formation among universities were loudly voiced for the first time in the industry’s 
live cycle. Reflecting world-wide evidence on the spinoff industry, a major review by 
the UK government later concluded that the number of spinoff firms being formed 
was hard to sustain unless a shift from quantity to quality in the universities’ general 
incubation model was urgently implemented (HM Treasury, 2003). The government 
white paper also indentified the need for assessing key performance indicators of 
university commercial activities within its general technology transfer policy frame. 
Meanwhile, the English and Scottish higher education authorities introduced their 
first special funds for spinoff formation targeted at universities (HEIF funds). In this 
context, it was increasingly recognized that prudent university investments in spinoff 
formation should be distinguished from unsuccessful spinoff activities (Lockett and 
Wright, 2005). Finally, the UK financial industry was getting cautious with the 
potential of many spinoff ventures, as deaths remained high relative to new births. 
After the initial enthusiasm of the early years, venture capital investors were less 
likely to support spinoffs unless there was real potential for a quick return on their 
investments (HM Treasury, 2003). The general economic downturn of 1999-2000 
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may have further precipitated this trend as the dot-com bust constrained investment 
funds towards start-ups in the UK. 
We believe that these alterations in the universities’ environment may have 
had significant impact on the field’s perceptions of legitimacy. Institutional theory 
argues that when social assumptions of which behaviors are taken-for-granted in a 
field change, actions may have different effects on an organization’s legitimacy and 
resource acquisition process (DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). The legitimacy of the spinoff industry was contested because it had not 
realized the potential envisaged in 1993 and both government and industry were 
looking for alternative arrangements that would guarantee its future success. We 
believe that, as the diffusion of the spinoff phenomenon reached its peak levels, the 
density of the spinoff population gradually lost its impact on the field’s legitimacy 
and now increased competition dynamics among universities (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 213). Competition 
among universities may have heightened not only for resources that universities 
themselves wished to attract for their operations, but also for venture capital support 
aimed at their spinoff portfolios. For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the 
effect of density-based legitimacy of spinoffs on university resource acquisition was 
stronger in the first years of the phenomenon, than after its peak. 
The performance-based legitimacy of spinoffs may have taken the opposite 
direction in helping universities acquire resources. We assume that by 2000, most 
universities would have been able to increase the performance of their spinoffs, due to 
experiential learning and peer imitation that perhaps took place while the industry 
was becoming legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As we argued above, the 
increased spinoff density that heightened competition for university resources may 
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have had a significant impact on the role of spinoff performance as a reputational 
asset for universities (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Rindova, et al., 2005; Rao, 1994). 
Thus, we expect that the role of spinoff performance was more important in the later 
years of the spinoff industry (fig. 6.1). Finally, we argue that media coverage of 
spinoffs may have been more important in the second period in helping universities 
acquire resources. As we argued, media coverage refers to legitimacy in the early 
phases of an industry, and to reputation in the later years. While this may sound like a 
definitional debate (Rao, 1994), it is important to acknowledge that legitimacy affects 
organizations at the individual level (either one is legitimate or not), whereas 
reputational effects are measured against competitors (one is better than another 
based on their performance). Assuming that spinoff performance issues became more 
prominent at later stages in the industry, it is reasonable to expect that the role of 
media was more critical for the acquisition of resources during that period, as 
competitors could potential absorb those resources away from a focal university 
(Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Rindova et al., 2005). We finally propose: 
H4: The impact of density-based legitimacy on university resource acquisition 
was stronger in the early years of the phenomenon. In contrast, the impact of 
performance-based and media-based legitimacy on university resource acquisition 
was stronger in the later years of the phenomenon. 
6.5 Methodology 
6.5.1 Sample and analysis  
To test our hypotheses, we gathered longitudinal data on the population of 
universities and spinoffs firms. Our panel dataset included all 113 universities in 
England and Scotland and all spinoff companies (n=1404) of these universities along 
with their full demographics, covering a period of 15 years between 1993 and 2007. 
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Our purpose was to examine the impact of spinoff productivity, performance and 
press coverage on university funding from various sources. To test hypothesis 4, we 
further split our sample in two parts, one for the period between 1993 and 2000 and 
another for the remaining years until 2007. We initially combined several funding 
sources into one dependent variable (total university funding) and then conducted 
robustness checks by treating three major funding sources as dependent variables in 
separate analyses. Because we are concerned with count variables that can take large 
values, hierarchical ordinary least square regression (OLS) is the appropriate 
statistical method (Brooks, 2008; Gujarati, 2003). Consequently, we run 4 
hierarchical regression models for each period adding explanatory variables to the 
baseline model in three steps.  
To account for unobserved heterogeneity, I have relied on random effects 
linear regression. To control for endogeneity, all university-level independent and 
control variables were lagged by two years (this also allowed for their impact on the 
decision making process of the funding bodies to develop). The two environmental 
factors were left without time lag.  
 
6.5.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of our study was total university 
funding relative to size (i.e. average university funding per full-time student). We 
took the average figures to account for changes in the size of universities over the 
years as some recruited students quicker than others. We collected funding figures 
from two main sources: a) annual publications of the Higher Education Statistics 
Authority of England (HESA) and the Scottish Funding Council (SFC), which 
contain separate databases on income from research grants and contracts, 
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endowments and UK charity donations, and b) directly from the four main UK 
research councils, i.e. the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC), the Economic Sciences Research Council (ESRC), the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
(BBRSC). Together, the combined income from these sources accounts for more than 
90% of the English and Scottish universities’ funding5.  
To simplify our data and conduct the robustness analyses, figures on total 
funding were grouped into three categories: a) UK government, b) UK research 
council, and c) UK industry, including endowments. Respectively, these categories 
represent university income from a) non-competing government grants, b) competing 
government grants, and c) the industry. Funds from the central government were 
coded as “non-competing government” for a very important reason. These funds are 
allocated based on university performance in teaching and research as they are 
measured in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) of the UK government. RAEs 
are conducted every 5-7 years and guide university funding until the next RAE 
assignment. Consequently, the central government funds are called “recurrent” in that 
little variation is expected between those 5-7 years. Further, universities do not 
compete for these funds directly, but only through their relative performance as 
individual institutions. Income from the various research councils was coded as 
“competing government” because research councils draw their resources from the 
central government but allocate them based on the quality of competing bids made by 
universities. We used the three categories as alternatives against the initial dependent 
variable average university funding in separate regression analyses. 
                                                          
5
 These figures exclude income from student fees. Fees are at the discretion of universities to collect 
and are mostly related to teaching 
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The theoretical assumption that the various funding bodies would support 
universities committed to spinoff activities was not explicitly stated by any of these 
bodies. However, over the years, their mission statements would hint at the increasing 
importance of university commercial activities. For example, aside from support to 
improve human health and produce skilled researchers, the Medical Research Council 
mentions the “advancement and dissemination of knowledge to improve the 
economic competitiveness of the UK” as one of its main goals. Similarly, UK 
government funding in the form of recurrent grants has been emphasizing the 
importance of research and, to a lesser extent, knowledge transfer alongside teaching 
in its allocation decisions. Recurrent grants are largely based on the RAE scores that 
were last conducted in 2001, the critical juncture in our analysis. 
Independent variables. We gained information on the number of spinoffs 
from each university independently. The exact birth dates were captured from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. The independent variable density-
based legitimacy was measured by the number of spinoff firms formed by universities 
each year in our window of observation. 
Next, we collected yearly information on revenues of spinoff firms from the 
FAME database. The independent variable performance-based legitimacy was 
therefore measured by the average spinoff revenues (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; 
Haveman, 1993) of all live spinoffs in a university’s portfolio at any point in time. 
Theoretically, we expected that spinoff performance would enhance university 
funding (Deephouse, 1996). 
The media-based legitimacy of spinoffs was assessed by counting the number 
of UK press clippings that related to a university and its spinoff firms in a single 
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article. We searched the LexisNexis database for articles with the name of a 
university and each of its spinoff firms as keywords and marked such articles in the 
15 year period that we were interested in. We recorded a total of 8866 articles linked 
to our 1404 spinoffs and their parent universities. Although we could group articles 
based on their negative or positive tenor (Pollock and Rindova, 2003), an 
examination of our database showed that there were hardly any articles positioned 
negatively towards spinoff-related events. We therefore proceeded to measure the 
independent variable “media coverage” as the cumulative number of media articles 
for each university at any year. Content analysis of this type has been used in various 
other settings in the organizational studies literature (e.g. Deephouse and Carter, 
2005). 
Control variables. We controlled for a number of university-level and 
environmental factors that may affect the decision of financiers to support 
universities. To control for university performance, we collected yearly data on the 
number of publications in ranked journals by each university as listed in the ISI Web 
of Knowledge (cf. Keith and Babchuk, 1998). Organizational performance is a 
construct linked to legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996) and likely funding bodies would 
consider this as the primary criterion to evaluate universities. 
Consistent with previous research (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Roberts and Dowling, 2002), we controlled for university reputation based on 
scores in the Times Higher Education university guide that is published annually 
since 1993. Many scholars have cast their doubts as to whether media rankings can 
accurately measure reputation because they consider them as rather noisy and 
inconsistent indicators of quality. However, ratings and rankings collapse the diverse 
and complex information necessary to evaluate organizational quality into a single 
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number and “it is precisely this synoptic nature of rankings that makes them have a 
strong impact on an organization’s prominence” (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova and 
Sever, 2005:1038). 
Similar to reputation, we included a measure of university status defined as 
the cumulative number of Nobel Prizes won over the years. Status is different from 
reputation because the former is based on network theory and the demonstration of 
past quality, while reputation stems from signaling theory that emphasizes the ability 
to send signals to stakeholders through current organizational actions (Feldman, 
Feller, Bercovitz and Burton, 2002; Rindova et al., 2006: 54; Sine, Shane and 
DiGregorio, 2003). 
To control for university age, we measured the number of years since the 
founding of each institution and took the natural logarithm of this value. The reason 
for this was that not all universities were considered as such during our period of 
observation. In the UK, a lot of educational institutions were granted university status 
during the 1990’s and 2000’s and they were formerly designated “polytechnics” or 
colleges with no independent degree-awarding powers. The change was part of the 
Quality Assurance Agency’s plan to transform the educational industry and 
incentivize polytechnics that were old (some were formed in the 19th century) but not 
as good as established universities. We also controlled for relative university size by 
taking the natural logarithm of the total number of full-time students of a university. 
Rowan (1982) has shown that the size of educational organizations is not always a 
good predictor of their behavior, but it can be used as a control variable when other 
constructs are included in analyses. According to Deephouse (1996) and others, the 
organizational attributes of size and age are linked to legitimacy, so that older and 
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bigger universities could attract more resources than inexperienced or smaller ones, 
because the former are seen as more legitimate. 
We controlled for the relative political power  of groups of universities 
(Pfeffer, 1992: 101). Almost simultaneously with the emergence of the spinoff 
industry, four university associations were established in 1994. Of these, Russell 
Group was formed first and, in reaction, the 1994 Group, the Million+ and the 
University Alliance followed immediately after. The associations were intended at 
lobbying government, parliament and private bodies for financial and other support 
and have been forming common positions on important matters such as sponsoring, 
exploitation of intellectual property, the definition of UK educational standards and 
other relevant initiatives. Members of these political alliances often benchmark 
themselves against other members to secure alignment in the scope and performance 
of the initiatives in a given academic year (Edinburgh University Minutes, 2004). 
Participation in each of these alliances was measured with a dummy variable taking 
the values 0 and 1. Despite 1994 being their founding year, not all current members 
joined simultaneously. Some institutions joined an association years after 1994, hence 
there is considerable variation in the distribution of the variable’s prices. 
Finally, two environmental controls were included, i.e. regional economic 
development and regional R&D intensity. The mechanism through which these 
operate is twofold: when economic development or R&D investments are high, it is 
natural to expect that a big part of these funds will end up to universities. 
Alternatively, when development and R&D investments are low in a region, the 
various financial resource providers can try stimulating the regional economy by 
investing in teaching, research or knowledge transfer. In the technology transfer 
literature, regional GDP and R&D have also been used to predict the opposite 
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direction of our own research, i.e. the formation of spinoffs by universities (Lockett 
and Wright, 2005). We collected data from the National Statistics Authority on per-
capita GDP and per-capita R&D investments of each of the ten UK regions in our 
sample: nine in England plus Scotland. 
6.6 Results  
Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are reported in Table 
6.1. To check for problems with multicollinearity, we conducted Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) tests. The VIF scores were well below the warning level of 10 (Gujarati, 
2003), thus we proceeded with the data analysis normally. Table 6.2 shows results for 
the entire period of observation. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show results of hierarchical 
regression of ten models, five for the period between 1993 and 2000 and five for the 
period 2001-2007, predicting average total university funding. Model 1, table 6.3 
includes only the control variables – university performance, reputation, status, age 
and size; regional GDP and R&D; and membership into networks. For the first 
period, almost all control variables are significant with a positive effect on our 
dependent variable, except for university age and regional R&D. The negative sign of 
reputation is justified by the data coding, because highly reputable universities are 
measured as having small values in the league tables (e.g. the University of 
Cambridge’s score is 1 out of 113, meaning it is the institution with the highest 
reputation). The negative impact of size is perhaps justified as relatively large 
universities cannot be entirely funded by government or industry sources. These 
entities often focus on teaching; therefore fees from students are a core source in their 
budgets. Of the three political power associations, Russell Group has the most 
important effect as it includes some of the most well performing and internationally 
recognized universities of England and Scotland. The 1994 Group has some positive 
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influence on university funding and the Million+, comprising mostly of former 
polytechnics, none. 
As predicted in hypothesis 1, Model 2, table 6.3, shows that high spinoff 
density has a positive effect on average total university funding. Consistent with the 
density-based legitimacy assumption, the number of university spinoff firms formed 
strongly affects the decision of funding bodies to allocate resources to universities. 
Spinoff performance has also a positive impact on university funding (model 3), 
although in the over model (model 5), the effect is not significant. Finally, spinoff 
media coverage significantly increases university funding both in models 4 and 5. 
Taken together, the effect of the three independent variables explains close to 30% of 
the average university funding sources.  
In the second period of the study (2001-2007), spinoff density, performance 
and media publicity again support hypotheses 1-3 (models 7-9 in table 6.4). The three 
independent variables are able to explain around 35% of the total university funding 
variance. Comparing tables 6.3 and 6.4, we also find strong support for hypothesis 4. 
As predicted, whereas spinoff density was more important in the first few years of the 
phenomenon, spinoff performance and media coverage were more important in the 
later years. In particular, the spinoff performance effect is significant for the first time 
in model 10, and the spinoff popularity has increased its impact on university funding 
from 11% to 31%.  
Overall, we found support for all four hypotheses. However, we conducted 
further analyses, also as a robustness check, by splitting financial resources into three 
categories – UK government, UK research council and UK industry, representing 
respectively income from non-competing government grants, competing government 
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 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
                
                
1 Total funding  1.00              
2 Research output .35*  1.00             
3 Reputation -.61* -.56* 1.00            
4 Status .24* -.53* -.32* 1.00           
5 Ageª .35* -.58* -.76* .35* 1.00          
6 Sizeª -.29* -.19* -.18* .14* .16* 1.00         
7 Regional GDP .21* .22*  .06*  .04 .18* -.02 1.00        
8 Regional R&D  .02  .01  .00 .17*  -.11*  .01  .18* 1.00       
9 Russell Group .23* -.63* -.56* .43* .38*   .31*  .00  -.02 1.00      
10 1994 Group  .03 -.00 -.39* -.06*  .26* -.02  .04 .10* -.15* 1.00     
11 Million+ -.14* -.20* .51* -.09* -.21* .16*  .17*  -.04 -.18* -.17* 1.00    
12 Spinoff density .23* -.61* -.46* .44* .45* .24*  .07*  -.02 .57*  .03 -.15* 1.00   
13 Spinoff performance  .08* -.15* -.14* .15* .18* .07* .13*  .04  .09* -.00 -.09* .13* 1.00  
14 Spinoff popularity .26* -.59* -.28* .36* .33* .14* .23* .04*  -.38* -.03 -.08* .40* .21* 1.00 
 N 1665 1695 1476 1695 1695 1665 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1690 1693 1695 
 Mean 777 146 56.5 0.49 2.71 9.35 15.3k 1148 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.77 355k 21.96 
 S.D. 2058 276 33.2 2.52 1.80 0.81 4.6k 941 0.35 0.33 0.38 1.64 1527 86.58 
 
*p<0.05 
ª Natural logarithm 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations  
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N=1649; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.2: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average total funding: 1993-2007
Independent 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
           
Research output 0.16*** (0.27) 0.11** (0.32) 0.15*** (0.28) 0.14** (0.29) 0.11** (0.32) 
Reputation -0.29*** (1.89) -0.29*** (1.89) -0.30*** (1.90) -0.30*** (1.90) -0.30*** (1.91) 
Status 0.09** (24.7) 0.08** (25.6) 0.09** (25.1) 0.10*** (24.8) 0.08** (27.1) 
Ageª 0.12 (0.44) 0.02 (0.44) 0.00 (0.45) -0.00 (0.46) 0.00 (0.48) 
Sizeª -0.16*** (0.00) -0.17*** (0.00) -0.17*** (0.00) -0.16*** (0.00) -0.17*** (0.01) 
Regional GDP 0.18*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.10) 0.18*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.01) 
Regional R&D -0.04† (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) -0.04† (0.05) -0.04† (0.05) -0.04† (0.05) 
Russell Group -0.04 (211) -0.04*** (211) -0.03 (212) -0.03 (212) -0.03*** (212) 
1994 Group -0.10*** (154) -0.10*** (154) -0.09** (154) -0.09** (154) -1.00** (155) 
Million+ -0.00 (304) -0.00 (304) -0.00 (304) -0.00 (304) -0.00 (304) 
Spinoff density  
 
0.08** (6.72)     0.07* (7.79) 
Spinoff perform.     0.04* (2.16)   0.02 (2.55) 
Spinoff popularity       0.05† (1.10) 0.01 (1.45) 
    
       
    
       
R2 0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.25  
Adj. R2 0.23  0.24  0.24  0.25  0.25  
ΔR2   0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
F for ΔR2   4.98  1.86  3.03  0.14  
F 51.79***  56.77***  53.65***  54.83***  51.93***  
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Independent 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
           
Research output 0.09* (0.18) 0.01 (0.18) 0.01 (0.18)  0.04 (0.18) -0.02 (0.18) 
Reputation -0.26*** (1.06) -0.25*** (1.02) -0.25*** (1.05) -0.29*** (1.04) -0.26*** (1.01) 
Status 0.34*** (7.46) 0.30*** (7.32) 0.34*** (7.46) 0.30*** (7.51) 0.28*** (7.38) 
Ageª 0.38 (19.0) 0.05 (18.3) 0.03 (19.0) 0.01 (18.7) 0.02 (18.3) 
Sizeª -0.17** (33.7) -0.18*** (32.5) -0.18*** (33.6) -0.18*** (32.9) -0.18*** (32.1) 
Regional GDP 0.12*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Regional R&D -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Russell Group 0.29*** (74.3) 0.27*** (71.7) 0.29*** (74.2) 0.31*** (72.9) 0.29*** (71.2) 
1994 Group 0.06* (56.3) 0.06* (54.2) 0.07** (56.6) 0.08** (55.2) 0.07** (53.9) 
Million+ -0.03 (52.1) -0.02 (50.2) -0.02 (52.3) -0.03 (50.1) -0.02 (49.8) 
Spinoff density   0.21*** (12.9)     0.18*** (13.2) 
Spinoff perform.     0.05* (0.00)   0.02 (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity       0.15*** (0.88) 0.11*** (0.93) 
           
           
R2 0.67  0.70  0.68  0.69  0.71  
Adj. R2 0.67  0.69  0.67  0.69  0.71  
ΔR2   0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04  
F for ΔR2   14.07  4.61  36.11  27.33  
F 151.81***  154.22***  139.11***  147.90***  135.67***  
N=744; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.3: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average total funding: 1993-2000 
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Independent 
variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
           
Research output 0.37*** (0.12) 0.36*** (0.12) 0.40*** (0.13) 0.22*** (0.11) 0.24*** (0.11) 
Reputation  -0.14** (1.35) -0.13** (1.36) -0.14** (1.44) -0.11** (1.22) -0.10* (1.21) 
Status 0.27*** (10.1) 0.26*** (10.2) 0.24*** (10.9) 0.24*** (8.72) 0.21*** (9.31) 
Ageª 0.12** (21.6) 0.11** (21.6) 0.08* (23.2) 0.03 (19.7) 0.02 (19.8) 
Sizeª -0.09*** (44.6) -0.10*** (44.5) -0.09*** (47.5) -0.06** (40.5) -0.06** (39.9) 
Regional GDP 0.05* (0.01) 0.05* (0.01) 0.06** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Regional R&D 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Russell Group 0.15*** (112) 0.13** (114) 0.14*** (119) 0.15*** (101) 0.15*** (102) 
1994 Group 0.11*** (85.2) 0.11*** (85.1) 0.12*** (91.6) 0.16*** (77.8) 0.17** (77.3) 
Million+ 0.02 (61.9) 0.02 (61.8) 0.03 (66.1) 0.03 (55.0) 0.01 (55.3) 
Spinoff density   0.05† (14.9)     0.04† (13.3) 
Spinoff perform.     0.07** (0.00)   0.03† (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity        0.38*** (0.19) 0.31*** (0.23) 
           
           
R2 0.71  0.73  0.71  0.80  0.78  
Adj. R2 0.71  0.72  0.71  0.80  0.78  
ΔR2   0.02  0.01  0.08  0.06  
F for ΔR2   2.95  9.27  294.10  62.98  
F 175.13***  171.48***  161.90***  263.37***  196.74***  
N=726; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.4: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average total funding: 2001-2007
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grants and the industry. Public institutions and particularly educational ones 
traditionally rely on public sources of funding (Rankin, 1956) so we wanted to 
examine two such public sources. Separately, we examined industry sources of 
funding to uncover possible differences relative to the public sources. Tables 6.5 and 
6.6 show regression estimates when the dependent variable is average non-competing 
government grants. The results provide mixed support for our main assumptions that 
spinoff legitimacy increased university funding. Between 1993 and 2000, spinoff 
density was the only construct with positive effect on funding (models 2 and 5), while 
spinoff performance and popularity were irrelevant predictors of the dependent 
variable. After 2001 (table 6.6), the only significant and positive effect on non-
competing university funding was from spinoff media coverage (models 9 and 10), 
while spinoff density and performance did not support our predictions. However, 
considering the differences between the two tables, we find quite strong support for 
hypothesis 4.  
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show regression estimates for the dependent variable 
“average competing government grants”. Our findings are again the same, with high 
spinoff numbers and spinoff media coverage affecting university funding in both 
periods (table 6.7, models 2 and 4; table 6.8, models 7 and 9), but performance not 
being a significant predictor in any of the two periods (models 3 and 8). Perhaps 
because English and Scottish research councils allocate funds based on research 
proposals made by educational institutions, the media effect was not so strong in the 
first period. However, after 2001 media coverage of spinoff activities was found to be 
a significant predictor, possibly due to the fact that a lot of the university research 
projects were now based on spinoff-related activities that were progressively 
legitimized in the two countries. Overall, the results can explain around one third of  
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Independent 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
           
Research output 0.35*** (0.12) 0.31*** (0.13) 0.35*** (0.12) 0.34*** (0.13) 0.30*** (0.13) 
Reputation -0.39*** (0.73) -0.39*** (0.72) -0.39*** (0.73) -0.40*** (0.73) -0.39*** (0.73) 
Status 0.19*** (5.16) 0.17*** (5.18) 0.19*** (5.17) 0.18*** (5.32) 0.17*** (5.30) 
Ageª 0.04 (13.2) 0.05 (13.0) 0.05 (13.2) 0.04 (13.3) 0.05 (13.1) 
Sizeª -0.19*** (23.3) -0.19*** (22.9) -0.19*** (23.3) -0.19*** (23.3) -0.19*** (22.9) 
Regional GDP 0.08*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 
Regional R&D 0.02 (0.01) 0.03† (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
Russell Group 0.12*** (51.4) 0.10*** (50.8) 0.11*** (51.4) 0.12*** (51.6) 0.10*** (51.0) 
1994 Group 0.05* (38.9) 0.05* (38.8) 0.05* (39.2) 0.05** (39.1) 0.05** (38.6) 
Million+ -0.02 (36.1)  -0.02 (35.6) -0.02 (36.2) -0.02 (36.1) -0.02 (35.7) 
Spinoff density   0.10*** (9.20)     0.10*** (9.45) 
Spinoff perform.     0.02 (0.00)   -0.03 (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity        0.02 (0.63) 0.01 (0.67) 
           
           
R2 0.82  0.83  0.82  0.82  0.83  
Adj. R2 0.82  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.82  
ΔR2   0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  
F for ΔR2   23.57  2.09  1.26  8.73  
F 337.41***  318.32***  307.39***  306.96***  269.77***  
N=744; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed)  
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.5: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average non-competing (recurrent) funding: 1993-2000 
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Independent 
variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
           
Research output 0.74*** (0.06) 0.75*** (0.06) 0.75*** (0.07) 0.64*** (0.06) 0.65*** (0.06) 
Reputation -0.14*** (0.74) -0.14*** (0.75) -0.15*** (0.79) -0.12*** (0.66) -0.13*** (0.65) 
Status 0.06*** (5.57) 0.06*** (5.64) 0.06*** (5.97) 0.04** (4.70) 0.04** (5.02) 
Ageª 0.09*** (11.8) 0.09*** (11.9) 0.08*** (12.7) 0.04* (10.6) 0.04* (10.7) 
Sizeª -0.12*** (24.4) -0.12*** (24.4) -0.12*** (26.0) -0.10*** (21.8) -0.10*** (21.6) 
Regional GDP 0.11*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.00) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Regional R&D -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) 
Russell Group -0.01 (61.7) -0.01 (62.7) -0.01 (65.4) -0.01 (54.5) -0.01 (55.1) 
1994 Group 0.13*** (46.7) 0.13*** (46.7) 0.12** (50.2) 0.17*** (41.9) 0.16*** (41.7) 
Million+ 0.01 (33.9) 0.01 (33.9) 0.01 (36.2) 0.01 (30.2) 0.01 (29.8) 
Spinoff density   -0.01 (8.18)     -0.01 (7.18) 
Spinoff perform.     -0.02 (0.00)   -0.01** (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity        0.25*** (0.10) 0.21*** (0.12) 
           
           
R2 0.89  0.89  0.89  0.92  0.92  
Adj. R2 0.89  0.89  0.88  0.92  0.92  
ΔR2   0.00  0.00  0.03  0.03  
F for ΔR2   0.31  1.31  318.92  71.92  
F 591.57***  537.30***  503.53***  766.84***  607.63***  
N=726; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.6: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average non-competing (recurrent) funding: 2001-2007 
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Independent 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
           
Research output 0.04 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) 0.04 (0.11) -0.01 (0.11) -0.10 (0.11) 
Reputation -0.19** (0.65) -0.17** (0.62) -0.19** (0.66) -0.21*** (0.65) -0.18** (0.63) 
Status 0.21*** (4.58) 0.16*** (4.44) 0.21*** (4.58) 0.18*** (4.66) 0.14*** (4.52) 
Ageª 0.01 (11.7) 0.03 (11.2) 0.01 (11.8) -0.02 (11.7) 0.01 (11.3) 
Sizeª -0.14*** (20.8) -0.15*** (19.8) -0.14*** (20.8) -0.14*** (20.6) -0.15*** (19.8) 
Regional GDP 0.19*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.01) 0.19*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.01) 0.17*** (0.01) 
Regional R&D -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Russell Group 0.41*** (46.7) 0.39*** (44.6) 0.40*** (46.9) 0.43*** (46.6) 0.40*** (44.9) 
1994 Group 0.15*** (35.1) 0.15*** (33.5) 0.15*** (35.5) 0.16*** (34.9) 0.16*** (33.7) 
Million+ -0.01 (31.7) -0.03 (30.3) -0.04 (31.9) -0.04 (31.3) -0.03 (30.4) 
Spinoff density   0.27*** (7.87)     0.25*** (8.02) 
Spinoff perform.     -0.00 (0.00)   -0.02 (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity       0.12*** (0.55) 0.08** (0.57) 
           
           
R2 0.56  0.60  0.56  0.57  0.60  
Adj. R2 0.55  0.55  0.55  0.56  0.59  
ΔR2   0.04  0.00  0.01  0.04  
F for ΔR2   73.61  0.01  15.72  26.76  
F 90.48***  97.24***  82.14***  85.36***  83.25***  
N=731; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.7: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average competing (council) funding: 1993-2000 
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Independent 
variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
           
Research output 0.33*** (0.08) 0.32*** (0.08) 0.35*** (0.09) 0.17*** (0.08) 0.17*** (0.79) 
Reputation -0.22*** (0.96) -0.21*** (0.96) -0.22*** (1.02) -0.18*** (0.87) -0.18*** (0.86) 
Status 0.16*** (7.24) 0.15*** (7.31) 0.15*** (7.75) 0.11*** (6.23) 0.11*** (6.65) 
Ageª 0.07† (15.4) 0.06 (15.4) 0.05 (16.4) -0.02 (14.1) -0.02 (14.1) 
Sizeª -0.08** (31.8) -0.08** (31.7) -0.08** (33.7) -0.04† (28.9) -0.05† (28.5) 
Regional GDP 0.07** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.08** (0.01) 0.03† (0.00) 0.05* (0.00) 
Regional R&D 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Russell Group 0.17*** (80.1) 0.16** (81.4) 0.16** (84.8) 0.18*** (72.3) 0.17*** (72.9) 
1994 Group 0.13*** (60.6) 0.14*** (60.6) 0.12*** (65.1) 0.19*** (55.5) 0.19*** (55.2) 
Million+ 0.04 (44.2) 0.04 (44.1) 0.04 (47.0) 0.03 (40.0) 0.02 (39.6) 
Spinoff density   0.06† (10.6)     0.06* (9.50) 
Spinoff perform.     0.00 (0.00)   -0.04† (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity       0.42*** (0.13) 0.37*** (0.16) 
           
           
R2 0.63  0.63  0.63  0.73  0.70  
Adj. R2 0.62  0.62  0.62  0.72  0.70  
ΔR2   0.00  0.00  0.10  0.08  
F for ΔR2   3.45  0.01  270.70  61.13  
F 120.12***  109.89***  104.16***  172.90***  129.95***  
N=722; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
  
Table 6.8: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average competing (council) funding: 2001-2007 
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Independent 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
           
Research output 0.14** (0.10) 0.09* (0.10) 0.15*** (0.10) 0.08* (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 
Reputation -0.31*** (0.59) -0.30*** (0.59) -0.31*** (0.59) -0.33*** (0.58) -0.32*** (0.58) 
Status 0.42*** (4.21) 0.39*** (4.24) 0.41*** (4.18) 0.38*** (4.24) 0.37*** (4.25) 
Ageª 0.06 (10.7) 0.07 (10.6) 0.05 (10.7) 0.03 (10.6) 0.04 (10.5) 
Sizeª -0.19** (19.0) -0.20*** (18.8) -0.19*** (18.8) -0.19*** (18.5) -0.20*** (18.4) 
Regional GDP 0.05† (0.01) 0.04*** (0.00) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04† (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Regional R&D 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Russell Group 0.11** (41.9) 0.10** (41.5) 0.12** (41.6) 0.13*** (41.1)  0.12** (40.9) 
1994 Group -0.04 (31.7) -0.04 (31.4) -0.03 (31.7) -0.03** (31.1) -0.03 (31.0) 
Million+ -0.01 (29.4) -0.01 (29.1) -0.01 (29.3) -0.01 (28.7) 0.01 (28.6) 
Spinoff density   0.12*** (7.53)     0.09** (7.58) 
Spinoff perform.     0.08*** (0.00)   0.05* (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity        0.15*** (0.49) 0.12*** (0.54) 
           
           
R2 0.67  0.68  0.67  0.68  0.69  
Adj. R2 0.66  0.67  0.67  0.68  0.69  
ΔR2   0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  
F for ΔR2   17.54  13.13  35.81  16.61  
F 146.59***  137.87***  136.67***  142.85***  123.80***  
N=744; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.9: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average industry funding: 1993-2000 
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Independent 
variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
           
Research output 0.38*** (0.05) 0.38*** (0.05) 0.42*** (0.05) 0.27*** (0.05) 0.32*** (0.05) 
Reputation -0.02 (0.59) -0.01 (0.59) -0.00 (0.60) -0.00 (0.57) 0.03 (0.55) 
Status 0.38*** (4.48) 0.38*** (4.53) 0.34*** (4.54) 0.38*** (4.10) 0.33*** (4.25) 
Ageª 0.16*** (9.52) 0.16*** (9.55) 0.11** (9.67) 0.09** (9.28) 0.08** (9.04) 
Sizeª -0.11*** (19.6) -0.10*** (19.6) -0.18*** (19.7) -0.08** (19.1) -0.08*** (18.2) 
Regional GDP 0.01 (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
Regional R&D  -0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 
Russell Group 0.09* (49.5) 0.08* (50.4) 0.10*** (49.7) 0.09** (47.6) 0.10** (46.6) 
1994 Group 0.06* (37.5) 0.06* (37.5) 0.08** (38.2) 0.10*** (36.6) 0.12*** (35.3) 
Million+ -0.01 (27.2) -0.01 (27.3) -0.01 (27.5) -0.01 (26.4) 0.00 (25.3) 
Spinoff density   0.02 (6.57)     0.02 (6.08) 
Spinoff perform.     0.15*** (0.01)   0.13*** (0.00) 
Spinoff popularity       0.27*** (0.09) 0.19*** (0.10) 
           
           
R2 0.72  0.73  0.74  0.78  0.77  
Adj. R2 0.72  0.72  0.74  0.77  0.77  
ΔR2   0.01  0.02  0.04  0.04  
F for ΔR2   0.80  52.27  131.42  41.55  
F 189.86***  172.63***  184.40***  225.74***  180.60***  
N=723; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10 (2-tailed) 
ª Natural logarithm; Standardized coefficients reported; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.10: Results of hierarchical OLS regression on average industry funding: 2001-2007 
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the variance in the dependent variable (models 5 and 10). They also provide moderate 
support for hypothesis 4, as spinoff density has a stronger impact in the first period, 
and spinoff publicity is stronger in the second.  
We finally provide another robustness check for the dependent variable 
“average industry funding” (includes endowments from private donors) in tables 6.9 
and 6.10. The UK industrial funds matched the research hypotheses more than any 
other. A significant effect of spinoff performance and publicity on university industry 
funding was found exactly as predicted in both periods (hypotheses 2, 3 and 4), while 
spinoff density was more important in the second period (hypotheses 1 and 4) 
although always in a positive sign.  
6.7 Discussion 
In this paper, we started with the central question of how public organizations 
can raise financial resources from their environments. We argued that one of the key 
themes in the management literature is the legitimacy of organizational actions in 
helping organizations attract the endorsement of market audiences (Suchman, 1995). 
In our context, we examined how university funding evolved alongside three 
legitimacy dimensions of the spinoff phenomenon using institutional (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) and population ecology theories (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). We 
found that universities engaging in spinoff formation were rewarded by public and 
private financial providers in two ways: first, through the impact of increased spinoff 
density and performance, and second, through the legitimacy/reputational importance 
of spinoff media coverage. 
Our findings are important for the academic entrepreneurship literature 
(Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Rothaermel et al, 2007). Specifically, the emergence 
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of the spinoff industry has been seen as a natural process, despite lack of empirical 
evidence on how universities can benefit from commercial activities (Shane, 2004a). 
Emphasis in the existing literature has been placed upon issues such as university 
attributes that enhance spinoff generation (Lockett and Wright, 2005) and typologies 
for spinoff incubation (Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, Van de Velde and Vohora, 2005). 
In the early 1990’s, the general perception among policy-makers in England and 
Scotland was that spinoffs would bring back benefits to universities directly through 
equity investments. However, we show here how the transformation of the 
educational market made the exiting major financing bodies reward universities for 
their spinoff activities through the gradual legitimation of these activities. Further, the 
particular effect of media coverage is in contrast to efficiency explanations in the 
academic entrepreneurship and organization studies literatures regarding public 
universities. Unlike for-profit markets (Johnson et al, 2005; Pollock and Rindova, 
2003) the role of media in providing organizational legitimacy is not often associated 
with state-owned enterprises. Finally, contrary to prior survey research methods (e.g. 
Lockett and Wright, 2005), the results of this study are important because they are 
based on the most up-to-date, complete panel database of UK spinoffs that has 
appeared in the literature. 
Our study is pioneering in trying to understand how public organizations 
acquire financial resources using theoretical perspectives that have been utilized in 
for-profit settings. It has been argued that due to their significant reliance to the state, 
public entities need only comply to state requirements in order to continue securing 
financial resources. This compliance usually takes the form of structural adaptations 
(Rowan, 1982; Scott, 1981; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) that grant public entities a 
certain level of legitimacy. Thus, public organizations such as universities can 
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continue to work based on government contracts and grants (Rankin, 1956). 
However, organizational studies theorists have rarely examined the legitimacy of new 
practices when environmental requirements push public organizations towards 
strategic diversification. Within this context, we argue that examining the gradual 
legitimation of new practices (rather than general organizational structures) can better 
explain the endorsement of public organizations by funding bodies. This implies that 
there is significant flexibility in the way funding flows into public organizations. In 
the case of UK universities, there were no reward schemes for spinoff formation, yet 
the gradual legitimation of these activities (through the spinoff density, performance 
and media coverage) induced public and private funding sources to provide 
universities with financial resources. This indirect effect has not be recognized in the 
management literature. More specifically, socially constructed accounts of reality 
(Luckmann and Berger, 1991) based on mass media influences are extremely rare in 
explaining public administration behaviors. 
A second implication of organization theorists’ overwhelming emphasis on 
the institutional rather than technical aspects of public organizations (Scott, 1981) is 
the fact that competition dynamics are often excluded from their work. We show that 
legitimacy dynamics in non-profit fields can change to competition dynamics with 
time. This may perhaps happen more easily when the new activities of public 
organizations move towards market-like arrangements as it happened with the 
introduction of commercial activities among public universities. The spinoff 
population emerged as a taken-for-granted practice despite initial opposition against it 
and it later turned to competition among universities as to which would produce the 
highest number of successful spinoffs (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). Accordingly, our 
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results show that after a certain point, competition was quite important in explaining 
university resource acquisition. 
The study’s findings are in contrast to other sociological explanations on 
scientific practices among public educational organizations. For example, Merton’s 
(1973:439) “Matthew effect in science” suggests that allocation of financial rewards 
is based on university networks and status, so that there is relatively little variation in 
resource acquisition: high status universities “will take it all”, even at times when 
they are not performing well. We found similar support in our analyses in that 
university reputation, status and publications record inevitably affect their financial 
resource acquisition. However, the legitimacy of their new practices and the evolution 
of market competition had an equally strong effect in the UK higher education sector. 
Key policy implications of study lie at the importance of the legitimation 
mechanism of public organization practices within national innovation systems. The 
central government in the UK took legislative measures to incentivize universities 
towards greater links with the industry and greater knowledge transfer (HM Treasury, 
1993; 2003). However, as our results indicate, financial support from recurrent (non-
competing grants) were less aligned with trends in the spinoff industry: when 
resources from competing grants, the UK industry and private endowments were 
flowing into universities as a result of the increased legitimacy of spinoff activities, 
recurrent grants remained less aligned to these trends even after more than 10 years of 
spinoff experience in the two countries. This perhaps demonstrates organizational 
inertia among government agencies in the way they reward public organizations 
under their jurisdiction. More specifically, several authors (e.g. Etzkowitz, 2003) 
have proposed that, given governmental mandates for more university commercial 
activities, these activities should be incorporated as a third function in the university’s 
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mission, along with teaching and research. They should thus be monitored and 
rewarded accordingly. 
Our work has implications on how organizations respond to institutional 
pressures and manage their legitimacy. As Suchman (1995: 593) notes, when there is 
contestation over an organization’s legitimacy because of changing audience 
preferences, the organization has two options in order to maintain its legitimacy: a) 
perceive change and b) protect accomplishments. We found that universities that 
perceived the changes and placed emphasis on spinoff productivity and performance 
managed to accumulate resources quicker than others. Also, universities that had their 
accomplishments promoted through the press were able to secure even higher 
financial support throughout the entire period of observation. This has implications as 
to how public organizations can manipulate their environment in their favor (cf. 
Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999). 
Like any other study, this one has its limitations. First, we argued about the 
influence of spinoff media coverage, yet there is a chance that university, spinoff or 
institutional characteristics may affect the possibility of a university and/or spinoff 
attracting media coverage. For instance, the physical distance between universities 
and/or spinoffs from media centers is one such factor (cf. Pollock and Rindova, 
2003). Prior links that a university or spinoff may have with the media can cause the 
same endogeneity problem. We were unable to control for this possible bias due to 
lack of data about spinoff location and the sheer volume of the database that would 
make such an endeavor virtually impossible. 
In addition, we treated universities as the unit of analysis but there is possibly 
significant variation at the departmental level within universities. Most papers in 
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organizational studies distinguish among industries because different industries have 
different characteristics and levels of legitimacy. In our context, it is likely that 
spinoffs from medical and engineering departments are much easier to be established, 
grow and attract media attention than spinoffs from other faculties (Jong, 2006; 
O’Shea et al., 2005). Also, treating the entire university as the unit of analysis cannot 
reveal differences in the accumulation by or distribution of resources to certain 
departments. Instead, we have used funding figures in aggregate for all departments 
or faculties in a university. 
A major theme for future research would therefore be to examine the impact 
of certain kinds of spinoff companies (services, biotech, engineering) on revenues or 
other university benefits. For example, because spinoff firms generate publicity for 
universities, it might worth examining the impact on university reputation. Also, 
spinoff firms may be linked to changes in the productivity of researchers or to the 
recruitment of faculty members and PhD researchers. Short discussions that we had 
with university Technology Transfer officers revealed that there have been cases 
where faculty teams moved to another university simply because they found 
appealing the prospect of working on spinoff-related projects. 
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7. COMMUNITY ECOLOGY: A GENERAL MODEL OF RECIPROCAL 
LEGITIMACY BETWEEN TWO ORGANIZATIONAL POPULATIONS6 
7.1. Abstract 
Drawing from empirical contexts of mutualism and symbiosis among 
populations of organizations (e.g. corporate entrepreneurship units and the 
organizations they create), we build theory on the legitimation process among 
populations. We advance previous work in the community ecology literature by 
bringing in the concept of reciprocity in social exchanges to argue that reciprocal 
cooperative transactions help organizational populations gain legitimacy early in their 
life cycles. Propositions on the exact antecedents (power balance, communication 
capabilities and technological capabilities) of reciprocal transactions are formulated. 
These elements lead to a reciprocal legitimation of interacting organizational 
populations. We finally develop propositions on the consequences (network 
sustainability, protection from competition, population growth) of reciprocal 
legitimacy.   
7.2. Introduction 
This paper deals with how organizational populations gain legitimacy through 
their interaction with other populations in a larger community. The focus of the study 
is on exchanges among two or more populations based on the norms of reciprocity in 
their community (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Gouldner (1960) 
named reciprocity as the core property that defines the stability and harmonious 
coevolution of two interrelated entities. Reciprocity is based on the understanding 
among the participants in a community that giving away freely will be reciprocated, 
thus fostering bonds among the parties. This paper focuses on the social relationships 
                                                          
6
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association conference. 
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where reciprocity can be found, i.e. cooperation rather than competition, among 
organizations.  
The emphasis of the study is on legitimacy among populations of 
organizations within communities (community ecology), rather than individual 
organizations within populations (population ecology). In organization studies, 
measuring legitimacy at the individual or population levels has been key to 
institutional and population ecology theorists but has received little attention at the 
community level of analysis. We believe that examining legitimacy processes at the 
community level is a fruitful research path in understanding how populations (e.g. 
industries) can acquire and manage legitimacy through their own collective actions. 
We specifically address this theoretical gap in the community ecology literature by 
introducing the concept of legitimacy based on reciprocal exchanges among 
populations.  
But why should exchanges be important at all? When studying the 
interrelatedness of populations, community ecologists have traditionally looked at a) 
location, b) functional complementarity and c) connections/exchanges among 
populations7. Reviewing this body of work, Scott (2006: 183) claimed that 
community theorists’ early focus was more on colocation (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 
1987) than on functional interdependence or exchanges. This led to important 
connections and exchanges among organizations being ignored (Astley, 1984; Astley, 
1985; Astley and Fombrun, 1983), thus weakening the way we understand 
communities. Ignoring connections and exchanges in community ecology has also 
been criticized by early institutional theorists. Because of this limitation, institutional 
                                                          
7
 Similarly, Freeman and Audia (2006) recently classified organizational communities into four 
categories. According to them, communities can be distinguished based on two criteria: a) spatial 
differentiation and b) functional complementarity.  
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theorists drew their attention to what they called “community fields”, large 
establishments that include all possible population exchanges in a system (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983: 148; cf. Scott, 2006). They then proposed that fields gain 
legitimacy through network connections, structural equivalence and the increased 
interaction among organizations (Baker and Faulkner, 2006; Gulati, 1998). The aim 
of this paper is to advance our knowledge on the role of exchanges among 
populations within the classic ecological framework. Thus, in line with the previous 
arguments, we shift our attention away from functionalism or collocation and in favor 
of exchanges in order to understand legitimacy within communities.  
What is important in the legitimation theory that we propose is the reciprocal 
nature of the exchanges between organizational populations ─ reciprocity as a 
dynamic force that governs the exchange of donations (gifts) between populations. 
The idea of reciprocal social relationships can be traced back in early sociological 
and anthropological writings by scholars such as Becker (1956), Mauss (1990), 
Hobhouse (2004) and Simmel (1964) who identified reciprocity with fundamental 
ethical behaviors of individual human beings in primitive and contemporary societies. 
In these societies, the moral applicability of reciprocity lies in its cultural mandate: 
people ought to reciprocate when they receive a gift in order to preserve social 
relationships. Further, in social exchange theory, reciprocity has been described as a 
folk belief involving the cultural expectation that people “get what they deserve” 
(Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Emerson, 1976; Gouldner, 1960).  
In this study, because we are interested with organizational settings, we adopt 
a definition of reciprocity as a transactional pattern in interdependent exchanges 
(Gouldner, 1960; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005: 876). We also change the level of 
analysis from individual human beings to groups/populations of organizations. Seen 
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from this point of view, a reciprocal exchange among organizational populations is 
one that is based on expectations for mutual benefits during an economic transaction 
that is not based on explicit agreement among the partners (Molm, 1999; Molm, 
Peterson and Takahashi, 2003). Direct reciprocal exchanges begin with actors 
performing actions that benefit others, without negotiation and without knowing 
whether, when or to what extent the others will reciprocate (Molm, Collett and 
Schaefer, 2007). They are therefore purely based on a belief in sharing, not contracts 
(Boucher et al, 1982: 329). In human as well as in organizational communities, 
sequential reciprocal actions such as these initiate new rounds of exchange and 
solidify social relationships (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).  
Drawing from these social exchange theory assumptions (Blau, 1964; 
Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960), we examine in detail how 
interacting organizational populations generate legitimacy in a dyadic system. We 
first examine the antecedents of this legitimation process by looking at important 
determinants of successful reciprocal exchanges, for example, the balance of power 
between two populations. If there is high imbalance between A and B, chances are 
that reciprocity will fail to materialize, or that one of the partners will increase its 
legitimacy at the other’s expense (exploitation). Then, we examine the outcomes of 
legitimacy from reciprocal transactions to show that populations coevolving through 
this process are able to secure three core benefits for their members: a) network 
duration, b) protection from predator populations (i.e. competition) and c) population 
expansion (Boucher, James and Keeler, 1982).  
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first detail the empirical context 
from which we drew inspiration to develop a theory of reciprocal legitimacy. We then 
review the community ecology literature in organization studies focusing on the 
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antecedents and consequences of community legitimization. Later, we review core 
aspects of reciprocity within the social exchange theory and formulate propositions 
that explain how the interaction between populations helps them gain legitimacy.  
7.3. Empirical contexts of application 
7.3.1. Mutualistic and symbiotic relationships 
To be able to generalize a theory that is based on the co-dependence of 
organizational populations, we consider pairs of populations to which it could be 
applicable. The community ecology literature in biology (Boucher et al, 1982; 
Pianka, 1994), organizational studies (Astley, 1984; Astley, 1985; Astley and 
Fombrum, 1983; Barnett and Carroll, 1987) as well as evolutionary theory (Aldrich 
and Ruef, 2006; Janzen, 1980; Romanelli, 1991) offer many examples of such 
interacting populations. In the most general formulation, the relationship between 
populations of species can be characterized by competition, predation, commensalism 
or mutualism (Boucher et al, 1982)8. Of these, mutualism is the only cooperative 
interaction that fully benefits both species. Since we are going to argue about 
cooperative transactions based on reciprocity, in this paper, we will only focus on 
mutualistic relationships. For the purposes of theorizing, we will also assume that 
species or populations are identical to organizational industries (Astley, 1984).  
Mutualism is a term applied to populations belonging to the same species 
(albeit with some differences among them); when the interacting populations belong 
to different species their relationship is called symbiotic, i.e. one in which two 
organisms live together in close association (Boucher et al, 1982). Mutualism and 
                                                          
8
 Mutualism can be defined as a +/+ interaction, while competition, predation and commensalism as /, /+ and +/0 respectively (Boucher et al, 1982). Other scholars use slightly different specifications. 
For example, Aldrich and Ruef (2006) classify full (/) or partial competition (/0), neutrality (0/0), 
predation (+/), and mutualism (+/+) under commensalism and symbiosis (+/+) separately. Barnett and 
Carroll (1987) only distinguish between competition and mutualism. Finally, Pianka (1994) uses 
Boucher et al’s (1982) classification but adds amensalism (, 0) and neutralism (0/0). 
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symbiosis are similar terms: the first refers to positive interdependence based on 
complementary differences, and the latter refers to positive interdependence based on 
supplementary similarities (Barnett and Carroll, 1987). Symbiotic and mutualistic 
relationships need not be obligate: the populations involved may have come together 
voluntarily (“facultative” mutualism) or accidentally (Boucher et al, 1982). This 
paper will specifically follow voluntary symbiotic relationships between two9 
organizational populations.  
In biology, scientists have observed that cooperative relationships between 
two species have several positive effects on the interacting populations. Mutualism 
and symbiosis can help with a) nutrition, b) supply of energy, c) protection from 
predators, and d) transportation to safe areas where the two populations can 
proliferate without interference from malicious environmental conditions (Boucher et 
al, 1982). Throughout this paper, we consider a lot of these and other biological 
observations as analogies to the behaviors of organizational populations.  
7.3.2. Organization-creating organizations 
Although biology can provide us with various specifications of interdependent 
living organisms, we focus our attention on organizational populations from the 
management literature. An interesting empirical context for reciprocal transactions is 
the block of so called organization-creating organizations (OCOs) and their created 
organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965a; Romanelli, 1991). Stinchcombe conceptualized 
these entities as special cases of organizations that satisfy the following three 
conditions: They a) operate in a variable environment that fosters innovation and b) 
have the resources to create other organizations so long as c)  some of these resources 
                                                          
9
 The symbiotic interaction of a single pair of species such as this is called monophily. When the 
exchanging partners are more than two and less than five, the symbiosis is characterized as oligophily. 
More than five partners constitute a polyphily.  
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are explicitly free from vested interests (Stinchcombe, 1965a: 34). OCOs resemble 
today’s corporate entrepreneurship units where the core organization has diverted 
some of its resources to the formation of new business units that will satisfy new 
customers or markets. The facilitator of the parent corporation’s strategy is the 
corporate entrepreneurship unit. Due to their interdependence, the corporate 
entrepreneurship unit and the new business units that it creates develop a symbiotic 
relationship similar to the one we described above.  
From a legitimacy perspective, corporate entrepreneurship units could 
endanger the legitimacy of the core organization. Consider the extreme possibility of 
a car manufacturer diversifying its operations to incorporate food production. The 
danger lies at the potential illegitimacy of both the new entities: the corporate 
entrepreneurship unit that manufactures products it has no expertise in, and the food 
business unit that suffers from the classic liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965b). 
How could the two organizational forms acquire legitimacy in a market? To the 
extent that organization-creating organizations and their organizations form complex 
exchange systems of interacting populations, the properties of their reciprocal 
cooperative relationship can greatly predict their legitimization process.  
To illuminate this process, we provide another example from the academic 
entrepreneurship literature (Shane, 2004a). Starting in the early 1990’s, public 
universities across the western world were increasingly asked by governments to 
incorporate commercial activities to their traditional mission of teaching and research 
(Etzkowitz, 2003) in order to increase technology transfer to the local economy 
(Shane, 2004a). A lot of these universities diversified their structures to form 
spinoffs, independent companies based on university intellectual property. Spinoffs 
were managed by newly established Technology Transfer Offices (TTO). These 
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offices acted as intermediary institutions between universities and spinoffs and 
designed the entire university spinoff strategy. TTOs inherently suffered from a 
liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965a) in that they lacked critical marketing 
expertise that audiences would point at to avoid supporting universities in their 
spinoff efforts. Universities needed the support of financial and other audience 
members in order to demonstrate their legitimacy and adaptability to the new state 
requirements. At the same time, newly established spinoff ventures suffered from the 
same liability of newness that most novel organizations experience early in their life 
cycles (Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007; Shane, 2004a). Spinoffs were also 
criticized as risky, illegitimate university practices by a large body of people in the 
educational market (Bok, 2003; Etzkowitz, 2003). Observing TTOs and spinoffs at 
the population level, the question is “how could the two populations gain legitimacy 
and grow”?  
A common practice among universities has been the donation of resources to 
new spinoffs within their capacity. For example, the academic entrepreneurship 
literature has described how spinoffs often utilize university space without financial 
costs, even after the incorporation of these entities as independent private firms. 
Because the inventors of spinoffs are university employees and universities often 
hold minority stakes in spinoffs, spinoffs save critical resources at the beginning of 
their lifecycles by receiving such gifts (Shane, 2004a). Further, spinoffs are often 
managed by former university employees (e.g. academic staff or inventors) who 
abandon their previous posts to take up managerial positions at the new ventures. 
Spinoffs therefore gain managerial expertise that could hardly be obtained by 
ordinary industry startups (Shane, 2004a). Spinoffs benefit from university 
endowments, for example, continuous support in terms of technology development 
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and networking that are critical for their legitimation and success (Delmar and Shane, 
2006; Shane and Stuart, 2002). Further, a lot of these processes are not confounded to 
the individual spinoff level, but can be observed at the population level. For instance, 
joint spinoffs by more than one university draw resources and endowments from 
various educational institutions at the same time.  
The relationship between universities and spinoffs in not a one-way exchange. 
Novel spinoff technologies have helped universities explore technology 
commercialization applications, as teams of inventors within universities often work 
on multiple projects, thus realizing economies of scale in the commercialization 
process (Shane, 2004a). Further, because universities lacked expertise in commercial 
business deals prior to engaging in spinoff formation, successful spinoffs have helped 
them acquire the necessary design, production and marketing knowledge to continue 
with these operations (Shane, 2004a). This often takes place even after a spinoff has 
gained its independence from the university. Historically, universities have also been 
seen as receiving intangible resources from spinoffs. For example, it has been argued 
that spinoffs enhance university status, and help it recruit better researchers, staff and 
students due to the appeal of its spinoff firms (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Shane, 
2004a).  
A lot of the resources exchanged between spinoffs and universities have 
traditionally not been based on contractual agreements (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; 
Rothaermel et al., 2007; Shane, 2004a). Instead, the behaviors of both parties are 
based on the understanding that giving freely to each other can be beneficial for both. 
This can be described as a symbiotic relationship as universities and spinoffs operate 
supplementary functions within the context of technology transfer (Boucher et al, 
1982). Further, given the opposition against and the illegitimacy of spinoff activities 
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early in the field’s history, it would be worth examining how spinoffs became taken 
for granted practices (Suchman, 1995). We believe that looking deeper into the 
properties of the reciprocal exchanges between universities and spinoffs as 
populations of organizations can help us understand the process of legitimation.  
7.4. The community ecology literature 
Organizational ecology draws from biology (Pianka, 1994) and Hawley’s 
human ecology (Hawley, 1986) to examine ecological processes among organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1997). Hawley conceptualized the ecological paradigm of 
human behavior and studied human beings not only as individual social actors within 
certain geographical boundaries, but collectively as populations of individuals within 
communities (Hawley, 1986). The pattern of interaction and the interdependence 
between communities within the larger ecosystem were seen as key determinants of 
human behavior in his theory. In the same way, organizational ecologists study the 
interaction and coevolution of organizations either as individual entities within 
populations (population ecology) or as populations within communities (community 
ecology), using organizational demographics as their tolls (Carroll, 1984; Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  
Relative to population ecology, the attention of ecologists to the community 
level of analysis has been quite recent (Astley, 1985; Baum and Singh, 1994; Carroll, 
1984). The shift has been the result of a recognition that population ecology focuses 
on established populations and emphasizes factors that homogenize individual 
organizational forms through inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Inertia is the chief 
organizational behavior that preserves population and form stability. In contrast, the 
promise of community ecology is to “overcome these limitations by focusing on the 
rise and fall of populations as basic units of evolutionary change, simultaneously 
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explaining homogeneity and heterogeneity among them” (Astley, 1985: 224). 
Community ecology has been described as the set of coevolving populations joined 
by ties of commensalism and symbiosis (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006); it is this dynamic 
coevolution that is responsible for the rise and fall of populations.  
7.4.1 Community legitimacy 
The main focus of community ecology has been to explain how populations 
emerge and fall, without delving deeper into the interceding process of community 
legitimation. In the classic definition, communities emerge through changes in a) 
norms and values, b) laws and regulations and c) technology. But these populations 
need legitimacy in order to acquire resources and prosper10, otherwise they will 
disintegrate. The classic ecological definition sees the legitimization process of 
organizational populations as “supra-organizational” (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) and is 
underdeveloped theoretically or empirically. This process is mainly assumed to 
depend on cross-population actions and laws and regulations that affect the entire 
community. Given these generalizations, our aim in this paper is to fill the 
“legitimacy” gap in communities by specifically emphasizing cross-population 
actions within communities. We propose that reciprocal transactions (exchanges) act 
as legitimation mechanisms among emerging, symbiotic organizational populations.  
A second pillar in community ecologists’ work has been the process of 
strategy formation by populations of organizations (cf. Barnett and Burgelman, 
1996). In his seminal work, Astley (1984) contrasted the previous individual 
organization-environment management theories by proposing an alternative theory of 
business policy and strategy formulation based on interorganizational collectivities. 
                                                          
10
 Legitimacy is a generalized perception that the actions of an entity (or industry) are deemed 
appropriate within the values, beliefs and definitions of the surrounding social system (Suchman, 
1995).  
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Management theorists had envisaged the individual organization-environment 
relationship as one that needs to be managed as to a) the exogenous environmental 
threats and opportunities, b) the organization’s resource interdependence with outside 
stakeholders and c) competition within industrial arenas. In contrast, Astley (1984) 
and Astley and Fombrun (1983) drew from bioecology to suggest that organizational 
adaptations need not be constrained at the business unit or single corporation levels of 
analysis but that community-level strategizing is possible between different 
populations of organizations. They proposed that joint action in organizational 
collectivities can be based on direct/indirect symbiotic relationships among 
organizational populations (Boucher et al., 1982; McKelvey, 1982; Hawley, 1986).  
Specifically, ecologists have proposed four core structures of coordination 
among populations: agglomeration, confederation, conjugation and organic (Astley 
and Fombrun, 1983). Each of these superstructural relationships indicates different 
resource flows and forms of control that take place among the participant 
populations. Astley and colleagues (Astley, 1984; Astley and Fombrun, 1983) placed 
particular emphasis on how professional associations, organizational leadership and 
network dynamics shape the coordination pattern among populations in the 
collectivity.  
In the following paragraphs, we build on the antecedents of reciprocal 
legitimacy to extend the work of Astley and colleagues. In particular, we argue about 
the role of reciprocity in explaining trust among organizational populations (Blau, 
1964). We also examine how trust and the exchange of tangible and intangible 
resources based on long-term reciprocal cooperative transactions can protect 
populations from competing populations, thus helping them grow harmoniously. We 
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call these combined effects the antecedents of the reciprocal legitimation process of 
organizational populations. Figure 7.1 represents the conceptual model of the study.  
7.5. Social exchange theory and propositions 
7.5.1 Reciprocal legitimacy defined 
The definition of reciprocal legitimacy that we adopt here is one that directly 
focuses on the exchange pattern between illegitimate market participants. When two 
organizational populations emerge simultaneously amid information asymmetry and 
audience ambiguity, none has legitimacy in its own, but together both can. This 
conceptualization stems from the general norm of reciprocity as defined by Gouldner 
(1960). According to this, a) organizational populations should help those 
populations that have helped them and b) organizational populations should not 
compete with those that have helped them. The idea is not completely new to the 
management literature − as far as we are aware, there exists one study that treats 
legitimacy as a reciprocal concept. In his paper about legitimacy of brands among 
members of gay communities, Kates (2004) argues that: “Legitimacy is a reciprocal 
concept. While gay men confer legitimacy on Absolut [vodka], Absolut confers 
social legitimacy on gay men by sticking with the community through thick and thin. 
Powerful global brands, such as Absolut or Levi’s are thought to bestow legitimacy 
and respectability on the gay community, moving it from its marginalized social 
position to a more central one” (p. 458). In this case, moral legitimacy is assessed by 
the extent to which brands truly benefit the gay community, so that illegitimate 
brands must be punished for their homophobic, religious-bound attitudes.  
Situated within the community ecology literature, the proposed reciprocal 
legitimation theory is one that is based on collective rationality and collective 
organizational action. Instead of individual human beings or organizations, the unit of  
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analysis is the collectivity of organizations in a population. Specifically, we are 
interested in new populations that suffer from some sort of illegitimacy or liability of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965a). Such new populations typically designate all 
members of an organizational industrial classification. What the reciprocal 
legitimation process tries to answer is how these new industries gain legitimacy as a 
result of their symbiotic interdependence.  
Reciprocal legitimacy is a self-reinforcing process of evolution. One 
organizational population confers legitimacy to another and vice versa, thus granting 
overall legitimacy to the entire community. In this sense, the reciprocal legitimacy 
process resembles the Red Queen hypothesis of population ecologists (Barnett and 
Hansen 1996; Derfus, Maggiti, Grimm and Smith, 2008). The Red Queen theory 
describes the self-reinforcing process of change and adaptation through constant 
learning: one organization’s learning triggers competition, the competition in turn 
learns and new cycles of adaptation follow indefinitely. In this process, “it takes all 
the running one can do simply to keep in the same place” (Van Valen, 1973: 1711). 
The difference between reciprocal legitimacy and the Red Queen lies in the nature of 
the relationships and the level of analysis. The Red Queen describes changes based 
on competitive dynamics at the organizational level, while reciprocity describes 
changes based on mutualism and cooperation at the community level. In the Red 
Queen hypothesis, competition forces organizations to constantly learn and improve, 
otherwise they are selected out from the industry. In reciprocal legitimacy, symbiotic 
sets of organizations depend on their sequential cooperative actions to acquire 
legitimacy and resources.  
                                                          
11
 As quoted in Lewis Carroll’s “Through the looking glass and what Alice found there” (1871) 
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7.5.2. Properties of exchange:  slack resources and status  
Scholars in the sociology of organizations, including community ecologists 
(e.g. Astley, 1983), have predominantly looked at contractual agreements that 
enhance legitimacy and performance. For example, network theorists argue that 
individual alliances with reputable partners enhance organizational legitimacy 
(Dacin, Oliver and Roy, 2007; Doz, 1996; Gulati, 1998) because organizations absorb 
some of the reputational capital of their partners. Others have argued that 
communities of organizations can strategize together based on agreements for 
collective action and industrial lobbying (Astley, 1984; Astley and Fombrun, 1983). 
Instead, recent scholars have shifted their attention away from contracts and towards 
cooperative dynamics among organizations. They have examined ideas such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma on organizational cooperation (Dollinger, 1990) or the necessity 
to work with others, including competitors (Ingram and Roberts, 2000) due to 
regulatory or other environmental pressures (Oliver, 1992) in order to increase the 
legitimacy of the partners involved.  
We believe that reciprocal transactions not based on contracts but on a firm 
belief in reciprocity can enhance the legitimacy of organizations just as any other 
cooperative transaction. This can happen through the exchange of a) slack resources 
and b) status by early-stage populations of organizations12. Organization theorists 
have argued that illegitimate or emerging individual organizations have limited 
resources to share with others due to lack of previous performance accounts 
(Stinchcombe, 1965b). Despite this, every organization has some stock of “slack” 
resources not being utilized at certain times in their lifecycle (Nohria and Gulati, 
                                                          
12
 The amount of goods or services donated need not be identical (Gouldner, 1960:164), although 
Malinowski (1985) calls for “fairly equivalent” transactions (55). Unequal transactions may depend on 
the intensity of the receiver’s needs at the time of the donation (Gouldner, 1960:171). 
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1996). Slack resources can be either financial, human or social capital in excess of the 
minimum required to produce a given level of organizational output. We assume that 
most novel organizations have some slack that is unabsorbed, i.e. that is easy to 
recover when needed (Singh, 1986). Many entities in an emerging industry together 
have enough resources to share with members of another industry due to their sheer 
collective size. We argue that it is these slack resources they can donate to 
organizations in another industry at the time they need them.  
The second property available for exchange in reciprocal transactions is 
status. Organization theorists argue that status is the outcome of outstanding past 
performance (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006; Rindova Williamson, Petkova 
and Sever, 2005). Due to lack of successful performance accounts early in the life 
cycle of an industry, organizations in that industry lack status as much as resources. 
We assume that, when one group of organizations enhances its status based on 
successful performance, the other will be able to utilize this incremental reputational 
stock to advance its own status. In a sequential manner, signals (Spence, 1973; 
Rindova et al, 2005) sent from industry A to its environment can be upheld by 
industry B’s environment due to the symbiotic association between A and B. At the 
end of the spiraling process, both A and B will have enhanced their reputation 
significantly based on reciprocal acknowledgments of one another’s contribution to 
their success. Like tangible resources, in social exchange theory, signals and 
reputational stock are intangible resources that can be donated from one community 
to another (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960).  
The tangible and intangible gifts of slack resources and status are the best 
economic alternatives when contractual agreements are impossible. Organizational 
populations interact with many populations in a community; however, it is arguably 
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impossible to form agreements with all of them. Contractual alliances for the 
exchange of recourses can also be expensive: they carry obligations (Dacin et al, 
2007) and can generate transaction costs for the parties involved (Williamson, 1975). 
Given these inefficiencies, relying on reciprocated gifts is the best immediate 
alternative that can guarantee some sort of reputational and resource advantages at a 
low cost. In our view, spiraling cooperative transactions based on these norms of 
reciprocity can therefore enhance the legitimacy of new industries by increasing their 
visibility to external audiences (due to better resources and reputation). Having 
defined the resources available for exchange, we now outline the antecedents and 
consequences of successful reciprocal transactions.  
7.5.3 Antecedents of reciprocal exchanges  
A critical condition for the success of dyadic reciprocal exchanges is the 
political balance between two partners (Gouldner, 1960; Oliver, 1992; Rosenkopf and 
Tushman, 1994). Community ecologists argue that imbalance generates niches for 
domination, therefore cancelling the possibility that symbiotic relationships will 
emerge (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006: 244). Dominance through power means that an 
industrial collectivity controls the flow of resources to another industry, thus 
expanding at the expense of the latter (Hawley, 1986). Gouldner (1960) argued that 
the stability of a dyadic relationship between A and B is contingent upon the relative 
power of the two participants in reciprocal exchanges: if B has the power to demand 
back the gift it has offered to A, he/she will do so to spare the risk of a delayed 
counter-donation (cf. Fehr and Gaechter, 1998). On the other hand, a firm belief by 
members of an industry in helping members of another industry acquire cheap 
resources when they most need them, solidifies the relationship between the two 
groups of organizations. According to Malinowski (1985), reciprocity is the antithesis 
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of exploitation and refers to the interlocking duties which people owe one another: 
people who depend on each other believe that, in the long-run, the mutual exchange 
of goods and services will balance out in favor of both. As described in the previous 
sections, balance in the exchange system between A and B cannot be guaranteed 
through power, but only by a respectful delivery of tangible or reputational resources 
back to the initial donor. We propose:   
Proposition 1: The lower the political imbalance between two organizational 
populations, the higher the quality of reciprocal exchanges in the entire 
organizational community. 
Further, Hawley argues that the expansion and development of an ecological 
system depends on the technological capacity for communication and transportation 
possessed by its populations (1986:7). Specifically, the interdependence of human 
populations pushes them to adapt simultaneously. This adaptation is mediated by new 
information flaws into the system. The new information increases the capacity for the 
movement of material resources, thus reshaping the populations themselves. 
Information gathering in reciprocal exchanges is particularly important to also 
monitor the effectiveness of the exchange system (Gouldner, 1960). Ecologists have 
previously described the importance of information in designing arrangements 
between organizational populations based on equality. The need to analyze 
information in organizational settings is perhaps higher than among human beings, 
because organizations are complex entities with multiple members and functions that 
need to be managed effectively (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).  
One of the reasons why transactions need to be monitored is to assess the 
presence of defectors or free-riders: any interorganizational collectivity where 
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defectors cannot be identified is less likely to produce sustainable norms of 
reciprocity among its organizations (Gouldner, 1960). In line with this argument, 
evolutionary theorists have emphasized the role of information in the coevolution of 
industries (Lewin and Volbeerda, 1999). Gathering feedback from the entire system 
is a key characteristic that can help reinvent managerial practices within the 
populations (Baum and Singh, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Analyzing 
feedback on how resources are shared by more than one populations in a community 
is further crucial for the divisionalization of labor during reciprocal transactions 
(Stinchcombe, 1990: 113). Dividing job tasks and responsibilities when exchanging 
gifts from one industry to another is key to securing that resources are not spared 
unnecessarily and that exchanges are made efficiently. To summarize, the stability of 
the relationship between coevolving industries is largely dependent on the richness of 
information they collect during the exchange. We therefore propose:  
Proposition 2: The richer the information (feedback) flows between two 
organizational populations, the higher the quality of reciprocal exchanges in the 
entire organizational community. 
A second element in Hawley’s (1986) human ecological paradigm is the role 
of the means of transportation available to human populations. Drawing an analogy to 
Hawley’s theory, we argue that the same transportational needs are present between 
cooperating industries. The utilization of industry structures to deliver gifts owed to 
another industry is crucial for the stability of the community. In particular, it is 
necessary that existing slack resources are delivered at the right time, to the right 
recipient and at the right speed (Gouldner, 1960; Hawley, 1986; Malinowski, 1985). 
If the delivery of goods and services in this manner fails to materialize, the sequence 
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of reciprocal donations is also destabilized, thus failing to assist populations in their 
resource acquisition efforts.  
Other ecologists such as Astley (1985) have focused on the role of 
technological capabilities in inter-organizational evolution. They have argued that 
interdependencies between technologies of different populations can fuse those 
populations together; for two industries to come together there needs to be a certain 
degree of agreement between the technologies they use, otherwise cooperation is hard 
to achieve (McKelvey, 1982). Astley (1985) argues that, consequently, “only those 
populations that are able to share technologies can function as constituent members 
of higher level communities and survive”; if they do not share similar technologies, 
there is little room for synergies and cooperation. Rao (2006) and Aldrich and Ruef 
(2006) have argued that technology is a core feature that facilitates various links 
between organizational populations. We assume that the exchange of resources and 
status between populations in reciprocal dyads is heavily dependent upon the 
available technologies of the new populations. Sophisticated technologies can also be 
used for the physical transportation of goods and services from one population to 
another. We propose:  
Proposition 3: The higher the sophistication of technology and transportation 
between two organizational populations, the higher the quality of reciprocal 
exchanges in the entire organizational community. 
7.5.4 Outcomes of reciprocal exchanges 
As we briefly discussed earlier, community ecologists have focused on 
collective strategizing as one of the core outcomes of legitimate populations’ actions. 
Collective strategizing is carried out through the actions taken by industry or field 
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associations collectively. Both organizational populations in a dyad coordinate their 
efforts for the mutual benefit of their members. Astley and Fombrun (1983) 
conceptualized this kind of strategy as “community adaptation” and divided it into 
commensalistic and symbiotic. In both commensalistic and symbiotic strategies, 
community adaptation is guaranteed through cooperation and exchanges that are 
based on interdependence. Yet, collective strategizing as described by Astley and 
Fombrun (1983) is the outcome of deliberate, targeted, contract-based population 
actions. The question is what other immediate benefits can cohabiting populations 
secure through their reciprocal, free of charge donations within a community?  
The first benefit that we have argued about throughout this paper is resources 
as gifts. Bioecologists argue that symbiotic relationships help partners acquire 
nutrition in several ways, for example, by facilitating the digestion of goods or by 
supplying each other with critical nutrients (Boucher et al, 1982). The analogy 
between biology and organizations is obvious. The second core benefit from 
reciprocal transactions is the sustainability of the network between populations. We 
conceptualize the duration of the network connections as the equivalent of energy 
provision among biological species (Boucher et al, 1982; Pianka, 1994). The 
formation and maintenance of strong reciprocal links between two populations is 
important because it can guarantee continuous supply of resources from one to the 
other. Organizational theorists have routinely studied these kinds of links using 
network theories (Baker and Faulkner, 2006; Granovetter, 1985). Networks focus 
predominantly on contractual agreements and alliances between organizations 
(Gualti, 1998). They are therefore bound to end at some point in time, eventually 
ending the effects of networking on the participants. In contrast, we believe that 
reciprocal transactions based on a commitment to sharing slack resources and 
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reputation between industries can be potentially endless. In the particular example of 
academic spinoffs, it has been documented that both universities and spinoffs begin 
donating to each other early in their industries’ life cycles; they continue to do so 
even after spinoffs are completely independent companies, residing outside the 
university.  
To be fair, just as network theorists, community ecologists have often 
conceived of collective strategies as joint agreements for lobbying based on contracts 
and designated industrial leadership (Astley and Fombrun, 1983). However, they 
have found that contractual interconnections increase disturbance among populations 
and reduce the capacity of the community to adapt to its environment. In contrast to 
this, social exchange theory suggests that reciprocal actions promote the development 
of trust in social relationships, because reciprocity allows the demonstration of trust 
and intentions through gifts (Blau, 1964). We believe that the imprinting effect of 
reciprocity among early industry members can foster great networking patterns with 
other industry members in the future. Over time, reciprocity can become 
institutionalized, as actors can develop common behavioral patterns and routines that 
harmonize these behaviors. In the long-run, the self-reinforcing process of giving in 
sequential transactions can be an indication of the duration and sustainability of the 
exchanges within the community (Molm et al, 2007). These exchanges can guarantee 
critical tangible and intangible resource supply far in the future, unlike temporary 
strategic alliances. We propose:  
Proposition 4: Reciprocal exchanges between organizational populations 
increase the sustainability of the network between them, thus securing the continuous 
future exchange of resources within the community.  
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Biologists argue that symbiotic relationships at the community level can help 
populations protect each other from predators (Boucher et al, 1982; Pianka, 1994). 
One of the ways this happens is through the provision of housing by one partner to 
another. In the example of academic entrepreneurship, the provision of office space 
by Technology Transfer Offices to newly established spinoff firms is a standard 
practice. To discover analogies between protection from predators in biology and 
those in organizational settings, we need consider the competitors of universities (e.g. 
science parks) and spinoffs (e.g. other startup companies) within a country. 
Exchanges based on reciprocity can protect both universities and spinoffs from these 
competitors due to price advantages. First, because exchanges based on sharing are 
cheap and are not based on contracts, they do not incur transaction costs to the parties 
involved (Williamson, 1975). Second, because they are acquired for free, the 
receiving partner can develop further production- or cost-advantages relative to 
competitors. Third, utilizing slack resources in a reciprocal exchange network 
maintains low costs even for the donor. For example, research has shown that 
spending slack resources on organizational projects to enhance innovation is not 
always fruitful, thus wasting slack resources that could be donated to a partner. It has 
also been argued that preserving idle slack resources may increase relaxation of 
discipline within organizations (Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  
By utilizing shared communication, transportation and technological links 
early in their lifecycles, industries can develop another valuable advantage: common 
competencies. Competencies are necessary for their constant adaptation to the 
environment and to competitors’ moves. In the organizational ecology literature, 
these kinds of competencies are often termed “comps” (McKelvey, 1982). Comps are 
the dominant competencies that distinguish organizational species and are formulated 
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through incremental organizational changes over time13. Comps play the same role as 
genes do in human beings: they possess and transmit the managerial and technical 
know-how from one generation to the other (McKelvey, 1982; Pianka, 1994), thus 
ensuring continuity and specialization among populations in a community. As we 
argued above, common comps between two industries are cheaper and quicker to 
acquire when exchanges between these industries are based on gifts than on contracts. 
Comps are usually inherently inimitable or costly to copy  competing populations 
can only reproduce high quality tacit knowledge through similar long-standing 
networks or better technologies. We believe that reciprocal transactions can therefore 
protect industrial collectivities from their competition by providing them with a 
relative competitive advantage based on both cost benefits and unique competencies 
developed within a community system (Boucher et al, 1982; Gouldner, 1960; 
McKelvey, 1982; Pianka, 1994). We propose:  
Proposition 5: Reciprocal exchanges between organizational populations 
develop cost advantages and inimitable comps that help the entire community protect 
its members from competitors.  
In biology, a corollary of protection from predators is the species’ 
proliferation in environmental safety. Safe locations are critical for the survival of 
animal populations because residing in safe areas helps them reproduce without 
interference. This kind of rapid proliferation is known as “escalation” (Vermeij, 
1994). Escalation is based on the assumption that predators are unable to reverse the 
proliferation process due to their unfavorable location relative to the prey. Parallel 
processes can take place in organizational settings. Specifically, reproducing in safe 
                                                          
13
 Janzen (1980) and Pianka (1984: 329) argue that the coevolution of populations starts by 
evolutionary changes in the traits of a population in response to trait changes of a second population. 
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environments is something that organizational populations can easily do if they hold 
advantages against competing populations. A consequence of having weak 
competitors is the ability of a population to increase its size by adding new members 
that wish to exploit these advantages (cf. Bresser and Harl, 1986). Because the 
community has acquired these advantages through reciprocal donations among its 
member populations when they most need them, the populations can somehow 
control the introduction of new members into them. Obviously, a key prerequisite for 
joining an industry such as this would be the commitment of newcomers to the 
existing ideology of reciprocity (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960). In 
the case of academic entrepreneurship, ties between spinoffs and Technology 
Transfer Offices would prohibit the admittance of new spinoffs or TTOs to their 
respective populations, unless they had embraced reciprocity as a standard behavioral 
pattern.  
The control of a population’s increasing size is crucial for another reason. 
Population ecologists argue that high density in an industry makes the resources more 
and more scarce, thus increasing competitive pressures from within (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Carroll and Hannan, 1989). Controlling density to a certain degree 
could therefore limit frictions among individual organizations and preserve 
cooperative ideologies of practice. In general, if populations can increase their size at 
a controlled rate, the utilization of resources within the capacity of the larger 
community can achieve its highest quality (Hawley, 1986).  
Given the impact of residing in safe areas (weak competition) in controlling 
population density, the question is how can the escalation process stop? Biologists 
argue that the rapid proliferation of populations in safe nests can only be stopped by 
external, uncontrollable environmental shocks (Vermeij, 1994). In organization 
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studies, external shocks can be critical events such as radical technological 
discontinuities (Anderson and Tushman, 1990), unexpected government legislation 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) or natural disasters. The existence of such destabilizing 
shocks in the literature serves as another proof of why stability in the relationship 
among populations is necessary, thus reinforcing the argument in favor of strong 
reciprocal bonds. We propose:  
Proposition 6: Reciprocal exchanges between organizational populations can 
help the entire community proliferate safely and at a controlled rate. 
7.5.5. Reciprocal legitimacy at work 
One of the negative aspects of symbiosis through reciprocal donations in pairs 
of organizational populations is the fact that overreliance on each other eventually 
risks transforming the entire community into a closed system. Astley (1985: 235) 
warned that too much interdependence based on exchange of resources makes 
populations shut themselves off from outside influences. An easy way to overcome 
this disadvantage is for the populations to begin exchanging resources with their 
environment. In this paper, we do not deny the potentially negative effects of too 
much interdependence between populations due to reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). We 
emphasize the fact that early exchanges between illegitimate populations solidify 
their mutual networking and produce competitive advantages and controlled 
population growth that ultimately help the community gain legitimacy in its entirety. 
Further, because legitimacy is associated with resource acquisition (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995), the exchange of resources between the community 
and its external environment is dependent on how the environment assesses the 
legitimacy of the populations involved.  
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Organizational ecology and institutional theorists (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) argue that environments form opinions about what is 
acceptable organizational behavior based on several criteria. Two of these are signals 
of performance (Rao, 1994; Rindova et al, 2005) and increased population density 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). High cost advantages and inimitable comps developed 
in cheap reciprocal transactions certainly help populations increase their performance 
(Barney, 1991). As we argued, they also help populations attract new organizations 
thus increasing their density at a controlled rate (Hawley, 1986). Combined, signals 
and density increase the visibility of the two emerging population to their 
environment. As a consequence, information on the usefulness and appropriateness of 
the two industries also increases, helping convey a sense of respectability and 
legitimacy of the entire community to the outside environment (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Spence, 1973). At this stage, the 
environment may start supplying the community with further resources, thus kick-
starting a process of community-environment exchanges. The norms of reciprocity 
therefore do not constrain organizational populations to their mutual interdependence 
(Atley, 1985). Instead, they help them acquire legitimacy and, as a consequence, 
resources from their environments, thus cancelling the possibility that they remain 
isolated. We propose:  
Proposition 7: Sustainable networks, cost advantages, inimitable combs and 
safe proliferation resulting from reciprocal exchanges within a community increase 
the size and visibility of its populations to the external environment, thus generating 
legitimacy to the community. 
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7.7 Discussion 
Drawing analogies between biology and management studies, this paper has 
proposed a new theory of organizational “reciprocal legitimacy” at the community 
level of analysis. First, we have argued about the resources that can be exchanged 
between pairs of early-stage, illegitimate organizational populations: slack resources 
and status. The quality of these exchanges is moderated (antecedents) by the political 
balance between the two populations, the information that is being transmitted in 
relation to these exchanges and the technology available for them. Successful 
reciprocal transactions may lead to three types of advantages for participating 
populations: network sustainability, cost advantages and comps, controlled density. 
These processes enhance the size and visibility of the entire community to its external 
environment, thus granting legitimacy to the populations.  
The idea proposed here is testable to the extent that data collection limitations 
can be overcome. As for most ecological studies, techniques and methods of analysis 
have been proposed by leading scholars in the field such as Carroll and Hannan 
(2000). To examine how resources are exchanged through gifts, one may look into 
young industries or federations of organizations (D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; 
Provan, 1983; 1984) where these can be common. To examine the consequences of 
reciprocal transactions, one would have to compare the evolution of two pairs of 
industries, perhaps one that is regulated by contractual agreements and another that is 
not. The three proposed consequences of community legitimacy can be treated as 
dependent variables in regression analyses.  
Developing a reciprocal legitimation theory is important for many reasons. 
First, population ecology and institutional theories have both been criticized for 
neglecting to explain how legitimacy is practically generated in a population. 
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Criticism of population ecology has focused on the use of organizational density as a 
measure of population legitimacy in itself (Young, 1988; Zucker, 1989), without 
delving deeper into the process of legitimacy generation at higher levels of 
abstraction (Astley, 1985). Criticism of institutional theory has focused on the fact 
that legitimacy is the outcome of a process, and using that process to explain its 
emergence is a tautological fallacy (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, Suddaby, 2008:18; 
Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). And despite DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) 
introduction of the construct of “organizational fields”, institutional theorists have 
focused almost exclusively on explaining individual organizations’ legitimacy, not 
fields or communities.  
Second, as Astley (1985:533) has pointed out, organizational theorists need to 
relax from the “obsessions of competitive survival” and “predatory practices”. Recent 
scholars in the organization studies and strategy literature have looked once again at 
competitive models such as the Red Queen hypothesis (Van Valen, 1973) or game 
theory (Dollinger, 1990) to provide explanations for industry-based legitimation and 
evolution. Unlike these studies, our work on reciprocal legitimacy emphasizes the 
relational character of organizational populations through cooperation and mutualism 
in social exchanges (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). We therefore 
contribute to the legitimacy debate by proposing a conceptually rich theoretical 
perspective based on organizational cooperation, rather than competition. We 
specifically examine the antecedents and consequences of reciprocal exchanges 
between populations at the community level of analysis (Astley, 1985; Astley and 
Fombrun, 1983). We conceive interorganizational relationships as cooperative, not 
competitive and as based on the belief of reciprocity through donations, rather than 
contracts and formal agreements (Gouldner, 1960).  
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Reciprocal exchanges are important for the legitimation and growth of 
organizational populations, when the latter are co-emerging and suffering from a 
liability of newness. Theoretically, this is crucial because organization scholars have 
emphasized the emergence of one population at a time, neglecting the effects of 
symbiotic interdependences on the emergence and legitimation of entire communities 
(Romanelli, 1991). Similarly, coevolution theorists have dealt with populations that 
are already in some “developed” stage in their life cycles (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) 
and lack of legitimacy is not core to these theoretical explanations. In fact, 
community ecologists have emphasized the importance of collective strategizing in 
established communities as an outcome of legitimacy, without examining how 
legitimacy is actually acquired by a population (Astley, 1985).  
Our work is different from networks and strategic alliances is many respects. 
Networks of organizations predominantly refer to the structural equivalence and 
colocation of individual organizational members in the network (e.g. Wiewel and 
Hunter, 1985). Instead, reciprocal transactions are based on the nature (e.g. resources, 
sequence) of exchanges, not on location or functional complementarity (Scott, 2006). 
Unlike cheap reciprocal transactions, strategic alliances (Gulati, 1998) are ex-ante 
agreements of limited duration aiming at increasing organizational performance and 
can incur severe transaction costs14 to their participants (Williamson, 1975). Finally, 
alliances are unable to capture the dynamics of entire organizational populations and 
have thus been operationalized between individual organizations, despite recent 
efforts by community ecologists towards that direction (Astley, 1985).  
 
                                                          
14
 Transaction costs refer to monetary or other resources (e.g. time) that are needed to enforce or 
monitor carrying out agreed transactions. In this paper, we do not argue that reciprocal exchanges are 
transaction cost-free, in fact, we argued about the importance in information to study these exchanges. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
University spinoffs have grown in numbers and size over the past two 
decades. This study has dealt with three relevant research questions. The first had to 
do with why they spread so quickly; the second with their potential benefits on 
universities, and the third with the coevolution of spinoffs and universities within the 
wider academic entrepreneurship community. The research questions were framed to 
fill specific gaps in the spinoff literature, as leading authors in the field have 
previously called (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Shane, 2004a). I approached these 
questions using theories from the economic sociology and the sociology of 
organizations literature, specifically, institutional, ecological and evolutionary 
perspectives (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Astley, 1985; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The results of the study 
largely supported the hypotheses that were crafted based on a careful qualitative and 
quantitative research design. I have presented in detail the phenomenological, 
theoretical and managerial implications of the two empirical projects and the one 
conceptual in separate chapters. I have also proposed specific directions for future 
research throughout chapters 5-7.  
Overall, the results of the study highlight the importance of environmental, 
institutional factors in shaping the education market. While this is in accordance with 
prior research on public organizations and universities (Scott, 1981; Tolbert, 1985; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Zajac and Kraatz, 1993), the implications of the study’s 
findings are far reaching. In particular, they demonstrate the expanding role of social 
construction mechanisms such as media and fashion mechanisms in educational 
institutions’ decision making processes. Chapter 5 argued about the role of these 
forces in pressuring universities to engage in spinoff activities, despite the lack of 
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resources, incentives and managerial commitment within these organizations. The 
project linked these processes with low levels of intervention from governmental and 
other public agencies with regards to the monitoring and regulation of public 
education markets. One important corollary of this observation had to do with how 
public organizations can “decouple” formal structures from substance. Specifically, 
low level government intervention was associated with decoupling by providing 
public universities with the opportunity to “deceive” the authorities in spite of 
pressures for compliance to state demands for restructuring. Yet, the results reiterated 
the importance of institutional compliance among public organizations in their 
decision-making models, as legitimacy in times of environmental turbulence forced 
institutions towards isomorphic, mimetic behavioral patterns. These findings have 
clear managerial implications as to how public entities should be regulated.  
Chapter 6 provided similar findings with regards to how public organizations 
are rewarded within the UK’s nation innovation policy framework. Unlike previous 
assumptions among researchers, the study’s novelty lies in its ability to uncovered 
non-efficiency explanations of public management initiatives (Lockett and Wright, 
2005; Shane, 2004a), including the role of social construction mechanisms in 
rewarding public institutions for their actions. It also highlighted the importance of 
the gradual legitimation of university actions before the latter can acquire resources 
from private and public financial providers. The results have direct implications as to 
how school managers should manage the legitimacy of their organizations within 
their changing environments. For example, it has been shown that media coverage is 
a significant tool that universities can exploit in their favor.  
The robustness and reliability of the study were tested in multiple cases. 
Several alternative explanations were proposed, for example, by conducting 
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robustness checks using different dependent variables. A multitude of control 
variables were also introduced in the empirical models to increase the explanatory 
power of the results beyond the predicted assumptions of the core independent 
variables. This study used longitudinal, panel data on the entire population of UK 
universities and spinoffs over a period of 15 years. For this, I spent extensive amount 
of time and effort in trying to ensure the reliability of the measurements used in both 
empirical studies. Consequently, I was able to uncover the precise trajectory of 
spinoff diffusion and the appropriation of resources by universities better than other 
empirical research designs in the academic entrepreneurship literature.  
While I have examined limitations and directions for future research earlier, I 
wish to outline here some of the projects I have already started working on in relation 
to this body of work. One of the findings in ch. 5 was the role of association 
membership (UNICO) in the universities’ spinoff formation efforts. The chapter 
argued about the role of the association in legitimizing spinoffs as appropriate 
university functions, as well as in setting norms and best practice among educational 
institutions. The data used for this project revealed significant variance in the timing 
that universities joined the association. My next immediate concern is therefore to 
assess the reasons for this variability. How do universities differ in their search for 
legitimacy? Are prior reputation and performance levels good predictors of their 
behavior relative to industry norms and associations? The legitimating role of 
professional associations has been examined in the organization studies literature on 
several occasions (e.g. Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 
1987; Greenwood Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Swan and Newell, 1995).  
The second future study will deal with the population density effects of 
spinoff generation on their death rates. The population data I obtained on spinoffs 
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may be pointing to the role of resource constrains in the spinoff industry’s growth, as 
is evidenced in the collapse of births and the increased mortality post-2001 (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977). In ch. 5, I demonstrated the role of environmental factors in 
predicting the evolution of the industry over time, yet the availability of the data are 
ideal for the exploration of pure population ecology effects.  
Finally, an important note on the implications of ch. 7 for theory and future 
research. The novelty of this study is embedded in the combined operationalization of 
biological and social exchange (reciprocity norms) constructs for the study of 
evolutionary processes. Interestingly, these processes were further examined at the 
population ecology level. My literature review on community ecology and 
organizational evolution indicate that very few theoretical formulations in the current 
literature are testable in empirical settings. Acclaimed authors in the fields have 
argued convincingly in favor of this observation (e.g. Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; 
Freeman and Audia, 2006). I believe that the context of academic entrepreneurship 
from which I drew inspiration is exceptionally unique in its availability for the 
empirical examination of reciprocal legitimation processes that ch.7 proposed. In 
particular, the database that was used elsewhere in this study has the breadth to carry 
out measurements and analyses at the community ecology level, using the 
populations of spinoffs and universities as the exchange parties in reciprocal 
transactions. But more data would certainly be required for this objective.  
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Appendix 10.1: Institutional and diffusion theory literature review 
Journal papers 
No Authors Theoretical model and variables Data, findings and contributions Method and sample 
1 Abrahamson, 
1991 
Four theoretical perspective are examined: 
1. Efficient-choice 
2. Fad  
3. Fashion 
4. Forced-selection  
 
When and how are technically inefficient 
innovations adopted and when and how are 
technically efficient innovations rejected?   
 
Defines perspectives based on power, networks, 
politics, mimicry and performance level of 
firms. Processes outside and inside the 
organization are examined. Effectively looks at 
efficiency vs. fads in adoption of innovations.  
Conceptual paper 
2 Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf, 
1993 
Proposes a mathematical model of bandwagons to 
determine: 
 
1. whether a bandwagon will occur 
2. how many organizations jump on it 
3. how many retain the innovation it diffuses 
 
Data are based on “collectivities” and the idea of 
ambiguity in the usefulness of the innovation.  
 
 
Testing a bandwagon model 
3 Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001 
Spread of downsizing as a practice: 
Resistant organizations are old, large, domestically 
owned, with high reputation and high human 
capital.  
 
As more organizations downsized thought, 
individual choices became less influential and, in a 
bandwagon process, resistant organizations imitated 
the majority that had adopted downsizing as a 
practice.  
 
Demonstrates the safety-in-numbers effect in 
adoption studies. Examines the interaction 
between social and economic effects over time.  
Defines downsizing as laying off 5% or 
more of a firm’s labour. Event history 
analysis  
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4 Attewell, 1992 Adoption depends on a sequence of variables 
related to learning e.g.: 
 
Computer bureaus, manufacturers’ knowledge, 
consultants influence, troubleshooting expertise, 
dynamics within the user firm (e.g. centralization 
etc) etc.  
 
Contrary to dominant diffusion models of 
information flaws (media) and influence, the 
paper focuses on the role of know-how and 
organizational learning for the adoption of 
innovations.  
 
Offers critique of current diffusion theory and 
proposes alternatives (in literature review) 
 
Case studies and interviews 
5 Bothner, 2003 Adoption of 6th generation processor depends on: 
1) Competition, but in relation to... 
2) Size in a dynamic way, i.e. certain companies 
will adopt quicker or slower depending on their size 
as other competitors adopt the innovation.  
 
 
Provides a dynamic model with regards to 
competition and size of adopting firms.  
 
Event history analysis based on a Log-
normal model 
6 Burns and 
Wholey, 1993 
Information processing theory and diffusion 
1. Org. diversity and scale 
2. Org. size  
3. Org. slack resources  
 
Inter-organizational networks and diffusion: 
1. Network embeddedness (centre-periphery) 
2. Org. visibility and prestige  
3. Prior transmission of information on adoption via 
professional media  
4. Cumulative prior adoption (within region) 
 
Previous studies have assumed diffusion via:  
1. Rational choice to solve problems 
2. Mimicry (fads) 
3. Media influences 
4. Normative pressures (local networks) 
 
Investigates the impact of organizational and 
network factors on the adoption and 
abandonment of matrix management in a panel 
of organizations over a 17-year period.  
 
Another key question is:  
Is programme adoption and abandonment 
processes symmetrical or based on different 
factors?  
Logistic regression 
7 Burt, 1987 Social contagion: 
1. Cohesion (communication through media, 
Early theorizing and operationalization of those 
two central concepts in diffusion.  
MLE regression 
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physical proximity between ego and alter) 
2. Structural equivalence (competition between ego 
and alter)  
 
8 Chang et al, 
2006 
Firm innovation spreads with: 
-Institutional infrastructure of a country 
-Affiliations (networks) within the countries’ 
infrastructure  
-Profitability of other affiliates in same group 
Dynamic model where groups across countries 
are compared. Weak and strong infrastructure 
are also mixed with those groups to explain 
contagion.  
Zero-inflated Poisson and Zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression 
9 Clark, 1968 Institutionalization of innovations in Higher 
Education: 
1) Organic growth model (development of 
professional activities formation of new institutions, 
definition of status associated with innovation)  
2) Differentiation model (based on institutionalized 
patterns within universities) 
3) Diffusion model (knowledge, information 
collection, evaluation, trial, adoption)  
4) Combined-process model (institutionalization 
occurs externally and internally)  
 
The essential dynamic element is the growth in 
complexity, systematization and strength of the 
basic ideas on which the innovation is founded.  
 
Results are generalizable to government, 
military, and other forms of organizations.  
Conceptual paper 
10 Clark and 
Soulsby, 1999 
Spread of MDF in the Czech Republic: 
1. Survival not growth is the aim (motives) 
2. Individual behaviours important (politics) 
Examines the economic, political and 
institutional factors that affect the adoption of 
the MD form in a post-communist, rather than 
western capitalist society.  
Case studies, interviews 
11 Cole, 1985 Spread of small-group activities based on: 
1. Incentives to national labour markets for 
innovation (politics) 
2. Establishment of well-funded organizations to 
communicate and support change (ideology) 
3. Disposition of organized labour towards these 
changes and its ability to enforce its preferences.  
Unit of analysis: Entire industries within 
national political communities 
Level of analysis: Cross-national 
 
Contributions:  
1) impact of power on org. forms (macro-
politics as opposed to micro-politics) and  
2) impact of environment on org. change 
 
Case studies, interviews 
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12 Colyvas, 2002 Diffusion of university inventions to the market: 
1) Role of intellectual property rights in bringing 
inventions to practice 
2) Role of university TTOs 
 
Contributes by applying institutional/diffusion 
theory to the specific context of academic 
entrepreneurship.  
Case studies, interviews 
13 Conell and 
Cohn, 1995 
General propositions: 
1. Firms often fail to respond to changes in their 
environment due to lack of awareness/ information 
(consciousness) 
2. Significant events serve to bring environmental 
changes to the attention of management  
3. Firms respond to limited information by imitating 
other successful firms  
 
Hypotheses tested: 
H1: Strikes stimulate other strikes by raising 
consciousness, and setting “starting dates” 
H2: Successful strikes produce more imitation 
than failed strikes 
H3: Unionization stimulates other strikes  
 
 
Event history analysis 
 
14 Cool et al, 1997 Research question is: 
-How do supply and demand factors affect the rate 
of diffusion of an innovation within an 
organization?  
 
Examines how the intra-organizational adoption 
of an innovation in individual organizations 
affects the overall diffusion of that innovation 
among all organizations.  
Defines a “critical mass” of 25% in order 
to locate the point of adoption.  
15 D’Aunno et al, 
1991 
The role of external audiences in legitimacy: 
Conflicting requirements and pressures from 
various environmental actors lead to conflicting 
actions from organizations that change. 
Organizations try to offer value to the most 
important forces in their environments, leaving less 
important ones with limited information or 
resources. 
 
Choosing which environmental demands 
(elements) to respond to is crucial in 
organizational survival. Accordingly, 
organizations are likely to adopt practices that 
are mostly aligned with influential social actors. 
Probit regression 
16 Davis, 1991 Hypotheses on what affects diffusion: 
1. Ownership structure of the firm (including 
interlock network of Boards) 
2. Previous existence will prevent further diffusion 
3. Interlocks with other firms (contagion) 
4. Prevalence in an industry  
 
Control variables: 
1. Size and previous performance of firm 
2. Whether they have adopted other take-over 
defence mechanisms (can be positive or 
negative impact, so dummy variable) 
3. Whether they are institution-owned 
4. Location of incorporation (US state)  
Cox event-history analysis 
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17 Davis and 
Greve, 1997 
“Spatial heterogeneity” model of adoption: 
Four vectors: 
1. Intrinsic rate of adoption 
2. Susceptibility to influences by others 
3. Infectiousness of previous adopters 
4. Social proximity to previous adopters 
 
Changes in corporate governance practices can 
be analysed by linking the adaptations of 
individual firms to the structures of the networks 
in which firms’ decision makers are embedded.  
MLE regressions 
 
18 Fiss and Zajac, 
2004 
Old views: 
1. Competition market pressures 
2. Product market pressures 
 
New views: 
1. Diversity of shareholders’ views 
2. Diversity of managers’ views 
3. Symbolic management of shareholders (language 
and appearance) 
 
Owners’ (banks, families, political parties) and 
managers’ (education, age) power affect 
diffusion and implementation of the innovation.  
 
The authors propose that adoption and non-
adoption are not sufficient tests; we also need to 
assess implementation after adoption to check 
for decoupling. 
 
Pooled cross-sectional regression and 
negative binomial regression 
19 Fliegstein, 1985 The ability of key actors to alter structure under 
three circumstances: 
 
1. When the firm has a product-related or –
unrelated strategy 
2. When corporate presidents have a background in 
sales or finance 
3. When other firms in the industry alter their 
structures 
 
Briefly examines five major theories to assess 
spread of the MD form: a) Strategy-structure; b) 
Transaction costs; c) Population ecology; d) 
Control theory-power; e) Institutional theory.  
 
Examines diversification strategies (related/ 
unrelated) and why they spread.  
Binary logit regression 
20 Galaskiewicz 
and Burt, 1991 
Two contagion models: 
Cohesion vs. Structural equivalence 
Describes corporate contributions officers’ 
evaluations of non-profit organizations seeking 
philanthropic donations 
 
Standard network autocorrelation models 
21 Green, 2004 Diffusion of managerial practices: 
1. The discursive justifications used to rationalize it. 
When such justifications are accepted and taken for 
granted, the practice reaches a state of 
Examines the impact of pathos, ethos and logos 
justifications in managerial discourse on the 
adoption of innovations Rhetorical theories used 
to explain diffusion are a) discourse analysis and 
Conceptual paper 
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institutionalization.  
2. Changes in justifications and diffusion provide a 
basis for explaining institutionalization as both a 
process and a state.  
 
b) social construction.  
22 Greve, 1995 Org. change may occur due to: 
1. Problem solving (Cyert &March, 1963) 
2. Learning (Burgelman, 1994) 
3. Conflict (Ocasio, 1994) 
4. Regeneration (Starbuck & Hedberg, 1977) 
5. Contagion (Burns & Wholey, 1983) 
The authors examine: 
Contagion = sensemaking of managers 
Competition = resource scarcity 
Defines as key determinants: size of the 
organization, intensity of competition, corporate 
and market contacts (networking) with other 
organizations  
Event history analysis: heterogeneous 
diffusion model as described by Tuma & 
Hannan (1984) 
  
23 Greve, 1996 Hypotheses/model on diffusion: 
1. Mimicry of other industry organizations 
2. Change of ownership 
3. Possession of knowledge 
-Herd behaviour theory (rationality within 
mimicry) 
-Properties to define org. forms 
-Great literature review on diffusion 
 
Event-history analysis: heterogeneous 
diffusion model as described by Tuma & 
Hannan (1984) 
24 Guler et al, 
2002 
Diffusion of ISO 9000 certificates: 
 
Social network theory using location in different 
countries to assess adoption of ISO through: 
-cohesion and  
-structural equivalence.  
Key findings: 
1) States and foreign multinational firms are key 
actors responsible for coercive isomorphism. 2) 
Cohesive trade relationships between countries 
generate coercive and normative effects. 3) 
Role-equivalent trade relationships result in 
learning-based and competitive imitation.  
 
Negative binomial regression  
25 Haveman and 
Rao, 2007 
Diffusion of a practice depends on: 
-Social movements and  
-Political movements 
The main contribution lies in uncovering the 
influence of social movements in the 
institutionalization of org. forms 
 
Cox event history  
26 Hedstrӧm, 1994 Mathematical model predicting the actors’ choices 
to join a movement based on: 
 
1. Individual factors to join 
Contagion through networks or cohesion Logistic regression  
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2. Other actors actually joining the movement 
(contagion) based on the two actors’ proximity 
 
27 Henisz and 
Delios, 2001 
Decision on firms’ location depends on: 
-Same business group’s firms decision to locate 
there (mimicry) 
-Low level of political hazards in the location 
 
These effects are moderated by how much 
experience a focal firm has in a particular 
country/location 
 
The use of prior experience as a moderator of 
the decision-making process is seen as crucial, 
given the market and political uncertainty.  
Discrete-time logit regression  
28 Holden, 1986 Mathematical model estimating: 
-Previous successful hijacking attempts 
-Previous unsuccessful hijacking attempts 
-Reported hijacking attempts 
-Reported unsuccessful hijacking attempts 
 
 
The authors’ estimates translate to: 
-Location of hijackings 
-Type of prior hijackings 
-Outcome of previous hijackings 
-Media coverage of previous hijackings 
Discrete-time linear excitation model 
proposed by Hawkes (1971) 
29 Kalev et al, 
2008 
Diffusion based on: 
1. The role of the state (state autonomy) 
2. Efficiency 
3. Labour control 
4. Professionalisation 
5. Discourse 
 
 
Brings insights from political sociology and 
framing theories to organizational studies 
research.  
Quantitative and qualitative analysis 
30 Kimberley and 
Evanisko, 1981 
The following are positive on adoption: 
1. Leadership a) tenure, b) cosmopolitanism and c) 
education 
2. Organizational a) centralization, b) specialization, 
c) size, d) functional differentiation, e) external 
integration 
3. Environmental a) competition, b) city size 
 
Tests a series of hypotheses on 3 main areas 
(leadership, organization, environment)   
Linear regressions 
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31 Knoke, 1982 Municipal reforms adopted based on:  
1. Cultural clash (religion, race)  
2. Hierarchical diffusion (city population log) 
3. Modernization (city age, population growth) 
4. Class conflict (wages, education)  
5. Neighbourhood effect (geography) 
 
Results do not support hypotheses Event history models 
32 Kostova and 
Roth, 2002 
Three main pillars in diffusion: 
1. Institutional profile of country (regulatory, 
cognitive, normative) 
2. Relational context of MNC (power dependence, 
trust, identification, ceremonial adoption) 
3. Decoupling (ceremonial adoption when 
regulatory environment is strong but there are less 
strong cognitive and normative pressures; or when 
dependence is high but recipient unit has low trust 
and identification with parent firm) 
 
The paper contributes by specifying institutional 
duality (double pressure from 2 environments: 
internal market and market abroad) may lead to 
decoupling: subsidiaries will not implement 
changes proposed by mother firm.  
 
The authors also distinguish among:  
-Pre-institutionalization,  
-Semi-institutionalization (some acceptance but 
short history means more like a fad) and  
-Full institutionalization 
 
Hierarchical regression and ANOVA 
33 Kraatz and 
Zajac, 1996 
US school adaptation: 
Strong institutional pressures would predict 
structural and functional adaptation in US colleges, 
but the opposite has been true: they changed their 
structure and goals according to their own interests 
in defiance of norms. Most hypotheses were 
rejected and this is seen as a limitation to the 
applicability of IT.   
 
The authors unpack the limits of neo-
institutional theory by finding results that 
contrast its major assumptions 
Event history analysis 
34 Lee and 
Pennings, 2002 
Two institutionalization processes: 
1. Competitive; includes “market feedback”, the 
process of spread of the superiority of a new 
environmentally selected form (due to better 
performance etc) 
2. Institutional; includes resources, influences, 
sensemaking, abilities, power, individual network 
Uses population ecology and institutional theory 
to argue that there are two processes that affect 
adoption: institutional and competitive: 
 
4 forces: 
-Market feedback, 
-Network embeddedness, 
Event history analysis  
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embeddedness etc.  -Size similarity, 
-Location proximity 
 
35 Meyer et al, 
1992 
Variables that affected diffusion: 
-Urbanization  
-Religion 
-Political independence  
-Rule of compulsory national education 
-Race 
-Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  
 
Political organization into nation-states was the 
main driving force behind the variables 
examined and the most important factor.  
Event-history using a log-linear model 
36 Myers, 2000 Adds media coverage (communication) to Strang 
and Tuma’s (1993) general framework on riot 
diffusion.  
Summarizes the 4 tenets of Strang and Tuma’s 
(1993) spatial and temporal heterogeneity 
diffusion 
 
Cox regression 
 
37 Nelson et al, 
2004 
Four models of innovation adoption: 
a. Rational choice adoption 
b. Quasi-rational choice 
c. Social construction 
d. Fad/fashion 
 
The two driving forces behind this categorization 
are the absence/presence of dynamic increasing 
returns and the ability/inability of the organization 
to get sharp persuasive feedback 
 
Proposes four generic diffusion models, similar 
to Abrahamson’s (1991, 1996) and Rogers’s 
(2003) theories 
Conceptual model 
38 O’Neil et al, 
1998 
Speed and persistence in strategy adoption depends 
on: 
Environmental factors: 
-Environmental uncertainty, 
-Macrocultures within and across  
 
Organizational factors: 
-Past success/performance 
-Size of performance difference between first 
Links diffusion theories to organizational 
strategies. Applies a multilevel theoretical 
model to contrast previously proposed efficiency 
explanations of strategy adoption (e.g. mergers, 
privatizations, diversification, downsizing etc.) 
Conceptual paper 
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adopter and competing organizations 
-Adoption failures 
-Organizational “memory” 
 
39 Orton and 
Weick, 1990 
Decoupling of adopted activities: 
Fragmented external environments and conflicting 
requirements stimulate decoupling of activities. 
Organizations will either pretend to be 
implementing changes/innovations or create formal 
structures without adherence to the technical 
requirements 
 
Reviews the theory on loose-coupling based on 
the concepts of its:  
a) Causation,  
b) typology, 
c) effects, compensations, and outcomes. 
Conceptual paper 
40 Palmer et al, 
1993 
Five main factors: 
1. Economic (strategy and size, tactics, 
performance) 
2. Politics (intra-organizational and inter-
organizational) 
3. Institutional (tradition, mimicry, coercion, 
normative pressure) 
4. “Non-financial dependence” (competition, power 
of customers etc) 
5. Firm age (old are inert, will not change) 
 
Economic and political factors affect diffusion 
at the beginning but later on institutional factors 
are more important (after the new form has 
gained legitimacy) 
Event-history models 
41 Pennings and 
Harianto, 1992 
Adoption of technological innovations: 
1. Accumulated knowledge skills (know-how) and 
experience in previous technologies 
2. External networking and linkages with 
technology firms.  
3. High previous capital investments in 
technological systems and equipment 
 
Application in the US commercial banking 
industry 
Event history model 
42 Rao, 1994 Exit (death) rates of automobile manufacturers are 
based on: 
1. Cumulative victories in product certification 
contests within their industry  
Deals with the social construction of reputation 
and its impact in the survival and performance 
of organizations.  
Cox regression  
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2. Cumulative victories decrease the exit rate of 
start-ups more than that of lateral entries. 
 
Reputation is the mediating variable in the 
relationship between certification contests and exits.  
 
43 Ruef, 2000 Where do organizational forms come from? How do 
they spread? 
 
Community ecology approach: 
a) the residual sociopolitical legitimation enjoyed 
by an emerging form due to prior collective action 
on the part of a predecessor form and… 
b) the residual cognitive legitimation enjoyed by an 
emerging form resulting from its ability to draw on 
the more highly crystallized identity of a 
predecessor form.  
c) A third dimension of the symbiotic relationship 
taps into benefits that are not tied to legitimacy per 
se, but rather to resource spillovers. 
 
 
This conceptualization captures the intuition that 
the probability of form emergence… 
a) increases with carrying capacity and the 
legitimacy/resource spillover effect of having 
existing organizations with a similar identity but 
b) decreases when competition among existing 
organizations consumes much of the resources 
available to the potential form.  
 
Thus, in the emergence (legitimization) of new 
organizational forms, there is an interplay 
between symbiosis/mutualism and population 
ecologists’ density assumption. 
 
Poisson regression  
 
44 Sanders and 
Tuschke, 2007 
Three main constructs: 
1. Organizational learning [exposure to other 
environments, perhaps in other countries] through: 
a) affiliations with partners which have already 
adopted, b) executives with high education 
2. Second order learning: previous adoption of 
institutionally contested practices 
3. Diffusion forces: cohesion and structural 
equivalence 
4. Regulatory legitimacy: legal changes remove 
barriers to adoption 
 
 
The authors find that the first four (4) elements 
have stronger effect on pioneers than late 
adopters. 
 
Timings: 
-Pioneer adopter (before legislation permitted 
the adoption) 
-Momentum adopter (after legislation) 
-Non-adopter 
Event history models 
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45 Sherer and Lee, 
2002 
Adoption of workforce changes: 
-Prior human resource scarcity negatively affects 
adoption 
-Prior prestige of principal office likely to lead to 
early adoption 
 
Merges institutional theory with resource 
dependence theory to construct a theory on 
institutional change. 
Event history analysis 
 
 
46 Spell and Blum, 
2005 
Two perspectives on adoption: 
1. Strategic choice perspective (org. Size, union 
presence, turnover) 
2. Institutional perspective (others have adopted in 
the industry, discourse through media coverage)  
Timing: 
The strategic approach is stronger at the 
beginning and the institutional gets stronger 
thereafter 
 
Moderator: 
Moderating effect of discourse on density vs. 
adoption 
 
Cox event history model 
47 Strang and 
Macy, 2001 
Diffusion is not necessarily dependent on rational or 
mimetic processes:  
In general, mimetic, under-rationalized processes 
lead to fads and the spread of ineffective 
innovations, while  rational, over-rationalized 
choices lead to the spread of effective innovations. 
The authors propose a single model that applies to 
both the above scenarios:  
Within their bounded-rationality, firms learn from 
each other and pay attention particularly to their 
successful peers before deciding on what to adopt.  
 
The paper explains how bandwagons collapse, 
thus amending DiMaggio and Powell’s 
arguments on mimicry: 
Mimetic behaviours that lead to unsuccessful 
outcomes push certain players to defect from 
common practices and towards uncommon 
innovations, so that mimicry eventually 
increases population diversity (not 
isomorphism) and promotes temporal instability 
(not stability).  
Econometric models and 
experiments/simulation 
 
48 Strang and 
Meyer, 1993 
Institutional factors of diffusion: 
1) Cultural linkages: categorization into same 
industry or cultural groups; competitive emulation; 
isomorphism 
2a) Theorization by the adopters: e.g. organizational 
communication or control processes that are 
theorized help the spread of reforms in these areas. 
Marxist theorizations helps socialist revolutions 
2a and 2b happen jointly: this has the powerful 
effect of matching the adopter to the practice 
and the practice to the adopter.  
 
Theorization acts as a “social construction” 
mechanisms that affects the content and form of 
diffusion.  
 
Conceptual paper 
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spread. When theorization is shared among all 
adopters, the actors involved will be considered 
homogenized.  
2b) Theorization of the diffusion practice: the 
practice speaks out for its benefits thereby making it 
more appealing for adaptation by others.  
3) Modernity: the ideas of progress and justice that 
shape the environment of organizations. Same 
technologies and same legitimate accounts of 
organizing bring them together.  
 
Analytic strategies: 
-better specify relational model 
-specify theoretical linkages 
-examine variations among populations 
-examine variation among diffusion practices 
(more or less modern etc) 
-examine the content of diffusion 
49 Strang and 
Soule, 1998 
Diffusion is often used to denote “increasing 
incidence” but that makes it uninteresting: “causal 
process” is the best way to look at diffusion.  
 
External vs. Internal diffusion:  
1)External elements are the mass media and the 
various change agents.  
2) Internal includes a) cohesion through strong ties 
(networks), b) news through weak ties, c) structural 
equivalence and competition, d) prestige, e) spatial 
proximity, f) cultural categories  
 
Distinguishes between the diffusion practice 
(mimicry) or the diffusion outcome (social 
learning) 
 
Conceptual paper but offers review of 
econometric models used in diffusion 
studies 
50 Strang and 
Tuma, 1993 
Spatial and temporal heterogeneity in diffusion: 
Network centrality and local structures of influence 
based on coherence and structural equivalence 
enhance diffusion speed.  
In contrast to previously proposed population-
level models, the authors develop individual-
level models of adoption that allow 
heterogeneity both within the population and 
across time.  
 
Spatial and temporal heterogeneous 
diffusion models 
51 Swan and 
Newell, 1995 
Previous literature: 
1. General strategy regarding innovation 
2. Firm size 
 
Contributions: 
1. Membership profile of a professional association 
Examines relationships between the 
involvement of individuals in a professional 
association (seminars and conferences, 
meetings, social events), the level to which they 
network with others within their firms and the 
level of technological innovation in their firms 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis  
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and its channels to disseminate knowledge 
2. The importance of the association in promoting 
innovation among its members 
 
(boundary spanning activities) 
52 Teece, 1980 Administrative innovations: 
1. Have no protection by patenting them, hence can 
diffuse easily.  
2. They involve significant costs and org. 
disruption.  
3. They cannot be adopted partially or on a step-by-
step basis, therefore timing and speed of diffusion 
are crucial.  
 
Corporate acquisitions could be an economic 
factor worth investigating regarding diffusion of 
administrative innovations 
Logistic regression  
53 Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983 
City characteristics-predictors: 
1. Number of foreign-born immigrants 
2. Socioeconomic bases (education etc) 
3. Scope of functions performed by city 
4. City age (negative effect) 
5. City size 
Internal organizational characteristics proved 
more important for adoption at the beginning, 
but later when the reforms where 
institutionalized, external environmental 
characteristics were found to be more important 
than internal.  
Cox regression model 
54 Van de Bulte 
and Lilien, 
2001 
Medicine adoption is affected by potential adopters’ 
perceptions of 5 critical product characteristics: 
1. Complexity, 
2. Compatibility with existing values, 
3. Trivialability, 
4. Observability of results, 
5. Relative advantage over alternatives 
Social contagion: 
1. Information transfer, 
2. Normative pressures, 
3. Competitive pressures, 
4. Performance network effect 
Cox regression model 
55 Weber and 
Davis, 2000 
Stock exchange diffusion: 
Local processes: 
-Size of economy (overall and relative to the 
country’s population) 
-Legacy of colonialism 
-Recent transition to multiparty democracy 
 
Global processes: 
-Multinational prior investments 
The paper integrates globalization dynamics into 
institutional theory to explain the spread of stock 
exchanges in the 1980s-90s.  
 
Results contrast dependence theory assumptions 
and the role of legal tradition or religion 
(protestantism) in the diffusion process 
Cox regression model  
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-IMF aid 
-Centrality in trade flows 
-Regional “contagion” 
 
56 Wejnert, 2002 Diffusion of innovations based on: 
1. Characteristics of the innovation (public vs. 
private consequences; benefits vs. costs) 
2. Characteristics of innovators (societal entity; 
familiarity with the innovation; status 
characteristics; socioeconomic characteristics; 
position in social networks; personal characteristics) 
3.  Environmental context (geographical settings; 
societal culture; political conditions; global 
uniformity) 
 
 
Great conceptualization and full literature 
review of these three key factors.  
Conceptual paper  
57 Westphal and 
Zajac, 1997 
Major assumptions: 
-CEOs who have experienced a similar increase in 
board independence at their companies will export 
that to the firm in whose board they also sit.  
-The greater the proportion of CEOs on a board, the 
lower the likelihood of an increase in demographic 
distance between the CEO and the board 
-The greater the proportion of CEOs on a board, the 
lower the likelihood of a decrease in unrelated 
diversification 
 
 
Brings in the norm of reciprocity and social 
exchange theory 
 
Event history analysis. Entropy measure 
on diversification used  
58 Zuckerman, 
1999 
Legitimacy and resources: 
The candidate-audience interface includes all actors, 
intra-organizational and external. Appeal to the 
most powerful secures legitimacy and, thus, 
longevity and performance.  
 
 
Highlights the importance of mediators such as 
product critics in a market.  
Fixed-effects regression analysis 
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Book s and Book Chapters 
 
No Authors Theoretical model and variables Data, findings and contributions 
1 DiMaggio, 
1991 
Diffusion of art museums: 
Social elites supported the creation and professionalization of museums 
for their own purposes, but the interests of the museums’ management 
institutionalized the form by appealing to wider audiences.  
 
The author participates in the debate over whether the 
diffusion/institutionalization of a practice is due to systemic change 
(org. interests and purposes) vs. conventional change (compliance) 
2 Lynch, 1996 Thought contagion (“memes”): 
The new science of memes deals with the evolution of ideas that program 
for their own retransmission (cf. Richard Dawkins) through mass belief 
systems.  
 
Retransmission happens through 7 general patterns, called “modes”: 
-Quantity effect 
-Efficiency effect 
-Proselytizing 
-Belief preservation 
-Sabotaging competition 
-Cognitive advantage 
-Motivational advantage 
 
Lynch introduces the core elements of the theory of memes, linking it 
to the social sciences (sociology, anthropology, economics, 
psychology, game theories). Apart from the recreation and proliferation 
of existing ideas through its core modes, thought contagion can 
recombine or even generate new ideas in a field/society 
3 Rogers, 2003 Elements of diffusion: 
1. An innovation/technology 
2. Communicated through certain channels 
3.Over time 
4. Among members of a social system 
 
Types of innovation decisions: 
1. Optional 
2. Collective 
3. Authority 
 
Consequences: 
Some other elements: 
-Diffusion can be planned or spontaneous. 
-Heterophily (or structural equivalence) can explain variation.  
-Social norms, structure or leadership can explain variation. 
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1. Intended vs. unintended 
2. Direct vs. indirect 
3. Desirable vs. undesirable 
 
4 Strang and 
Sine, 2002 
Interorganizational institutions 
Key concepts:  
-Naturalistic vs. force/choice-based emergence of new institutional 
arrangements 
-The role of institutional performers at the top (e.g. the state, legislation) 
-The role of “triggers of change” and “challengers” as institutional 
innovators 
-Legitimacy through illegitimate actions 
-Links with ecological perspectives 
 
Proposes the following topics for future research: 
-Establishing a clear IT paradigm 
-Deinstitutionalization paradigm 
-Distinguish between legitimacy and status (how does status affect 
institution building/decline?) 
-Move towards internal/endogenous sources of organizational change 
-Exploring a top-down as well as bottom-up (specific actors) research 
approaches 
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Appendix 10.2: Organizational Ecology theory literature review 
Journal papers 
No Authors Theoretical model and variables Findings and contributions Method and sample 
1 Anderson  
and Tushman, 
1990 
Technology cycle:  
Technological discontinuity > (Era of ferment) > Dominant design > (Era 
of incremental change) > Technological discontinuity 2. 
 
Discontinuities underline either products (product forms that command a 
decisive cost, performance or quality advantage) or processes (superb 
ways of making a product). Sales of the new technology will peak after 
the emergence of a dominant design, not during the era of ferment.  
 
Literature review of theoretical models that 
explain technological change, including 
anthropology, sociology etc.  
 
Case studies 
2 Astley, 1985 Population vs. Community ecology 
 
A) Population ecology focuses on established populations, emphasizing 
factors that homogenize organizational forms and preserve population 
stability.  
B) Community ecology overcomes these limitations: it focuses on the rise 
and fall of populations as basic units of evolutionary change, 
simultaneously explaining homogeneity and heterogeneity between them.  
 
What links the population and community ecologies is technology: 
Interdependencies between the technologies of different populations fuse 
those populations together and only those populations that are able to 
function as constituent members of such higher level communities will 
survive.  
The core argument of the paper is that: 
 
Community ecology can better capture the 
evolution of fields compared to simply 
population ecology (PE). PE says that failing 
organizations are replaced by new entries 
that gradually change the population 
composition (phyletic gradualism). Thus, PE 
focuses on the regulation of established 
populations (that are prone to stability), not 
their origins or extinction. In contrast, CE 
supports an episodic not gradual tempo of 
population change based on radical 
technological changes governed by 
“historical happenstance” and “blind 
decision”, not technical necessity. 
Technological change ≈ “biological 
mutation”. Also, innovation comes in the 
form of technological “clusters” 
Conceptual  
Paper 
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3 Astley and 
Fombrun, 
1983 
Adaptation takes two forms: 
1) Individual and  
2) Communal 
 
Individual adaptation is subdivided to: 
1) Somatic (bodily form) which is temporary and reversible in the lifetime 
of an organism. It is particular to the life of the organism and is not passed 
on to successors. 
2) Genetic (morphology of a whole species) represents a long-term 
adaptation of the species.  
 
Communal adaptation is subdivided to: 
1) Commensalistic (organizations-members of the same species make 
similar demands on their environment) 
2) Symbiotic (organizations-members of different species make dissimilar 
demands on their environment: they supplement each other’s efforts and 
are thus mutually interdependent) 
 
Individual adaptation in organizations (individual strategies): 
1) Business strategy is like somatic/morphological adaptation (how to 
meet variation in an organization’s environment) 
2) Corporate strategy is like genetic adaptation (defining the businesses 
that that organizations should be in through long-term changes in its 
structure to accommodate itself to new environmental niches) 
 
The authors suggest the following framework 
regarding strategy: 
 
Interorg. env. >  Collect. Str. >  Commun. ad. 
Gener. env. > Corpor. str. > Genetic adapt. 
Task env. > Business str. > Somatic adapt. 
 
The paper’s contribution lies in defining the 
communal adaptation/strategy. Thus, 
coordination among members of the 
organizational population depends on 1) the 
number of entities in the population and 2) 
the type of relationship between them.  
 
Finally, the authors classify collective 
strategies into 4 categories: 
 
-Confederate 
-Agglomerate 
-Conjugate 
-Organic 
 
The challenge for organizations is to balance 
their individualistic goals within such 
communities and the interests of the other 
members or the wider society within which 
they participate. Firms must fulfill social and 
political as well as economic functions 
 
Conceptual paper 
4 Astley and 
Van de Ven, 
1983 
 
Examines 6 core questions that remain unanswered in the Org. Studies 
literature.  
 
1) Organizations: functionally rational or socially constructed 
embodiments of individual action? 
2) Organizational change: Internal adaptation or environmental selection? 
The authors use 2 core dimensions: 
 
1) Micro vs. Macro levels of analysis 
2) Deterministic vs. Voluntaristic (free will) 
assumptions of human nature 
 
Conceptual paper 
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3) Organizational life: determined by environmental constraints or by 
strategic managerial choices? 
4) Organ. environment: simple aggregation of externally-controlled 
organizations or an integrated collectivity governed by its own internal 
social and political forces? 
5) Organizational behavior: is it principally concerned with individual or 
collective action? 
6) Organizations: neutral technical instruments engineered to achieve 
goals or institutionalized manifestations of the vested interests and power 
structure of the wider society? 
 
The authors distinguish 4 generic views of 
organization studies: 
 
1) Natural selection view 
2) Collective-action view 
3) System-structural view 
4) Strategic choice view 
 
5 Barnett, 2006 Some interesting propositions: 
1) The strength of collective actions declines immediately after an 
industry establishes legitimacy  
2) The strength of collective action in a mature industry declines 
immediately after legitimacy is re-established. 
3) Over the life of an industry, member firms focus on individual activities 
unless disrupted by a legitimacy challenge 
4) Industries in decline are less likely to mobilize in the face of a 
legitimacy threat than industries in emergency or maturity. 
 
The paper examines the role of collective 
action and competition during the lifecycle 
of an industry 
Conceptual paper 
6 Barnett and 
Burgelman, 
1996  
Evolutionary perspectives of strategy Introduction to SMJ special issue Conceptual paper 
7 Barnett and 
Carroll, 1987 
Competition vs. Mutualism 
1) Competition: “direct” or “diffuse” 
2) Mutualism: “direct” or “diffuse”. Diffuse mutualism is when 
organizations with similar characteristics enhance each other’s 
institutional legitimacy.  
 
Mutualism 
1) Commensalism (positive interdependence based on supplementary 
similarities) and 2) symbiosis (positive interdependence based on 
complementary differences) 
Examines whether any of these patterns of 
interdependence really existed in the 
Telephone Industry  
Event history models  
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8 Barnett and 
Hansen, 1996 
Red Queen: 
Self-reinforcing process of change through constant learning: one 
organization’s learning triggers competition, the competitors in turn 
“learn”, and so on. Organizations co-evolve through these reciprocal 
interactions 
 
Explores the conditions under which learning 
can be “adaptive” or “maladaptive”. In 
specific, it deals with the duration of an 
organization’s relationships a) recently and 
b) in the distant past.  
Event history models 
 
 
9 Beard and 
Dess, 1988 
 
Input-Output analysis (from economics) 
a) Industrial organizational classification 
b) Organizational species’ technology 
c) Organizational species’ interdependence 
 
Species/population/form 
Organizational species are polythetic groups of competence-sharing 
populations isolated from each other because their dominant competencies 
are not easily learned or transmitted (McKelvey, 1982). An organizational 
population designates all members of an organizational species or 
industrial classification at any time and the term organizational form 
designates the typical organization in terms of a specified set of defining 
characteristics of that population 
 
Organization task environment ≈ Organ. 
niche  
Conceptual paper 
10 Boucher et al, 
1982 
Competition vs. Mutualism vs. Predation 
 
Interactions effects for two species or two populations: 
Mutualism: +/+  
Competition: -/- 
Predation: -/+ 
Commensalism: +/0 
Two types of mutualism: 
Direct mutualism = physical contact 
Indirect mutualism = no physical contact  
Direct mutualism benefits: 
-Nutrition,  
-Supply of energy,  
-Protection from enemies,  
-Transport to safer places 
Mutualism ≈ symbiosis, obligacy,  
commensalism, cooperation, 
protocooperation, mutual aid, facilitation, 
reciprocal altruism, and entraide.  
 
How many partners in a mutualism? One 
(monophily), few or up to 5 (oligophily) or 
many (polyphily)? Oligophily is the 
compromise between the risks of 
specialization and the inefficiency of 
generalist interactions. 
Conceptual paper 
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The evolution from commensalism to mutualism can take these forms: 
1) Evolution to symbiotic mutualism is thought to begin a) through 
proximity of the organisms involved. Then, b) one of the two provides the 
other with a benefit that greatly enhances its chances for survival. Finally, 
c) as more needs of the association are met by the combined abilities of 
the mutualists, the intensity of the competition on those partners from 
ecologically similar species will diminish.  
2) Evolution to nonsymbiotic mutualism is that in which the two species 
are physically unconnected.  
 
The formation of mutualistic communities may take place from a) 
coevolution of the species or b) accidentally, e.g.  due to developments in 
prior archetypes or more distant populations that eventually result in 
bringing the focal mutualistic populations together.  
 
 
11 Bresser, 1988 Collective strategies that might result in impairment of secrecy and 
information disclosure: 
1) Regulative legislation: regulators collect and distribute information to 
competitors 
2) Contracting (mergers/JVs): defecting employees, ineffective 
communication links between participant organizations 
3) Trade associations: distribution of trade statistics/data 
 
The authors propose different levels of feasibility between 
collective/competitive strategies based on various  
combinations of: a) competition/regulation/trade associations and 
contracting with b) pricing, advertising and promotion, product innovation 
dimensions 
 
The paper discusses possible combination of 
collective and competitive strategies in an 
industry. Such combinations can be 
dangerous due to the need to share and, at the 
same time, conceal information from other 
market participants.  
 
Conceptual paper 
12 Bresser and 
Harl, 1986 
Environmental interdependence can be analyzed by: 
1) Rate of movement among environ. elements (movement= environ. 
variation that increases when there is a higher frequency of change and if 
change becomes less predictable. Increased movement aggravates stress 
Coordination forms of collective strategy: 
-Regulative legislation 
-Contracting (mergers, JV) 
-Coopting and interlocking directories 
Conceptual paper 
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and decision-making uncertainty increases) 
2) Strength of interconnectedness between environ. elements 
[Interconnectedness is determined by the extent to which rules or 
formal/informal agreements exist to regulate the interactions among 
environmental elements. Interconnectedness increases as rules create 
linkages and therefore govern more interactions among environmental 
units. There is competitive (based on market rules) and contractual (based 
on contracts) interconnectedness] 
 
-Trade and professional associations 
-Collusion and industry leadership 
 
Impact of collective strategies: 
-reduce strategic flexibility 
-increase the impact of external disturbances 
-low organizational adaptability 
-attract new industry entrants 
 
13 Bruderer and 
Singh, 1996 
Evolution: central concepts are… 
1. Birth = variation 
2. Org. learning = adaptation 
3. Death = selection (fitness) 
4. Proliferation = retention 
 
The authors provide a  literature review of 
the adaptation vs. selection debate among 
evolutionary theorists 
Simulation 
14 Campbell, 
1975 
Differences between social and biological VSR evolution: 
 
-Social variation is, of course, identical to biological 
-Social selection is similar to biological 
-Social retention/duplication is more problematic than biological.  
 
Social retention mechanisms include: child socialization, reward and 
punishment, identification, imitation, indoctrination into tribal ideologies, 
language and linguistic meaning systems etc. But majority 
opinions/behaviors are perhaps the most important such mechanisms.  
 
Core contributions: 
1) Too much variation through 
discontinuities can be harmful. Biological 
mutations are 99% of maladaptive or neutral, 
not positive effects.  
2) Too strong a retention mechanism 
jeopardizes the production of variations, thus 
also further evolution – we need some 
balance. 
 
Conceptual paper 
15 Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 
2005 
Social Exchange Theory (SET): 
Examines the following areas for additional research: 
a) Roots of conceptual ambiguities 
b) Norms and rules of exchange 
c) Nature of resources being exchanged 
d) Social exchange relationships 
 
 
The paper provides a review of the literature 
on SET. It highlights conceptual and other 
deficiencies in the current arguments and 
methodological paradigm of SET.  
Conceptual paper 
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16 Derfus et al, 
2008 
Red Queen revisited: 
a) Firm actions increase performance 
b) Firm actions increase and so do rival actions and speed of rival actions 
c) Firm actions stay constant, rival actions increase, hence focal firm’s 
performance decreases 
 
Additions to the baseline model: RQ is 
moderated by: 
a) Industry concentration 
b) Industry demand 
c) Market position of firm 
Negative binomial 
regression 
17 Dollinger, 
1990 
Collective strategy # interorganizational strategy: 
Interorganizational interaction takes form as pairwise activity. When that 
activity is repeated over large numbers of loosely linked organizations, 
then we have collective action.  
 
A) Collective strategy comes from Hawley’s sociobiology and exchange 
theory (Blau, 1964; Cook, 1977) which evolved into RBV (Pfeffer & 
 Salancik, 1978) 
 
B1) Development process: Firm-level interactions > repetition > clustered 
strategies(cooperation becomes self-sustainable)  > population-level 
collective strategy 
 
B2) Evolutionary process: Pairwise cooperation > mimetic adaptation, 
competitive isomorphism, institutional isomorphism > critical mass 
established > colonization 
 
C) Environmental context: Munificence, complexity and dynamism in the 
environment foster collective actions at the intermediate level. When they 
are too high or too low, collective action will not take place.  
 
D) Efficacy/performance: As colonization spreads, the individual firm 
gains become smaller - the gains only become larger for the entire 
population relative to other populations. 
 
The authors answer four questions: 
1. How common/frequent are collective 
strategies? 
2. How are they developed? 
3. What are the environmental and industry 
influences on collective actions in 
fragmented settings? 
4. What is the efficacy of collective strategy? 
Conceptual paper 
18 Doz, 1996 Explores the impact of: 
a) Learning,  
b) Reevaluation,  
c) Readjustment 
Explores the evolution of strategic alliances Case studies 
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19 Fatas-
Villafranca et 
al, 2007 
 
Coevolution of national industries and institutions:  
-Role of well-trained scientists and engineers 
-Role of universities as supporting institutions that coevolve with national 
industries 
-Existence of techno-scientific radical changes 
-Role of price/performance competition worldwide 
-Existence of local (dis)advantages in the access to key production inputs 
depending on national conditions 
 
Block 1: production, growth, demand and 
market dynamics 
Block 2:Innovation 
Block 3: Evolution of national university 
systems 
Block 4: Specific coevolution mechanism 
Simulation 
20 Freeman and 
Audia, 2006 
Two criteria to distinguish Organizational communities 
a) Spatial differentiation 
b) Functional complementarity 
 
Based on these, there are 4 types of communities: 
1. Organizational demography (NO, NO) 
2. Interorganizational relations (NO, YES) 
3. Concentration and agglomeration (YES, NO) 
4. Residential communities (YES, YES) 
 
2. Interorganizational relationships: are 
based on ideologies, identities, technological 
space, market concentration (generalists vs. 
specialists) and participant’s socio-
demographic space (e.g. size).  
3. Concentration: the main argument here is 
between local density vs. country density.  
4. Residential communities ≈ social networks 
 
Conceptual paper 
21 Garud and 
Rappa, 1994 
Technology is conceived of as: 
-the researchers’ initial Beliefs 
-the Artifacts they create and 
-the Evaluation Routines 
 
There are reciprocal relationships between pairs of these elements. For 
example, beliefs define the standards (routines), and the desired standards 
also shape existing beliefs. 
 
Provides a socio-cognitive model of 
technology evolution (adoption) 
Case study 
22 Goes and 
Park, 1997 
Key inter-organizational links that foster innovation: 
-Structural 
-Administrative 
-Institutional (trade associations) 
-Resource-based 
 
Organizations form linkages to foster 
innovation, adapt to environmental demands 
and prosper. Specifically, institutional links 
among organizations in a field are stronger 
and more frequent when the market is in 
turbulence.  
 
MLE regression 
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23 Gouldner, 
1960 
The norm of reciprocity: 
 
The stability of the relationship between A, B requires the investigation of 
a) mutually contingent benefits rendered and b) the manner (relative 
power) that this is sustained.  
 
Malinowski: Reciprocity refers to the interlocking status duties which 
people owe one another. People believe that, in the long-run, the mutual 
exchange of goods and services will balance out.  
 
Reciprocity is a “starting mechanism”, in that it fosters social interaction. 
Unlike existing social arrangements, reciprocity enables the beginning of a 
social system, because one is obliged to respond to somebody else’s favor. 
Thus, the norm breaks off from the past status quo. 
 
Conditions to diagnose reciprocity: 
-The resources available in order to 
reciprocate 
-The intensity of the recipient’s need when 
the benefit was bestowed 
-The motives of the donor 
-The status of the participants 
-The time it takes to perform an obligation 
 
 
Conceptual paper 
24 Greve, 2002 When and where are new organizational populations established? 
 
The paper draws a distinction between temporal and (for the first time) 
spatial evolution of organizational forms. It argues that the density 
dependence (legitimacy vs. competition) argument does not hold in 
general but only in specifically delineated geographical neighborhoods of 
organizations.  
 
Organizations within neighborhoods (communities) interact with varying 
degrees of legitimation and competition effects, other than the classic 
ecological assumptions of a single, central population… 
 
The paper introduces the following 
theoretical terms: 
-Spatial contagion 
-Spatial competition 
-Spatial density dependence 
Negative binomial 
regression 
25 Hannan et al, 
1995 
Legitimation processes operate more broadly than competition: 
Legitimation= pan-European 
Competition= by country 
 
In population ecology, evolution is measured 
as the entry of new organizations in a 
population/country 
 
Quasi-likelihood 
estimators (McCullagh, 
1983) 
26 Hannan and 
Carroll, 1992 
Measuring population legitimacy:  
 In population ecology, only cognitive legitimacy is measured and this 
through density accounts. The first order density measures legitimacy, and 
the second order density measures competition.   
The population ecology legitimacy has been 
criticised heavily, for example by Zucker, 
1989; Delacroix and Rao, 1994; Baum and 
Powell, 1995; Young, 1988.  
Conceptual paper 
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27 Homans, 
1958 
Social behaviour as exchange: 
Homans introduced the research paradigm of exchange among social 
actors. He drew from the example of the “hungry pigeon” who develops 
an exchange relationship with the man that feeds it.  
 
This is one of the first pieces to propose that 
exchanges are not limited to material goods 
but also include symbolic values (e.g. social 
approval, prestige) 
Conceptual paper 
28 Janzen, 1980 Coevolution is: 
An evolutionary change in a trait of the individuals in one population in 
response to a trait of the individuals of a second population, followed by 
an evolutionary response by the second population to the change in the 
first.   
 
Coevolution is different from: 
-interaction,  
-symbiosis  
-mutualism 
Conceptual paper 
29 Kieser, 1989 Societal evolution: 
Genesis of organizations not only due to intentional action but also due to 
the preservation of accidentally formed practices that were initially 
intended for other purposes (Hayek, 1973) 
 
There are reciprocal selection processes at the 
world//institution/group/individual human behavior levels. However, it is 
inappropriate to characterize any of these as the prime mover of societal 
evolution: they all evolve simultaneously!! But asynchronic developments 
on these levels lead to societal crises, legitimation crises and ultimately 
the emergence of new organizational forms.  
 
The adaptability of societies is dependent on 
the speed (tempo) of evolutionary processes 
at the above three levels. Adaptability of the 
current organizational form is crucial in its 
selection as the dominant form. When the 
system cannot adapt as fast and efficiently as 
required by environmental and competitive 
forces it will eventually collapse, and other 
forms will replace it. 
 
Case study 
30 Koza and 
Lewin, 1998 
 
Coevolution of strategic alliances: 
-Mimetic behaviors dictate entry to strategic alliances for the first time by 
new firms 
-Successful experience in strategic alliances dictates more of these 
-Alliances due to mimetic behaviors will dissolve quicker than alliances 
based on firm-specific needs.  
-Exploitation intentions mean alliances will be organized to produce 
performance outcomes 
-Exploration intentions mean alliances will be organized to produce 
learning objectives 
 
The paper proposes a framework which 
views strategic alliances in the context of the 
adaptation choices of a firm.  
 
The morphology of an alliance (absorptive 
capacity, control, identification) may drive 
the evolution of alliances at the population 
level.  
Conceptual paper 
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31 Lewin et al, 
1999 
Proposes a more integrated framework of how firm strategic and 
organization adaptations co-evolve with changes in the environment and 
organization population and forms.  
 
 
Builds on March’s (1991) model of 
organizational adaptation. 
Conceptual paper 
32 Lewin and 
Volberda, 
1999 
Coevolution is: 
The joint outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and 
institutional effects. It takes place through direct interactions or feedback 
from the rest of the system.  
 
Properties: 
-Multilevel: within (micro) and between (macro) organizations. Macro 
includes communities. 
-Multidirectional causalities 
-Nonlinearity: counterintuitive results may occur due to strange links and 
feedback paths. 
-Positive feedback 
-Path/history dependence = Adaptation in time 
 
Suggests that we need large longitudinal 
datasets of org. populations that somehow 
coevolve  
Conceptual paper 
33 McKelvey 
and Aldrich, 
1983 
Examines the following in Org. Studies: 
-Classifiability 
-Generalizability 
-Predictability  
 
The authors propose the “theory of natural 
selection” perspective in population ecology.  
 
Conceptual paper 
34 Meeker, 1971 Social Exchange: 
Meeker amended the classic SET rules of exchange (reciprocity) by 
proposing that exchanges among individuals make take one of the 
following additional rules: 
-Rationality, 
-Altruism, 
-Group gain 
-Status consistency or rank equilibration 
-Competition 
 
Meeker’s model refers to individual social 
action among people 
Conceptual paper 
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35 Molm et al, 
1999 
Negotiation vs. reciprocity 
Discusses how the form of social exchange (negotiated vs. reciprocal) 
affects the distribution of power among the participants in the exchange 
network.  
 
In general, the reciprocal exchange produces lower power use than the 
negotiated.  
 
Contributes to the debate about whether 
social exchange based on the norm of 
reciprocity is any better than social exchange 
based on pre-agreed, negotiated terms.  
 
Experiment 
36 Molm et al, 
2007 
Theory of reciprocity and solidarity in exchange: 
1) Direct exchange:  
2) Indirect exchange: Each actor gives to another but receives benefits 
back from another. The indirect exchange involves more than two actors 
(in contrast to indirect) and  is seen as generating stronger bonds of 
solidarity than pair-wise exchange.   
 
These exchanges are embedded in wider networks, and power of actors 
within these networks is important.  
 
Distinguishes between reciprocal vs. 
negotiated exchange.  
 
Solidarity based on these exchanges develops 
through 3 mechanisms: a) the risk of non-
reciprocity, b) expressive value of 
reciprocity, c) salience of cooperative 
elements of the exchange 
Experiment 
37 Nielsen, 1988 Cooperative strategies: 
1. Pool strategy  
2. Exchange strategy 
3. De-escalate strategy 
4. Contingency strategy 
 
These can be found in a) negative-sum game/ declining markets, b) zero-
sum game/ mature markets, c) positive-sum game/ growth markets and in 
order to d) change the game/market  to a positive-sum/ growth one.  
 
Makes the case for cooperative rather than 
competitive strategies. It then offers 
examples of cooperative strategies (e.g. 
distribution agreements, transfer pricing, 
joint ventures etc). 
Conceptual paper 
38 Oliver, 1990 
 
Determinants of interorganizational relationships 
The authors examine the following types of relationships: 
-Trade associations 
-Voluntary agency federations 
-Joint ventures 
-Joint programs 
-Corporate-financial interlocks 
Critical contingencies in all relationship 
formation: 
-Necessity (e.g. regulatory pressures) 
-Asymmetry (to exercise power over other 
players’ resources) 
-Reciprocity (mutual cooperation/ 
collaboration, not competition) 
Conceptual paper 
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-Agency-sponsor linkages -Efficiency  
-Stability (predictability) 
-Legitimacy 
 
39 Romanelli, 
1991 
Three views are examined: 
a) Org. genetics view: focus on characteristic traits of organizations  
b) Environmental conditioning view: environments help forms grow  
c) Social systems view: forms are the product of embedded social-
organizational interactions  
Develops the concept of “organization-
creating organizations” as first defined by 
Stinchcombe (1965). These firms:  
 
1. Operate in a variable environment that 
fosters innovation;  
2. Have the resources to create other 
organizations and 
3. Some of these resources would be 
explicitly free from vested interests.  
 
Conceptual paper  
40 Ruef, 2000 Where do organizational forms come from? 
 
Symbiosis and mutualism can help answer the above question. In 
particular, symbiotic relationships help new forms acquire legitimacy in 
three ways: 
 
a) the residual sociopolitical legitimation enjoyed by an emerging form 
due to prior collective action on the part of a predecessor form 
b) the residual cognitive legitimation enjoyed by an emerging form 
resulting from its ability to draw on the more highly crystallized identity 
of a predecessor form.  
c) a third dimension of the symbiotic relationship taps into benefits that 
are not tied to legitimacy per se, but rather to resource spillovers. 
 
This conceptualization captures the intuition 
that the probability of form emergence… 
 a) increases with carrying capacity and the 
legitimacy/resource spillover effect of having 
existing organizations with a similar identity 
but b) decreases when competition among 
existing organizations consumes much of the 
resources available to the potential form.  
 
Poisson regression 
41 Schopler, 
1987 
 
Inter-organizational groups as collectivities: 
Two dimensions are proposed for classifying such groups:  
 
a) Group origin (mandatory or voluntary) and  
b) Degree of externally imposed task structure (high or low) 
 
Expected development and outcomes of 
inter-organizational groups:  
 
1. Reliable compliance 
2. Frustrated vs. responsive 
3. Directed vs. inner conflict 
Conceptual paper 
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The paper further draws from the following literatures: 
-Open systems theory 
-Exchange theory 
-Small group theory 
 
4. Creative commitment 
 
42 Terreberry, 
1968 
Two hypotheses discussed: 
1. Org. change is increasingly externally induced and 
2. Org. adaptability is a function of the ability to learn and to perform 
according to changes in the environment. 
 
Links to other concepts such as “symbiotic 
marketing” that relate to co-evolution, co-
existence. 
Conceptual paper 
43 Van Valen, 
1973 
 
Red Queen hypothesis’s origins Red Queen introduced for the first time in 
this biology paper 
Conceptual paper  
44 Vermeij, 
1994 
Summarizes 3 main evolutionary theories:  a) Escalation, b) Coevolution, c) Red Queen 
 
Escalation: refers to the increase in species numbers due to their residence in relatively safe areas, away from enemies. 
Population movements therefore have positive effects, and selection occurs based only on external events such as climate 
change, tectonic movements etc. Escalation accepts that species might go extinct due to enemy’s killings too. 
Coevolution: strict or diffuse. Participants in coevolution can be competitors, mutual beneficiaries, predator and prey, or 
host and guest. The survival and reproduction of the two parties depends largely on interaction between them, than on 
other potential sources of selection outside the dyad.  
Red Queen: the environment constantly deteriorates, thus, the species has to constantly evolve only to avoid extinction. A 
more likely outcome of the model is to achieve a mutual adaptation stalemate, i.e. a situation where the only way to 
stimulate further evolution among the interacting species is through the introduction of changes in the rules that govern 
adaptive compromise.  
 
Conceptual paper 
45 Westphal and 
Zajac, 1997 
Major assumptions: 
-CEOs who have experienced a similar increase in board independence at 
their companies will export that to the firm in whose board they also sit.  
-The greater the proportion of CEOs on a board, the lower the likelihood 
of an increase in demographic distance between the CEO and the board 
-The greater the proportion of CEOs on a board, the lower the likelihood 
of a decrease in unrelated diversification 
 
Brings in the norm of reciprocity and social 
exchange theory to explain diffusion 
 
Event history analysis. 
Entropy measures on 
diversification used 
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Books  and Book Chapters 
No Authors Theoretical model and variables Data, findings and contributions 
1 Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2006 
Variation: 
-Intentional or blind 
Selection: 
-Externally or internally 
Retention: 
-Within or between organizations 
 
Units of analysis: 
-Routines and competencies (behavioral, cognitive regularities/properties) 
-Organizations 
-Populations/communities 
 
Community ecology definition: 
“A set of coevolving organizational populations joined by ties of 
commensalism and symbiosis through their orientation to a common 
technology, normative order or regulatory regime”. Thus, the historical 
period or place of their emergence is up to the researcher to define and are 
not part of the community official definition.  
 
Commensalism:  
full competition (-,-), partial competition (-,0), predatory competition (+,-) 
Neutrality (0,0), partial mutualism (+,0), full mutualism (+,+) 
Symbiosis (+,+) 
Dominance (through power and influence that emerge after the formation/ 
establishment of the community and its populations) 
 
Six theoretical perspectives related to evolutionary theory’s VSR: 
-Ecological, Institutional, Interpretive, Organizational Learning, 
Resource dependence, Transaction cost economics.  
 
The organizations and populations we observe at a given moment are 
not the “most fit” in any absolute sense. Rather, their forms reflect the 
historical path laid down by a meandering drift of accumulated and 
selectively retained variations 
  
How do communities emerge? 
1) Norms and values 
2) Laws and regulations 
3) Technological change 
 
Formation process: 
1) The role of entrepreneurs 
2) Funding sources 
3) Ecological nestedness 
 
“Supra-organizational legitimacy” 
1) Organizational efforts 
2) Cross-population actions (e.g. associations, media,) 
3) Laws and regulations (e.g. state-sponsored unions) 
 
2 Baum and 
Singh, 1994 
Coevolution:  
An organization that stimulates the evolution of another organization is, in 
turn, itself responsive to that evolution, and the response is predictable.  
 
Coevolution is linked to the Red Queen hypothesis, “especially in the 
early stages of a population’s growth when the legitimacy of the 
population itself is being established”  
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2 types: 
There is direct (between two populations) and diffuse (among many 
populations in a broader ecological community) coevolution. 
 
3 Hawley, 
1986 
Individual and ecosystem: 
Every human being requires access to environment 
Interdependence with other human beings is imperative 
Human beings are time-bound in a finite world 
Humans possess an inherent tendency to preserve and expand life to the 
maximum given prevailing conditions 
The intrinsic limitation on the human being’s behavioral variability is 
indeterminate.  
 
Human ecology paradigm: 
Adaptation proceeds through the formation of interdependences among 
members of a population 
System development continues to the maximum size and complexity 
afforded by transportation and communication  
New information increases the capacity for the movement of materials, 
people, messages until the enlarged capacity is used. 
  
4 Pianka, 
1994 
Coevolution refers to the joint evolution of two (or more) taxa that have 
close ecological relationships but do not exchange genes and in which 
reciprocal selective pressures operate to make the evolution of either taxon 
partially dependent on the evolution of the other. Thus, coevolution 
includes most of the various forms of population interaction, from 
competition to predation to mutualism. Coevolution can help organisms 
become strongly specialized on a single species or a few closely related 
species of plants.  
 
Interactions between populations: 
Competition (-,-) 
Predation (+,-) 
Neutralism (0,0) 
Mutualism/mimicry (+,+) 
Commensalism (+,0) 
Amensalism (-,0) 
 
Ecological equivalence: 
Organisms evolving independently of one another under similar 
environmental conditions that respond to similar selective pressures with 
identical adaptations, that end up occupying the same niches in different 
communities.  
Key concepts examined: 
-Resource acquisition and allocation 
-Evolution, natural selection and speciation 
-Vital statistics of populations: demography 
-Population growth and regulation 
-Interactions between populations (mutualism, commensalism) 
-Predation and parasitism (and coevolution) 
-Community and ecosystem ecology (ecological equivalence, 
pseudocommunities) 
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5 Rao, 2006 Define communities: 
We have core and peripheral organizational features (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984) 
a) Core: stated goals, authority relations, core technology, market strategy. 
b) Peripheral: number and size of subunits, number of levels in authority 
structures,  span of control, interlocking directories, patterns of 
communication, strategic alliances) 
 
Generally repeats the definitions and the characteristics of community 
formation that Aldrich & Ruef (2006) have used.  
 
Symbiosis vs. Commensalism and their subcategories are the main types of 
communities exactly, as Aldrich again.  
 
Connections in hierarchical levels: Downward causation (all processes at 
the lower level depend on higher levels), and upward causation (upper 
levels depend on lower levels) 
 
Neutrality: 
Neutrality is not a absence of interactions but an evolved set of 
interactions that eliminates competitive effects that might otherwise 
occur between populations of organizations.  
 
Coevolution: 
The joint evolution of two or more populations that have close 
ecological relationships but do not exchange genes and in which 
reciprocal selective pressures operate to make the evolution of either 
partially dependent on the evolution of the other.  
Reciprocal coevolution ≠ mutual causation. “Rapid coevolution” can 
alter the nature of the ecological interactions in favor of both 
populations 
 
6 Rosenkopf 
and 
Tushman, 
1994 
Technological Communities dynamics: 
1. Actors e.g., research labs, paten agencies, professional societies, trade 
associations, regulatory bodies. These act and interact spurring the 
evolution of technological systems. 
2. Linkages, i.e. interdependence among actors. 
3. Power, because actors differ in their abilities to shape and influence the 
paths of technological change.  
 
Technology and organization coevolve and this process of coevolution is 
characterized by periods of social construction and periods of 
technological determinism 
7 Scott, 2008 Critique on Astley & Van de Ven’s (1983) community ecology: 
 
“In contrast to population ecologists who emphasized competitive 
processes among similar organizations, community ecologists pointed out 
that communities of organizations could develop structures that were 
mutually beneficial”.  
 
Sees as a limitation of Astley’s work its tendency to focus more on 
colocation than on functional interdependence, with the effect that 
Colocation ≠ Functional interdependence within communities 
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important connections and exchanges among organizations outside the 
spatial boundaries of the community were ignored.  
 
8 Van de Ven 
and Garud, 
1994 
Why and how are technological innovations developed and 
commercialized? 
1. VRS as a continuous and gradual process, 
2. Punctuated equilibrium (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) 
 
“Technological discontinuity” is also a factor that renews the novelty-
creation cycle.  
The authors believe that these perspectives do not capture well the 
origins of novelty (≈variation). Therefore, they argue that evolutionary, 
VRS processes are better viewed as a cumulative progression of 
numerous interrelated acts of variation, selection and retention over an 
extended period of time.   
 
A better understanding of the process of novelty can be obtained when 
the evolutionary concepts of VRS are defined as micro-events or 
individual events, rather than as macro-stages of evolution. 
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Appendix 10.3: Quantitative Data Coding: all variables 1993-2007 
No Variable 
name 
Description 
 
Panel variables 
1 uniid ID number of university used in the panel 
2 year Time period in the panel 
University and spinoff variables 
3 public Number of university publications 
4 avpublic Average number of publications per 1,000 full-time students 
5 rank Position in the Sunday Times university guide rankings (reputation) 
6 nobel Cumulative number of university Nobel Prizes (status) 
7 med Number of articles in the UK press that refer to both the university and the name of 
a spinoff 
8 cummed Cumulative number of articles in the UK press for each university and its spinoffs 
as above 
9 avmed Average number of articles in the UK press (by number of spinoffs) in a 
university’s portfolio 
10 allmed Cumulative number of articles in the UK press of all other universities in the 
population (excluding the focal one) and their spinoff firms yearly 
11 ipo Cumulative number of spinoffs that have experienced an IPO by university 
12 outs Cumulative number of outsourcing agreements with private companies to exploit a 
university’s IP 
13 unico Year of joining UNICO and years of experience with them thereafter. Used 
decreasing ratio of 0,8 for each year that passes after an exit from UNICO to denote 
decreasing importance of experience 
14 age Number of years since university founding (or conversion to university status for 
former polytechnics) 
15 lnage The natural logarithm of “age” 
16 size The number of university full time students 
17 lnsize The natural logarithm of “size” 
18 neta Membership in the Russell Group university network. Dummy variable 
19 netb Membership in the 1994 Group university network. Dummy variable 
20 netc Membership in the Million+ university network. Dummy variable 
21 netd Membership in the University Alliance university network. Dummy variable 
22 netaexp Cumulative years of experience in the Russell Group university network 
23 netbexp Cumulative years of experience in the 1994 Group university network 
24 netcexp Cumulative years of experience in the Million+ university network 
25 netdexp Cumulative years of experience in the University Alliance university network 
26 ttoexp TTO office age expressed in cumulative years 
27 ttoa TTO structure as a wholly-owned limited company. Dummy variable 
28 ttob TTO structure as a department within the university. Dummy variable 
29 ttoc TTO structure as department within a university. Dummy variable  
30 ttod TTO structure as Public Limited Company. Dummy variable 
31 spfirst Dummy variable measuring the year that a university created its first spinoff 
company 
32 spno Number of spinoffs formed each year 
33 spbio Number of spinoffs in: biotechnology, dental, chemistry, chemicals, food sciences, 
agriculture 
34 speng Number of spinoffs in: engineering, architecture, computing, construction, 
electronics and electrical engineering, automotive, energy, manufacturing, forestry 
and logging, fuel cells, healthcare equipment, material sciences, nanotechnology, 
physics, software, technology, telecommunications, testing devices, other 
technology 
35 spserv Number of spinoffs in: consulting, educational services, environmental services, 
financial services, lifestyle, market research, media, psychology, publishing, 
transportation, catering, archaeology, other services, other business activities 
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36 spjoint Number of joint spinoffs formed based on IP from more than one universities 
37 splive Cumulative number of university spinoffs alive at any year 
38 spdead Cumulative number of spinoffs that have stopped operating at any year 
39 spasset Total assets of all spinoffs by a university 
40 lnspasset The natural logarithm of spasset 
41 sprev Total revenues of all spinoffs by a university 
42 lnsprev The natural logarithm of sprev 
43 fukind University funding from the UK industry 
44 avfukind Average UK industry funding per university full-time student (divided by university 
size) 
45 ffees University funding from student fees 
46 avffees Average fees funding per university full-time student (divided by university size) 
47 fendow University funding from endowments 
48 avfendow Average endowment funding per university full-time student (divided by university 
size) 
49 rgtotal UK government recurrent grants, total figure 
50 avrgtotal Average UK government recurrent grants (total figure) per university full-time 
student (divided by university size) 
51 rgres UK government recurrent grants for research and technology transfer 
52 avrgres Average UK government recurrent grants for research and technology transfer per 
university full-time student (divided by university size) 
53 rgteach UK government recurrent grants for teaching 
54 avrgteach Average UK government recurrent grants for teaching per university full-time 
student (divided by university size) 
55 nmrc Number of Medical Research Council awards 
56 fmrc Total funding from Medical Research Council 
57 nbbsrc Number of BBSRC awards 
58 fbbsrc Total funding from BBSRC 
59 nepsrc Number of EPSRC awards 
60 fepsrc Total funding from EPSRC 
61 nesrc Number of ESRC awards 
62 fesrc Total funding from ESRC 
63 ncouncil Number of awards from all four UK research councils 
64 fcouncil Total funding from all four UK research councils 
65 avfcouncil Average total funding from all four UK research councils per university full-time 
student (divided by university size) 
66 nnesta Number of NESTA awards 
67 fnesta Total funding from NESTA 
Institutional variables 
68 gdp Gross Domestic Product by region 
69 rd R&D investment from private industry by region 
Interactions 
70 coh1 Cohort 1 refers to years 1993-1999. Dummy variable 
71 coh2 Cohort 2 refers to years 2000-2004. Dummy variable 
72 coh3 Cohort 3 refers to years 2005-2008. Dummy variable 
73 unitop Universities where ranking<30. Dummy variable 
74 unibot Universities where ranking>30. Dummy variable 
75 geogdp Regional development in terms of GDP combined with the size of the university 
that is located in an area 
76 geord Regional development in terms of R&D combined with the size of the university 
that is located in an area 
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Appendix 10.4: Qualitative Data Coding 
 ID Codes Interview 1 
London South Bank 
University  
Interview 2  
University College 
London 
Interview 3 
Oxford University  
Interview 4 
Surrey University  
Interview 5 
Strathclyde 
University  
Interview 6 
Edinburgh 
University  
D
em
o
gr
ap
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cs
 
D1  No of 
spinoffs 14 76 68 31 55 59 
D2  First spinoff 1999 1984 1963 1981 1977 1967 
D3  TTO staff 10 42 (inc. 15 business 
managers) 52 9 40 70 (+3 part-time) 
D4  Location London London England England Scotland Scotland 
D5 Specializa-tion KTPs Licensing/Spinoff Licensing/Spinoff 
Licensing/Spinoff/ 
KTPs 
Licensing/Spinoff/ 
KTPs Spinoffs 
D6 Research budget, 2007 £3.41m £94.34m £119.60m £48.11m £33.80m £68.28m 
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D7 TTO 
structure 
The other thing with 
this office is that it’s 
complicated: there is 
research, enterprise 
and spinoffs... 
...we are one of the 
few TTOs that is 
completely 
independent from the 
university in terms of 
funding... 
 
...we fund ourselves 
from the profits we 
make and we are in a 
point now where we 
can carry on 
indefinitely... 
ISIS is structured into 
three main business 
units: One 
technology transfer, 
the other consulting 
which is helping 
academics consult the 
third parties, and the 
third business unit is 
ISIS Enterprise 
which is selling 
consultancy services.  
 ...one is getting new 
spinoffs formed and 
funded, and that can 
involve the business 
planning, the 
funding, putting 
commercial 
management in place, 
mentoring the 
academics... The 
other half is to 
manage the 
university’s 
relationship as a 
shareholder... 
 
Some universities 
will set up a new 
company to do that 
activity, wholly 
owned or a 
subsidiary, whereas 
ours is part of the 
university structure, 
we are part of the 
university... 
 
No data available  
D
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101  Accidental 
emergence 
So if we didn’t have a 
strategy back in the 
90s, we do have a 
strategy now! 
...[in] a lot of UK 
universities... there 
isn’t anyone in 
specific recruited to do 
tech-transfer but if you 
are in research and 
administration you 
might be asked to do it 
as part of your job... 
 
I don’t think it was a 
 ...once it is embedded 
within the university, 
the universities 
learned there were 
spinoff benefits to 
that particular 
activity and were 
then prepared to back 
it without being 
pushed... 
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conscious decision 
from the part of the 
university to follow, I 
think it happened 
because of the 
circumstances at the 
time... 
 
...they had a small 
group run my Mr X 
pretty much on his 
own that did spinoffs 
and all the licensing 
was done within the 
Contracts Research 
Office... 
102 Income 
shortages 
But it coincided with 
reducing funds for 
universities as well. 
They had started 
looking around for 
money to support 
their research or try 
to do something else. 
So it must have 
stemmed from the 
1980’s... 
 ...all universities are 
cash-strapped 
themselves... 
   
103 Research 
capacity and 
prior 
exposure to 
commercial 
activities 
(naturalistic 
emergence) 
It also depends on 
what they do within a 
university obviously, 
and it’s all driven by 
the academics (what 
their expertise is, 
what research they 
do) because a lot of 
what we do stems 
from original 
research so if the 
  Originally the TTO 
was much more 
focused on IP than on 
commercialisation 
and then it gradually 
evolved... it’s a 
continuous process – 
it didn’t start and 
stop, it was 
continuous. 
 
...this office now has 
nearly 40 people, 
whereas when we 
started (1984) it had 
only 2 or 3. It helps 
to know that ours 
grew organically, 
whereas others had 
almost 40-50 people 
almost overnight... 
 
In the first 
instance, most 
company formation 
support was 
provided through 
what we used to 
call our Business 
Development 
teams...  
 
Basically, we had 
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university is good at 
winning research 
grants then it has 
more people, it can 
generate more 
business ideas etc. 
 
...we are much lower 
in the RAE scores 
than Imperial or UCL 
simply because we 
don’t have the 
research capacity... 
...they had more 
research base to 
commercialise - 
Cambridge has a 
huge number of 
people and 
connections around 
the world and their 
name... 
...the emphasis in 
Strathclyde has 
always been on 
applied research... 
 
One thing is that we 
started sooner than 
others. It’s also the 
culture of 
commercialisation 
here at Strathclyde, I 
mean the original 
Principle of the 
university, Sir 
Graham Hill... 
commercial people 
and they did 
licensing, they did 
commercial 
research contracts, 
and an academic 
who wanted to set 
up a company they 
did their best. 
 
There was a lot of 
ad-hoc company 
formation... 
104 Government 
incentives 
Since 2000 along 
came funds form 
HEIF and so all these 
offices have 
expanded. 
 
It was a government 
initiative to generate 
more tech-transfer 
from universities and 
to enable universities 
develop an income 
based on their 
expertise.  
 
What we do is not 
about money. What 
we do is all in order 
to support tech-
transfer because it is 
driven by 
government and the 
need for business. 
...as the government 
got more and more 
involved in pushing 
commercialisation as 
an activity that 
universities should do 
(I think partly to get 
themselves into 
funding) then there 
was more and more 
money available to do 
it... 
 
...there was HEIF 
money, the London 
Development Agency 
and the regional 
development agencies, 
then we had more 
funding to actually set 
up large Technology 
Transfer Offices... 
...what Margaret 
Thatcher did back in 
the late 1980s which 
didn’t allow BTG 
then to have the 
monopoly on 
technology... 
 
HEIF actually came 
later. There were 
things before like the 
biotechnology 
exploitation, there 
were business 
incubation schemes 
to help spinoffs, there 
was the University 
Challenge Funds in 
the late 90s.  
 
 
...on the one hand 
you have the 
government through 
the various funding 
supporting the RAE 
saying this is how 
you judge academics 
and you have another 
piece of the 
government saying 
that we actually want 
to promote 
commercialization 
  
...a lot of this in the 
past was driven by 
government policy 
and of course there 
was money attached 
to it, so people bid 
for the money in 
ways that attract the 
money. 
We do get proposals 
from academics 
saying, “oh, look how 
many sources of 
funding I can get” 
like the Smart 
Awards... and we 
would say “No, you 
won’t, you’ll get 
some commercial 
value to your 
proposal as well – 
there’s got to be a 
proper business plan, 
there’s got to be 
evidence of 
commercial need...” 
 
But a lot of our 
spinoffs still come 
from the Proof of 
Concept scheme and 
in some cases we get 
Our incubation 
business is not very 
much affected by 
the Scottish 
Executive (SE)...  
 
But... the Proof of 
Concept is 
potentially a 
substantial research 
award into the 
schools to pursue 
commercial deals... 
 
Now, none of that 
money has come 
from the SE as of 
yet.  
 237 
 
...even before HEIF, 
the funding schemes 
were made to support 
the community not 
just to make money... 
 
...the 1988 Patents 
Act that states that an 
IP generated by a 
full-time employee 
belongs to the 
employer... 
 
When we first 
started, the aim was 
to follow the 
government’s ideas – 
third leg funding, 
let’s get as much 
income as we can... 
 
The HEIF funds (we 
are going into round 
4) have been 
instrumental in 
helping set up the TT 
offices and 
commercialisation 
 
I think it was more of 
an evolution that 
legislative. You 
know, the 
government created 
the climate, the 
climate said we’ll 
become more 
independent and so 
we are further on the 
road than most other 
Europeans. 
a couple of hundred 
thousands from that 
source. 
 
...we have received 
help from the 
University Challenge 
Fund and the Synergy 
Fund... 
105 Industry 
reasons 
I think a lot of it 
came from big 
industries which 
began to cut costs 
and close their R&D 
and started using 
universities’. They 
were looking for 
new, original 
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research... 
106 U.S.A. 
influence 
 ...I think the UK and 
Europe have seen 
more what the US 
have done... 
Obviously the 
university has some 
links to some US 
universities and 
schools but I don’t 
think that impacts us.  
 
...we do speak with 
other big TTOs in the 
US but nothing more 
than really personal 
relationships.  
Would we be 
influenced by roles 
models? Yes but 
mostly from the US, 
not Europe. We 
probably in those 
days are looking to 
the US or the 
Oxbridges and those 
that are further along 
the path... 
Most of what we hear 
about them is second 
hand.  
 
...most of the things 
they tell us are things 
we already know, so I 
don’t think it’s 
rocket-science as 
they say... 
We pinched that 
strategy from, I 
think it was 
Stanford or MIT, 
where we insisted 
on a non-dilutable 
equity stake... 
107 University 
reputation 
...there may be 
competition but the 
less research-
intensive could never 
catch up with 
Imperial.  
...we have top-class 
research, RAE 5* 
departments (the 
majority of them), 
we’ve got Nobel Prize 
winners, leaders in all 
sorts of research fields 
and obviously that 
helps... 
 
 
    
108 Regional 
development 
policies 
it’s all about the 
impact of regional 
strategies on 
technology transfer 
and business 
development... 
 
There’s four proof-
of-concept funds in 
London for university 
pre-commercial 
funding so that 
impacts on spinoffs... 
 
 The regional 
development 
agencies care about 
whether we create 
jobs for the local 
economy but do the 
project managers 
think “Gosh, I’ve got 
to spin this company 
out instead of 
licensing it because it 
will create jobs”? No 
they don’t! 
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It’s all about how 
universities can 
improve and bring 
London together in 
terms of “this is what 
London has” 
...if you compare the 
Oxford cluster vs. the 
Cambridge cluster in 
areas, the Oxford 
cluster is very much 
home-grown...  
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201 Revenue/ 
income 
 
But I mean we have 
centres in the 
university, one of 
them is the food 
centre, which is 
supported by income 
from commercial 
activities... 
 
...one of our earliest 
[spinoffs] is still 
going and making 
money – not 
astronomical amounts 
of money but making 
to pay back dividends 
for the university... 
 
This universities 
brings in more money 
from KTPs which 
you could argue are 
much more useful in 
the generation of 
business and GDP 
than spinoffs have.  
 
What we do is not 
about money.  
...we are trying to get 
most of the equity at 
the beginning because 
we invest our own 
money... 
 
...in terms of income, 
we probably got more 
income from licensing 
than we got from 
spinoffs... 
 
...I think we sell one of 
our spinoffs every 
three years and we 
normally expect an 
income of about £10m 
for each sale... 
 
...what we are trying to 
do with spinoffs is get 
the money from the 
equity sale but we also 
have licenses to sell so 
we have an ongoing 
revenue stream... 
 
...it’s maybe 50-60% 
licensing and the rest 
is spinoffs... 
...what happens is 
revenues that comes 
to ISIS, ISIS takes 
30% and the rest is 
sent down to the 
university and they 
divide it according to 
their structure... 
 
So we don’t make a 
profit – everything 
we get we send 
straight down to the 
university.  
...the university isn’t 
so much bothered 
about the income 
generation, not any 
more... 
 
...even the best 
universities in the 
world like MIT do 
not earn more than 
3% of their entire 
budget from their 
commercialisation 
activities... 
 
...if you really look at 
Surrey, to contribute 
1% of the budget 
here and there, isn’t 
in commercial terms 
material to the 
survival of the 
university... 
 
...you get a nice 
spinoff then you sell 
it every 2-3 years, 
you can’t run it for an 
annual budget 
though. We try to 
look upon these 
windfall gains as 
The 
commercialization 
office here is not for 
the purpose of 
generating income 
for the university - 
we regard that some 
kind of a bonus, 
rather than the reason 
we are here.  
...excluding sort of 
two or three star 
players, that 
doesn’t create an 
awful lot of return 
for the university.  
 
...appearing in a 
“field” publication 
for venture 
capitalists or angels 
is even more 
important. It is 
practically more 
important! 
 
It’s important that 
people know that, 
to attract 
entrepreneurs, 
management 
teams, investors... 
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useful for doing 
things that you 
wouldn’t normally be 
able to do... 
 
The benefits in cash 
terms are always 
much less that the 
headline figures 
because of sharing it 
with the academics. 
 
It’s not so much a 
government thing, 
it’s a Research 
Council thing. The 
government gives 
money to Research 
Councils and these 
are then responsible 
for giving out the 
money.  
202 Risks  ...a spinoff, is a 
higher-risk, higher-
return investment... 
 
...if it goes down then 
we lose a lot of money 
and we’re still in 
control if we still hold 
the majority of the 
equity so we’ll then 
have to sort it out... 
bring a receiver or an 
administrator... 
 
    
203 Outsourcing 
agreements 
...we don’t have 
enough IP but yeah 
Organisations such as 
IP Group that have 
IP Group put in £20m 
to make a new 
...you ended up 
creating spinoffs 
We felt that they 
would put pressure to 
We don’t like the 
IP Group and we 
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we would talk to 
people, we would 
consider 
[outsourcing] if we 
thought it was 
beneficial.  
gone in and done deals 
with the universities 
have helped (whether 
it’s a good thing for 
the universities is 
another question) but 
it has made more 
companies spun out or 
get listed so they are 
much more in the 
public eye... 
chemistry building... 
 
The other one we 
have is with 
Technikos which is 
very similar to the IP 
Group deal. So it 
doesn’t affect how 
we commercialise 
things. 
perhaps but they were 
a little bit unready 
and most of them 
tended to be 
undercapitalised and 
with the wrong 
management team 
but when IP Group 
came on board we 
now have a different 
character within the 
TTO... 
 
They have a whole 
range of contacts in 
the marketplace for 
creating a high-
quality spinoff with 
the right management 
team, the right level 
of capitalisation to 
take it to the next 
stage. 
 
...they help us with 
due diligence, even 
with what might end 
up being a licensing 
opportunity because 
in order to determine 
whether they want to 
use it as a spinoff, 
they do all the due 
diligence. 
 
...so six and a half 
months with a market 
capitalisation of 
focus on winners and 
the day to day input 
and reliance on the 
funds is something 
we weren’t 
comfortable with...  
refused it.  
 
We wanted to put 
in place a fund 
similar to the IP 
group but it would 
have the first right 
to look, not the first 
right to refuse.  
 
There may be 
perfectly good 
reasons for IP 
Group to decline to 
invest in a 
particular 
proposition 
because they are 
exposed already to 
a particular sector 
and they don’t 
want more 
exposure... 
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£70m and they raised 
£30m in cash. And 
there is absolutely no 
way that this 
university (and I 
would argue any 
university) would 
have done this 
without someone like 
the IP Group. 
 
204 Negatives  I think it’s 
increasingly hard if 
you are an academic to 
teach, to raise money, 
to get grants, to be 
involved in reviewing 
other people’s papers, 
to make sure you keep 
a publications record 
and then, on top of 
that, for us to ask them 
help us write patents, 
to help with doing 
contract research... 
 
Some are ambivalent, 
some just think it’s 
wrong to 
commercialise basic 
academic research and 
some are very pro-
doing research... 
 
 Negative effects? To 
be honest I don’t 
know. I don’t think 
so. Did we lose 
anything that I can 
point to? Not really... 
...there was an 
academic who left to 
manage a spinoff 
company and as a 
result... research 
teams can break up in 
the relevant 
department of 
faculty... 
 
Some spinoffs had to 
be set up and occupy 
space within the 
university and they 
needed particularly 
lab space etc. 
 
Some conflicts of 
interest have to be 
carefully managed 
and sometimes they 
cause friction.  
 
205 Metrics ...universities were 
measured by number 
of patents they apply 
for and the number of 
...it’s the long-term 
growth of the spinoffs 
rather than just the 
number... 
Back in the late 90s 
the measurements 
were very numerical 
so “how many 
Number of spinoffs, 
no! So the long-term 
growth... our only 
involvement is that is 
We would highlight 
the level of licensing 
particularly to the 
pharmaceuticals and 
So, I think a 
volume approach 
to company 
formation is not 
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spinoffs, not whether 
the patents went 
anywhere or were 
licensed or whether 
the spinoffs were 
good at all! 
 
...there was pressure 
from the government 
and they wanted to see 
how many spinoffs 
you’ve set up - the fact 
is you can set up a 
spinoff in a week if 
you want it... 
 
 
academics have you 
met”, “how many 
patents have you 
filed”... 
 
 
has the right base to 
start with... but the 
long-term growth has 
nothing to do with 
us... 
 
So fewer numbers, 
better capitalised, 
better quality, better 
management, yes! 
the 40+ spinoff 
companies we have 
formed and the jobs 
that they have 
created.  
dissimilar to 
portfolio approach 
over shares...  
206 Networking 
with other 
universities 
...competition right 
now is less 
important... and 
instead they [we] 
look more to 
collaboration.  
 
 
  ...we get involved in 
the incubation of 
companies through 
the partnership 
between Surrey, 
Southampton, Bath 
and Bristol for the 
furtherance of the 
incubation... 
 
...those four 
universities decided 
that they would be 
able to attract more 
funds by putting 
together a 
collaborative bid 
where we needed 
some momentum, 
some critical mass... 
 So there is a [cross-
university] 
collaboration there; 
it’s a top-down 
collaboration in 
many respects... 
 
But the 
collaboration in the 
truer sense isn’t 
really there as 
much as it was in 
the past! 
207 Holding 
equity in 
spinoffs 
It used to be 25% but 
now we keep it under 
24%... 
 
...in a spinoff the 
academic will 
initially be able to 
 Oxford also cares 
about the fact that it 
has stakes in those 
companies and often 
quite big equity 
stakes - we have 
people looking after 
The university is not 
in the business of 
being a shareholder 
in external 
companies. So the 
university will exit 
when it feels it to be 
It’s our policy that 
where the initial 
value is entirely 
based on university 
IP we would seek 
20% after seed 
funding.  
...the university is 
always inclined to 
own an equity 
stake, and that 
equity stake is 
essentially differed 
royalty.  
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take the majority of 
the equity... 
companies where we 
have a stake in.  
appropriate. 
 
The university’s 
objective is to hold 
the shareholding for a 
realistic, reasonable 
amount of time to 
allow the company to 
become stable, 
profitable and then 
generally speaking 
probably to take an 
exit and concentrate 
on something else... 
 
We never look for a 
majority shareholding 
but we always seek a 
significant minority 
shareholding. 
 
Our view is that we 
are entitled to a stake 
given all the support 
that we provide... If 
we go about it in the 
right way, investors 
will see it as a 
positive sign. Some 
are a bit nervous 
about it... 
 
There is typically 
an equity stake in a 
newco of about 
15%... 
208 Role models ...the real model of 
what should be done 
in the pathways is 
King’s College.  
 
...if you look at the 
reports on 
commercial activities 
you know... Oxford, 
Cambridge, Imperial 
are top of the scale.  
 
...there is a lot that 
we can learn from all 
the universities... 
  Would we be 
influenced by roles 
models? Yes but 
mostly from the US, 
not Europe. We 
probably in those 
days are looking to 
the US or the 
Oxbridges and those 
that are further along 
the path... 
Probably the ones 
who have the best 
track records are 
Edinburgh (it has the 
biggest research 
base)... 
 
In England you hear 
about Oxford and 
Cambridge and, 
obviously, Imperial... 
 
I think it’s fair to say 
that other schools 
have come to us, to 
learn from us. I 
mean, there are 
offices that are run by 
people who started 
their careers here... 
 
209 Further   We also help attract   one of the 
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research 
funding 
further research 
funding for the 
university... A lot of 
it is from the 
industry.  
problems is if we 
have shares in the 
company that has 
spun out of 
engineering and 
sell the shares and 
reinvest the money 
in the informatics, 
then what happens 
when we sell the 
company from 
informatics? 
 
 
210 Strategy ...it’s not only one 
person, the academic 
or the person sitting 
here (and supporting 
it with IP or thinking 
of ways to take it), 
it’s also the support 
from the rest of the 
university, the 
finance, so the 
learning and the 
willingness which 
can come right from 
the top, the Vice 
Chancellor. 
 
...we have a very 
good course here 
called engineering 
and product design.  
 
 ...we are structured 
into three main 
business units: One 
technology transfer, 
the other consulting 
and the third business 
unit is ISIS 
Enterprise... 
 
...the university now 
has a solid 
commitment which 
without doubt has 
been one of the 
things that has 
allowed ISIS to grow 
compared to other 
tech-transfers.  
 Well, we’ve always 
taken the view that 
we should set the bar 
very high and we try 
to ensure that our 
spinoffs have the 
necessary cash for at 
least 18 months and 
that they have a 
strong management 
team.  
...there is an 
inevitable synergy 
between the 
companies formed 
and the university, 
because they come 
from here, and 
that’s the important 
thing. And that’s 
why we are not 
particularly 
focused on 
spinoffs. 
 
That’s what started 
creating growth in 
the sector and it 
became apparent 
that universities 
had a great 
opportunity.., an 
untapped 
resource... 
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301 Public 
awareness 
...media coverage is 
good, we have a 
bulletin that goes out 
to all the staff – we 
put our things on our 
internal web pages 
and people can read 
them if they want to... 
...[media] has 
increased awareness I 
think with the public 
that we do commercial 
deals and that is 
something good... 
 
It used to be accepted 
that universities were 
publicly-funded and 
now it has become 
more and more 
obvious that that was 
never fully the case... 
 
... in the late 90s or 
early 2000’s it was 
probably still 
regarded as, well, the 
oddballs go to tech-
transfer, they don’t 
really know what 
they want to do – 
don’t quite want to be 
an academic but 
don’t want to be in 
the industry... 
 
 
...the early criticism 
as I said was about 
the use of public 
funds. I think the 
climate has changed, 
nobody raises that in 
a serious public 
forum anymore... 
...the public 
recognises that we 
are not Ivory Towers 
who are kind of cut-
off from the 
communities within 
which they are based.  
 
So star companies 
tried to advertise 
themselves.., it would 
certainly add value to 
the university.  
I think there’s 
always been an 
interest although it 
never went to the 
front pages.  
 
So it is forming 
public opinion, yes. 
302 Recruitment 
of 
students/staff 
or research 
collaboration  
 ...if you are a student 
and you want to apply 
to a particular applied 
area in science or 
business and you go to 
a university where 
they do commercial 
activities then it is 
more likely to want to 
go there than to a 
university that 
doesn’t... 
 
...students are 
probably much more 
aware now of what 
UCL does and might 
want to come to UCL 
over and above other 
universities... 
 
...and when the 
...because they also 
use it to attract 
research and 
researchers who have 
perhaps been 
thinking of coming to 
the UK to take up a 
post will come and 
see me first.  
 
I’ve had some 
lectures who come 
here, I had one a 
couple of months ago 
and he came here 
first to talk through 
what we do in tech-
transfer.  
 
They’ve all got PhDs 
[at the TTO] 
People who want to 
work in space come 
to Surrey because it 
has a good space 
centre and a big 
spinoff company that 
comes with it and 
within that part of the 
academic fraternity 
we are well known 
for that... 
 
 
I’d like to think that it 
figures at the 
perception of 
Strathclyde as a 
university, and 
maybe some 
postgraduates do take 
that into account 
when they decide to 
come here.  
I think often 
researchers are 
focused on what 
they are doing 
and... I mean there 
are examples of 
joint research but... 
but that’s very 
occasional... 
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students get better then 
the better post-docs 
you get... the better 
teachers you get 
because they like the 
calibre students that 
you have. The whole 
thing snowballs and 
you end up with a 
much better university 
that is more profitable, 
has more students, can 
charge more and you 
get more industry 
contracts... 
 
We have had people 
who came to work 
here because of the 
commercial 
opportunities and 
professors who have 
moved their whole 
group from their 
universities... 
 
303 Reputation And if we never 
make any money 
from our 
entrepreneurial 
students they have 
brought us so much 
positive media 
coverage that is is 
fantastic. 
 
I don’t think it 
necessarily impacts (I 
...there was a press 
release about that 
company and we 
always try to get them 
to put down the fact 
that it was a UCL 
company... 
 
...are we going to 
spin-out something 
that we would see as 
a totally unethical 
company? No! We 
care deeply about the 
university’s 
reputation... 
 
I don’t really think 
[media] has had 
much of an effect 
...commercialisa-tion 
if used correctly and 
marketed correctly 
can be a wonderful 
incentive for 
attracting good 
quality undergraduate 
students, 
postgraduate students 
and it gives the 
university a certain 
profile within the 
I do my best to make 
sure we still get 
credit for them (the 
“glory”) because if a 
company is turning 
over several billion 
pounds and is 
employing 60-70-80 
people then you still 
want the world to 
know that you started 
it... 
Six-seven years 
ago they got caught 
up in the politics of 
what people did 
discussing whether 
universities were 
being too greedy...  
 
So all these things 
get press interest 
and the university 
tries to make the 
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Notes:  
Domain 1= Rationale behind decision to engage in spinoff formation 
Domain 2= Measuring success/benefits of spinoffs 
Domain 3= Media coverage of spinoffs 
think it’s good) on 
the rest of the 
university – it 
impacts us as a 
department because it 
raises our profile as 
an important entity 
within the 
university... 
 
About Time Design 
was the guy that went 
on the Dragon’s Den 
and he was offered 
money and he turned 
it down. And the 
following weeks the 
phone didn’t stop 
ringing with people 
wanting to invest.  
because if you look at 
it a lot of the media 
coverage on tech-
transfer is negative.  
 
One thing this does is 
it raises the profile of 
Oxford, then, for 
example we’ve just 
done a big deal on 
T.V. which means... 
there hasn’t been a 
new TB vaccine since 
1921, so you know... 
marketplace... 
 
And good 
commercialisation or 
doing things for the 
community or simply 
selling a company is 
something that can 
turn into a public 
relation story. 
 
...depending on how 
much is going on, the 
local newspapers will 
report it. At the 
moment there is no 
shortage of business 
stories but we have 
done even better at 
other times.... 
most of that... In 
terms of day-to-day 
stuff, it tends to go 
to the business 
pages, and gets 
reported in a very 
factual way... 
